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 I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at     
them, nor to hate them, but to understand them. 
    Baruch Spinoza 
 
 
 
   I'm always asking questions - not to find 'answers,' but to see     
where the questions lead. Dead ends sometimes? That's fine. 
New directions? Interesting. Great insights? Over-ambitious. 
     A glimpse here and there? Perfect. 
                                 Lesley Hazleton 
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Abstract 
 
            Moral identity, which is based on moral concerns, is one of the many types of 
identities that an individual may have. In recent literature, spanning the period from 
the 1980s to the present - including the work of the prominent researcher into moral 
identity, Blasi, and Aquino and Reed, who developed their widely used moral identity 
scale in 2000 - there has been a persistent assumption that fairness and caring, or the 
individualising moral foundations, comprise the entire contents of moral identity. 
However, it is well documented that broader cultural differences are considered to 
have a clear effect on individuals, as cultures vary in the degree to which their norms, 
values and beliefs influence individual identities. Despite this, no published studies 
have explored moral identity with respect to culture. Thus, in this thesis, I argued that 
culture influences people’s moral identity, and that we need to consider and expect 
more moral variation between people across different cultures. I aimed here to develop 
an understanding of the importance of culture influence on moral identity in two 
cultural contexts, those of Britain and Saudi Arabia.    
            In Study 1 (n=160), I employed the prototype approach, and my results show 
that traits related to fairness/reciprocity and care/harm were prototypical of the concept 
of a moral person among both the British and Saudi participants. Meanwhile, respect, 
as well as traits related to religiousness, were prototypical of the concept of a moral 
person in only the Saudi sample. In Study 2, (n = 539), participants from each culture 
were randomly assigned one of six conditions where they completed moral identity 
measures. In each condition, participants were presented either with a person 
characterised by the exact moral traits listed in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral 
identity scale, or with a person characterised by moral traits represent one of the five 
moral foundations. Also, for each condition, the moral traits important in the 
participants’ own culture were examined. The results showed large differences 
between the British and Saudi samples with regard to three moral foundations: in-
group/loyalty; authority/respect and purity/sanctity, all three of which relate to binding 
concerns. These differences were mediated by the perceived cultural importance of 
these traits in each sample, particularly the binding traits. In Study 3 (n=938), I 
developed a novel moral identity scale and tested it for its reliability and validity in 
overcoming the shortcomings of previous scales used to measure moral identity, 
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particularly the overlooked element of cultural variations in morality. Finally, in Study 
4 (n=496), and given that there is an assumption in the literature that moral identity 
which is based on the individualising moral foundations (particularly caring and 
fairness) has always pro-social implications. I argued in this study that when we 
expand our understanding of moral identity to include the long-overlooked binding 
moral approach (e.g., authority, purity, in-group loyalty), moral identity may relate to 
negative attitudes toward out-groups. The results supported the idea that we need not 
take for granted that moral identity contributes to a reduction in prejudice. The results 
also indicated that the new moral identity scale is better than Aquino and Reed’s (2002) 
moral identity scale in its ability to predict prejudice attitudes.  
           Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the contents of moral identity are more 
diverse than has been assumed in the moral identity research. In addition, the results 
indicate that there is a need to be mindful of a dark side to moral identity that is often 
neglected, specifically when we, as researchers, recognise and include various moral 
concerns in the conceptualisation and measurements of moral identity. 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the Stage for the Thesis 
 
                   [B]eing a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral 
                  issues (Taylor, 1989, p.112). 
 
          In this chapter, I will describe the background and the aim of the present thesis. 
I will then elaborate on the idea of ethnocentrism in psychology.  This will be followed 
by a discussion of the thesis’ approach to investigating moral identity cross –culturally. 
Lastly, I will provide a conceptual map of the thesis’ studies and an overview of the 
eight thesis chapters. 
 
1.1 Background and aim of the thesis 
           For decades, psychologists have been preoccupied with the topic of morality. 
As a result, many studies on moral development, moral reasoning and moral judgment 
have been conducted. However, researchers of moral psychology agree that there is a 
weak relationship between moral behaviour and longstanding concepts such as moral 
reasoning.  For example, moral judgment clarifies only 10% of the variability found 
in moral actions (Walker, 2004). Such a weak relationship has been referred to as a 
‘moral judgment–action gap’ (Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2015).  As it is difficult 
to build an adequate framework of moral behaviour by relying only on cognitive 
functions, the question becomes how such a framework can be developed. Can identity 
theories help to bridge the moral judgment-action gap? (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Walker, 
2004). The answer is likely to be yes. Therefore, attention has turned to other concepts 
and the role of the self in moral behaviour has been the subject of great empirical effort 
and consideration. This body of work has sought to link the self, or identity, to morality 
and thereby to advance our understanding of moral functions. Essentially, it has helped 
researchers expand their thinking about morality and included other frequently over-
looked concepts, such as identity, in order to achieve a more coherent account and 
explanation of moral behaviour. This thesis focuses on moral identity, which is 
described as ‘a self-conception organised around a set of moral traits’ (Aquino & Reed, 
2002, p. 1424).   
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         Why does moral identity matter and what is its importance? To begin to answer 
this, I will briefly elaborate on the above. The developmental psychologist Piaget first 
pioneered theories about the moral development of children in 1932. In 1971, 
Kohlberg agreed with Piaget but incorporated his own ideas to expand upon Piaget's 
theory of moral development. The central premise of both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s 
theories is that human moral behaviours are fundamentally motivated and can be 
predicted by their moral reasoning. Notably, this focus on moral thinking or reasoning 
to decide on moral issues was dominant in psychology from 1960 onwards (Shweder 
& Haidt,1993), Kohlberg's (1984) theory about moral reasoning representing this 
dominance. Kohlberg (1971,1984) mainly argued that mature moral reasoning should 
be based on the values of justice and fairness and that these values are universal. 
Kohlberg's theory has greatly influenced the research on morality, however, moral 
reasoning does not hold the promise for predicting an individual's moral behaviour 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Kohlberg & Candee,1984). Likewise, some scholars have 
raised questions about the utility of moral reasoning. For instance, it neglects the 
content of morality, overlooks the diversity of morality within different cultures and is 
biased against women (Gilligan, 1982; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Walker 
& Pitts, 1998). Therefore, psychologists have recently considered other factors, 
including moral standards, self-sanctioning and moral identity, in predicting behaviour 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt, 2001). Investigations of morality that move beyond 
moral reasoning are relatively new. Bloom (2012) pointed out that in old moral 
psychology studies, participants were required to solve, or make a decision, about 
some designed moral dilemma. However, new moral psychology, where researchers 
empirically investigate how people think about morality in daily interactions, has only 
emerged in recent decades. Regarding moral identity, Colby and Damon (1993) 
suggested that the ability to predict moral behaviour might be more effective if we 
consider the relationship between morality and the self. Consequently, there is much 
room to investigate the concept of moral identity and the behaviour that results from 
it.   
         Blasi, a prominent researcher of moral identity, states that “we need a 
psychological theory to explain how and why moral understanding leads, when it does, 
to the desire to act morally” (1990, p. 53). Blasi assumed that there is a neglected 
concept, moral identity, that can help us predict moral conduct. Moral identity reflects 
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the fundamental principles that motivate individuals to behave in different ways, 
depending upon the situation. Aquino and Reed (2002, p. 1425) argue that to engage 
in moral behaviours, moral reasoning is not enough and that it requires the salience of 
morality that resides in one’s self-identity. Over time, other researchers have 
contributed to Blasi's typology of moral identity, such as Aquino and Reed (2002) and 
Stets and Carter (2011).  
          Several studies have been conducted which examine the relationship between 
moral identity and various moral behaviours, such as donation behaviours (Aquino & 
Reed, 2002), academic honesty (Wowra, 2007), prosocial behaviours (Winterich, 
Aquino, Mittal & Swartz, 2013) and charitable behaviours (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 
2007), demonstrating that when our moral identity is activated, individuals are more 
likely to behave pro-socially. Prior research has focused on how moral identity can be 
measured and its correlations to different behavioural constructs, such as volunteerism 
and donation behaviours (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Nasir & Kirshner, 2003). A recent 
literature review of the moral self, revealed that the cultural influence on moral identity 
has received little attention (Jennings et al., 2015). Individuals are aware of 
themselves, and how their identities are formed in relationships, via social relations, 
social groups and social discourses (Moshman, 2013). As such, what is essentially 
missing from the growing body of empirical work on moral identity is the influence of 
different cultural contexts, and how culture impacts one’s moral identity. In a related 
vein, and in the same review, researchers have also pointed out that most studies focus 
on caring and fairness moral concerns as constituting the content of moral identity; 
thus, another question is raised here about other moral concerns that might be part of 
moral identity or more prototypical in other cultural contexts (Jennings et al., 2015).  
          An overall aim of this thesis is to extend our knowledge on moral identity and 
its relation to moral behaviours. I pursue this aim by recognising the influence of 
culture on moral identity and applying a cross-cultural lens to examine moral identity 
in the two under-researched cultures of Britain and Saudi Arabia.  To my knowledge, 
there is a complete absence of any published research on moral identity from a cross -
cultural perspective. We could amass crucial knowledge and gain greater clarity 
regarding the concept of moral identity in terms of cultural influences by considering 
how culture might shape identity in certain ways and bring about cultural variations in 
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morality. This thesis will achieve this goal through four empirical studies in both 
Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
           This thesis therefore, investigates moral identity in individualist and collectivist 
cultures. Britain, like many Western societies, is considered an individualistic society 
that emphasises individual rights and freedoms as being the basis of a democratic 
society. With individualism, priority is given to individual aspects, such as individual 
well-being, autonomy, and the right to privacy (Oyserman & Lee, 2008).  In contrast, 
most Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are considered collectivistic societies, with 
an emphasis on group respect and obedience, at the expense of individual freedom, 
and are remarkably less democratic (Chiu & Hong, 2006). With collectivism, greater 
concern is given to group harmony, mutual obligations and interdependence; 
individuals are continually required, and expected, to fit themselves into their society 
(Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Furthermore, as an Islamic country, Saudi Arabia is 
underrepresented in cross-cultural research. Oyserman and Lee (2008) noted tis gap in 
the cross-cultural literature. The most commonly sampled collectivistic countries have 
Confucian traditions, with little attention given to countries that are likely to have a 
different operationalisation of collectivism, such as Middle Eastern countries. The idea 
that some cultures are under- researched, not only in cross-cultural psychology but also 
in general psychology, and how this thesis attempts to tackle this issue, is further 
discussed in the following section. 
1.2 The moral identity of the Weirdest People: Ethnocentrism in moral identity 
research 
          When we ask students to a draw a map of the world in 10 minutes, they are likely 
to draw their country larger than other countries (Whittaker & Whittaker, 1972, as 
cited in Shiraev & Levy, 2010). This observation can be explained by the idea of 
familiarity; we tend to exaggerate what we are familiar with (Shiraev & Levy, 2010).  
Analogously, this overemphasis on a certain group might also be the case in 
psychology, where Western, educated (predominantly undergraduate students), 
industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD) people are treated as truly representative 
of the entire world population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Addressing the 
same concerns, Greenfield (2000a, p.233) argued that psychology is a science that 
emerged out of the West; most of its data and theories have been disproportionality 
developed by Western researchers.  As a result, mainstream psychology, in the form 
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we know it now, is bound by Western culture. It may be called an indigenous 
psychology, in which psychological knowledge and theories embody a particular 
cultural context and reflect its social reality (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002). 
This fact has not been widely recognised, and mainstream psychology has been 
mistakenly considered as universal (Arnett, 2008; Rogers, 2003; Rozin, 2001).   
         Before the Weirdest people’s paper came out, Arnett (2008) raised the same 
concerns regarding psychological research in terms of its true representation of 
humanity. Arnett (2008) conducted a meta-analysis that examined 4,037 published 
papers in different APA journals. In the span of 20 years, he found that 95% of these 
included papers based on American samples and produced by American researchers. 
Americans represent barely 5% of the world’s populations meaning that these articles 
neglected the other 95% of the world. In fact, the situation is worse in social 
psychology where not only are samples generally Americans but are also mostly 
undergraduate American students between the ages of 17 to 20 years of age, who study 
an introduction to psychology (Arnett, 2008; Rozin, 2001). Psychological research in 
this sense, suffers from a sampling error where we generalise the results from a small, 
typically American sample to the whole world (Stevenson, 2010). Likewise, in 
psychology textbooks, the percentages for studies conducted in America, Europe, and 
other countries are 80%, 18% and 2%, respectively (Smith & Bond, 1998). Arnett 
(2008) calls for a broadening of the scope of psychology and making it less American 
and more international by crossing American borders, both perceptually and 
geographically, and conducting studies in other cultural contexts.  
          With respect to social psychology, the concerns are not limited to the samples 
but also extend to the way that theories have been developed within one cultural 
framework. In this respect: 
 
          Social psychology has largely been shaped by researchers in only one 
country—the United States—and until very recently, there were few members 
of minority groups among professional social psychologists or the subjects they 
studied. Thus, social psychology is largely monocultural in that both the 
researchers attracted to the discipline and the subjects it has studied share the 
same culture’ (Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993, p. 10).  
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            In a related vein, Rogers (2003) criticised social psychology for being 
ethnocentric and falling into the trap of two racist fallacies. The first one is the ‘head 
in the sand’ fallacy, by which social psychologists sample American students and then 
construct and claim universal psychological knowledge, solely based on their narrow 
sample. By doing this, social psychology commits a fundamental attribution error; 
where is an intense focus on particular individuals and any influence by social or 
cultural settings is ignored.  The second fallacy is an ‘Us and Them’ fallacy. ‘Us’ is a 
group of Western people who tend to develop social theories about various human 
behaviours by detaching from culture and assuming that culture has its influence only 
on ‘Them’. ‘Them’ is the group of all other people, or people of colour, whose 
behaviours are generally determined by their culture. In line with this view, 
Greenwood (2004), in his evaluative paper on contemporary moral psychology (which 
I will refer back to in Chapter 3), warned against seeing collectivism as a sharp contrast 
to individualism, such as believing that social factors play roles in collectivism but not 
in individualism. He pointed out that researchers tend to dismiss the idea that Western 
individualism is also socially learned, and that both cultural dimensions are essentially 
products of the social structures and systems in any given society (Greenwood, 2004). 
            An important factor that contributes to the ethnocentrism in psychology is that 
the science of psychology has always been motivated to unearth the universal laws of 
human behaviour (Arnett, 2008; Greenfield, 2000b). Thus, while researchers carry out 
their studies, they overlook or ignore factors such as culture and social contexts 
because such factors stand in the way of identifying universal psychological principles 
and functions. More than that, researchers are confident that sampling a few people, 
usually American undergraduate students, accurately represents all the other people in 
the world (Arnett, 2008).              
           Regarding moral identity, a meta-analysis revealed that the majority of moral 
identity studies (112) have been conducted in North America and Europe, compared 
to just 10 in South and East Asia (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Empirical studies on 
moral identity in other cultural contexts have not yet made their way into the moral 
identity literature (Jennings et al., 2015). The researcher in the above mentioned meta-
analysis found that, in general, there is a positive relationship between moral identity 
and moral behaviours, however, the effective size of this relationship is smaller in 
collectivistic and non-Western countries than in individualistic ones. The authors 
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attributed this to either the lack of validity of the current moral identity scale, or to the 
idea that “the moral identity construct in its present form is culturally limited and needs 
to be expanded in order to accommodate to cultures different from the West” (Hertz 
& Krettenauer, 2016, p.8). This thesis is a response to the recognition of that need and 
limitation. One question that might be raised is why Britain is a focus, since it is a 
Western and individualistic country. As was mentioned earlier, in terms of moral 
identity research, Britain is an under-researched country. American research is 
dominant in psychology and in the moral identity literature. The findings from 
American studies need to be compared with studies from other countries, including 
other Western countries, as the global similarities to American data need to be 
questioned rather than assumed (Henrich et al., 2010).             
           This assumed ethnocentrism in moral identity research, in this case and in 
psychology in general, is unlikely to be conscious or intended (Greenfield, 2000b).  
According to Wallerstein’s world system theory (1980), this ethnocentrism in 
psychology can be seen as part and parcel of the influence and dominance of the 
capitalist world-system, which has occurred in many domains such as economics, 
cultural and military (see Wallerstein, 1980, for more detail about world-system 
theory). This thesis attempts to reduce ethnocentricity in moral identity literature and 
the dominance of Weird people data, by initially recognising the limitations in our 
knowledge and incorporating other cultures while investigating this topic (Berry, et 
al., 2002). In fact, moral identity or moral self can be found and studied in Weird and 
Non-Weird countries, but the content of this identity might be different, to some 
degree, across cultures. In this regard, I agree with Greenfield’s view that 
 
whereas in anthropology the struggle has been how to understand the 
perspective of others without assuming essentialistic differences, the 
struggle in psychology has been how to understand the perspective of 
others without assuming essentialistic similarities. These 
diametrically opposed problems should tell us that the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle (2000b, p.571). 
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1. 3 To use an Etic approach, Emic approach or both? 
          How I will approach the examination of moral identity in both cultures is 
important. Berry (1989) pointed out three steps that act as a guide for any researchers 
who want to conduct studies in different cross-cultural settings. These steps move 
between etic research, which focuses on the universal and common behaviours, to emic 
research, which focuses on the uniqueness of certain cultures in term of behaviour 
(Shiraev & Levy, 2010).  Etic and emic approaches were borrowed from the field of 
linguistics. In this field, the term ‘phonetics’ refers to the study of the sound of spoken 
language, regardless of meaning. As an etic approach, the focus of phonetics on speech 
sound is considered to be a universal phenomenon. On the contrary, ‘phonemics’ refers 
to the study of the phoneme, the sound produced in a specific language; thus, 
phonemics is culture-bond as is the emic approach (Helfrich, 1999).   
            Berry (1989) emphasised that this operational framework is not likely to be 
ideal and would be better used as a practical guide. In brief, the first step in this 
framework is the imposed Etic where the researchers adopt, or import, methods from 
Culture A to study certain phenomena or behaviour in Culture B. In this case, Culture 
A is Western cultures and Culture B non-Western cultures. The second step is 
transitioning from etic to emic. In this stage, the researcher has more knowledge about 
Culture B and is likely to modify his tools to accommodate Culture B. The third and 
final step is the derived etic. At this stage, researchers can produce tools and derive 
theories that can apply to Cultures A and B. The intention and aim here is to uncover 
the universal dimension that underpins particular human behaviour so such behaviour 
can be compared across culturally different populations (Berry, 1989; Stevenson, 
2010).   
            In this thesis, these three sequences will be operationalised with some 
differences.  First, there are three cultures in this thesis: North America (Culture A), 
where moral identity has been heavily researched; Britain (Culture B), and Saudi 
Arabia (Culture C), the last two of which will be the focus of this thesis. However, 
there is no imposing etic stage to start with in this thesis. While the moral domain in 
the current moral identity literature is mainly about issues of fairness and harm, in my 
first empirical study, participants in both the British and Saudi Arabian cultures will 
be asked to write their thoughts about the traits of an amoral person. Thus, (in this first 
step of Berry’s framework), there is no imposition of a certain moral assumption of 
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any kind, even by myself as researcher. In the second study (the second step of Berry’s 
framework), I will employ a widely used moral identity instrument (Aquino & Reed, 
2002), which is based on, and derived from, an American sample, but I will broaden 
its listed moral traits to gain more insight about moral identity in both British and Saudi 
Arabian cultural contexts.  In the third and fourth studies, (the third step of Berry’s 
framework), I will develop and test a new moral identity scale that allows me to 
compare moral identity across British and Saudi Arabia cultures. 
          This is how the Emic and Etic approaches will be implemented and integrated 
into this thesis as means of thinking about moral identity in North America (where the 
contemporary literature has been developed and built) and carrying out the research in 
two less researched cultures (Britain and Saudi Arabia). Identifying what is universal 
and what is specific to a culture in any examined phenomenon is one of the challenges 
for cross-cultural psychology (Shiraev & Levy, 2010). The hope is that the present 
research will uncover what is culturally universal and what is culturally relative in the 
content of people’s moral identity. 
 
1. 4 Overview of the thesis  
           This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to this 
thesis and can be considered as a road map for the reader. The next chapter examines 
the important yet missing cultural perspective in the temporary literature on moral 
identity. This argument is supported by a review of literature concerning cultural 
influences on both identity and morality and how both bodies of literature speak to the 
cultural aspect of moral identity. Chapter 3 is dedicated to a review of different 
theoretical models of moral identity and how researchers have conceptualised and 
thought about moral identity throughout their research. Such a review is important to 
demonstrate the large empirical gap in our understanding of moral identity. Both 
chapters 2 and 3 provide the rationale for my thesis. Chapter 4 presents the first 
empirical study in which the prototype of a moral person is examined in both cultures 
(see Figure 1 for the conceptual map of all the studies in this thesis).  In Chapter 5, the 
influence of different moral traits in activating moral identity is examined, along with 
participants’ perceptions of the cultural importance of these moral traits. Chapter 6 
focuses on the new moral identity scale I developed, its psychometric properties tested 
across the two cultures. Chapter 7 presents the fourth and final empirical study in this 
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thesis where the aim was to replicate factors of the moral identity scale and to address 
the question of whether there is a dark side to moral identity that is neglected 
specifically when we, as researchers, recognise other moral concerns, such as the 
binding moral concerns in the conceptualization and measurement of moral identity. 
Chapter 8 is the final chapter, in which I draw upon all of the previous chapters to 
synthesise the findings of all the empirical studies. The strengths and limitations of 
this research are also discussed, along with some implications and areas for future 
directions in moral identity research. 
            In the following chapter, I discuss two theoretical frameworks: the role of 
culture in identity, and the role of culture in morality. Such a discussion helps to ground 
my argument about how important, but neglected, the role of culture is in forming and 
shaping people’s moral identity. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual map of the thesis’ studies 
  Study 1 
Study aim: Examining moral prototypical traits that characterise a moral person 
in Britain and Saudi cultures. 
Main variables: Moral traits.  
Outcomes: Moral traits that are different from the ones used in Aquino’s scale, 
especially in the Saudi sample. The results support the assumptions of the moral 
foundation theory, which states that cultures differ in terms of the importance they 
give to certain moral concerns. 
 
Study 2 
Study aim: Testing how moral identity among British and Saudi people might be 
activated differently by dissimilar moral traits in comparison with Aquino and 
Reed’s traits. 
Main variables: IV: different moral traits. DV: Aquino and Reed’s moral identity 
scale and perceived cultural importance scale. 
Outcomes: Cultural differences between the sample groups cannot be detected 
by only using Aquino’s moral scale, meaning that there is the need to design a 
new moral identity scale. 
 
Study 3 
Study aim: Designing and testing a new moral identity scale. 
Main variables: Newly developed moral identity scale and other related validity 
measures.  
Outcomes: The results demonstrated the scale’s satisfactory psychometric 
properties in both samples. However, the predictably of the new moral identity 
scale still needs to be tested and compared with Aquino’s scale. 
 
Study 4 
Study aim: Examining the ability of a new moral identity scale to predict 
behaviours in comparison with the most widely used moral identity scale in the 
literature, Aquino and Reed's (2002).  Additionally, the factor structure of the 
new moral identity scale needs to be replicated. 
Main variables: IV: Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale and the newly 
designed moral identity scale. DV: prejudice and other related scales.  
Outcomes: The newly designed moral identity scale is better than Aquino’s for 
predicting prejudice in both Britain and Saudi Arabia. This study demonstrates 
that moral identity is not an absolute positive, and that the positive consequences 
of moral identity should not be taken for granted.  
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 Chapter 2 
Identity, Morality and Culture 
 
             Culture and Self do not only live together, require each other and make 
             each other up. They also make up a love-hate relationship; they need 
             each other and seek to control each other (Chiu & Kim, 2011, p. 533). 
 
            It is often difficult to delineate where culture ends, and morality begins 
            as culture and morality share an intricate and intimate relationship. 
            (Miller, 2001, p. 151). 
 
           As mentioned in the previous chapter, the influence of culture on moral identity 
has not been given significant attention in contemporary moral identity literature. An 
example of the neglected influence of culture is the focus on fairness and caring 
concerns as the only components of people’s moral identity in the theoretical 
conceptualisations of moral identity. Hence, the notion that there are other moral 
concerns related to moral identity has received little theoretical and empirical 
considerations. This chapter aims to provide the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
or in other words, why I argue that our moral identities are likely to be influenced by 
certain shared meanings and ways of thinking by individuals living in a particular 
culture. I will build my argument on literature that can be broken down into two 
themes. The first (Section 2.1) concerns the role of culture in identity, and the second 
concerns the role of culture on morality (Section 2.2).  In addition, I will consider some 
criticisms of expanding morality beyond justice and caring concerns.  At the end of 
the chapter, I will summarise the accumulated evidence that clearly indicate that the 
manner in which moral identity is formed is culturally defined.  
 
2.1 Identity and culture 
2.1.1 Introduction  
           The above quote by Chiu and Kim (2011) expresses one of the key concerns of 
researchers in psychology and other disciplines. It reflects the enormous scholarly 
debate about identity and the extent to which this identity is shaped and controlled by 
culture. Researchers have been interested in the dilemmas surrounding identity and 
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cultural influence and how people might be affected by this love-hate relationship with 
culture. In this chapter, several of the attempts made to address this topic will be 
explored.  
            This section will give an overview of the notions of self and identity in light of 
culture. The key goal here is not to comprehensively outline all of the issues or debates 
in this topic, but rather to provide an outline of the theoretical attempts that have been 
made to explain how culture might influence the individual's identity.     
           Concepts of identity and culture will be briefly defined, and a different approach 
to tackling this topic will be critically evaluated.  An argument will be presented as to 
how globalisation might complicate the relationship between identity and culture.  
  
2.1.2 Defining identity or self/personal identity 
            Having been used in many social sciences and having attracted many 
researchers from different disciplines, the notion of identity, or self-identity, has been 
defined in many different ways (Hitlin, 2011; Simon, 2004). For example, identity is 
defined as constitutive of one's self (Hitlin, 2011, p.519). To use simple terms, identity 
can be seen as “how we think about ourselves as people” (Kidd & Teagle, 2012, p.7). 
In this sense, identity can be considered a long journey taken to discover who we are.   
            Furthermore, self-identity reflects how we create and develop the sense of 
uniqueness that is incorporated into relationships with the world outside us.  Therefore, 
social identity theory articulates the personal identity concept as each person 
categorises their self in a unique way to differentiate themselves from others. Thus, it 
can be said that as such, identity is the lowest level of self-categorisation (Stets & 
Burke, 2000).  Other scholars have argued that self-identity is fundamentally about the 
philosophy, values, and meaning that the individual holds about their self (Leflot & 
Colpin, 2010).   
           Again, as can be perceived in the conceptualisations of identity that have 
already been examined, the focus is on identity-based personality rather than on social 
roles or group membership.  This focus allows the use of the terms self and identity as 
if they were synonymous. In this regard, researchers have pointed out that the 
interchangeable use in the literature of ‘personal identity’ and ‘self-concept’ suggests 
that both concepts represent similar constructs (Oyserman, Elmore & Smith, 2012). 
They further summarised this idea by noting that “self, self-concept, and identity can 
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be considered as nested elements which aspects of the "me" forming self-concepts and 
identities being part of self-concepts” (Oyserman et al., 2012, p.74). Yet, both the 
terms ‘self’ and ‘identity’ are sometimes used in psychological literature to refer to 
different psychological concepts. For instance, the self refers to people’s sense of 
themselves in relation to the outside world, while identity can be used to express an 
individual’s membership of various groups, such as gender and social class (Oyserman 
et al., 2012).  What matters here is that in this chapter, and throughout this entire 
project, identity and self are used as equivalent terms; this deliberate use is justified in 
light of what has been discussed so far.   
 
2.1.3 Defining culture 
           Williams (1983) argued that the term 'culture' is a complicated word for the 
English language. He noted that culture has been used in several social sciences, but 
in many irreconcilable and conflicting conceptualisations. This was echoed by Jahoda 
(1984) who stated that “culture is arguably the most elusive term in the generally rather 
fluid vocabulary of the social sciences” (p.140). That is perhaps the reason why 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) listed more than 150 definitions of culture.   
           So far, there has been no agreement between scholars about the description or 
conceptualisation of culture.   In 1984, an entire issue of The Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology was devoted to the problematic use of the term. In that issue, Rohner 
(1984) suggested that culture can be termed as “a symbolic meaning system” (p.119). 
           Here, Rohner’s (1984) definition reflects the view that culture is the shared 
meaning that is given to behaviours, events and almost everything else by individuals 
who live in a specific society.  Furthermore, he argued that culture is about the meaning 
that people have attributed to different things around them, thus, culture cannot be 
measured or observed through the senses.  However, in the same issue, as a counter-
argument to this standpoint, Jahoda (1984) insisted that the concept of culture should 
not only be about the abstract meaning that certain groups of people hold. He believed 
that objects, such as houses, directly affect people's behaviour, thus these objects must 
also be considered as a part of the concept of culture.    
          This debate continues, and scholars have yet to reach any agreement, partly 
because culture is a topic of interest to scholars in so many different fields. At its 
broadest, the position of a number of sociologists and anthropologists reflects a focus 
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on both objects and the meanings ascribed to them. However, the majority of 
psychologists pay most attention to the subjective part of culture, or in other words to 
shared meaning that individuals within a certain culture hold and how this meaning 
might influence any psychological phenomena.  This focus on culture can be seen in 
the description of culture by the well-known social psychologist Hofstede “the 
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes one group or category of people 
from another ” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004, p. 58). 
          Chiu and Hong, in their book Social Psychology of Culture (2006), have argued 
that it is hard to find any definition which can successfully grasp the complexity and 
richness of culture. They also raised another issue related to the definition of culture, 
when they suggested that any one definition of culture that is effectively used by social 
psychologists, is unlikely to have the same usefulness for other scholars in social 
sciences. In a similar vein, by focusing on shared meaning, Chiu and Hong (2006) 
highlighted that culture can be understood as a commonly shared frame of reference 
for a particular group, that guides its members behaviours. What is noteworthy is that 
some researchers who have supported this notion of culture, have made an excellent 
point about this shared meaning, maintaining that every individual within a culture 
tends to absorb part of this collective meaning, hence no one can claim that an 
individual has the entire meaning.  Adopting this idea is helpful, as will be seen later 
in this chapter, because assuming that every individual in a culture has exactly the 
same portion of knowledge generates much criticism concerning the utility of making 
assumptions about shared meanings.    
           Before leaving this discussion, it is useful to note a somewhat different 
approach to the conceptualisation of culture.  Poortinga (1990) believed that culture 
has a similar level of importance as a human's genes, in that both oppose constraints 
on individual behaviours and limit our available actions and options in any given 
situation. However, Poortinga said nothing about the structures of these constraints 
and how they impact upon, or narrow, people's actions, in other words, how these 
constraints operate and can be examined in terms of individuals' psychological levels.        
           In regard to the use of the term ‘culture’ in this thesis, I refer to the two countries 
that are the focus of this thesis, Britain and Saudi Arabia, as ‘the two cultures’. In 
doing this, I recognise that the people in both societies have a particular cultural frame 
of reference regarding what it means to be a moral person or to have a moral identity.   
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2.1.4 Why culture matters, and the notion of the self as a cultural product 
            Mead (1934/1962) identified the aim of social psychology as being “to explain 
the conduct of the individuals in terms of the organised conduct of the social group 
rather than to account for the organised conduct of the social group in terms of the 
separate individuals belonging to it” (p.7). Here, Mead required social psychologists 
in particular, and psychology scholars in general, to scrutinise psychological 
phenomena as they exist in social groups. In this sense, it is crucial to adopt a holistic 
view of the individuals rather than envisage them as autonomous unities.  It is open to 
question whether scholars have attained this, as it is widely accepted that focusing 
upon and generalising psychological outcomes from a limited number of social groups 
to create a behavioural universal model, has resulted in an acknowledgeable bias (Chiu 
& Hong, 2006).   
            This mindfulness of the role of culture has motivated more scholars to adopt 
cross-cultural perspectives and to conduct studies that aspire to “discover systematic 
relationships between (a) psychological variables at the individual level, and (b) 
cultural, social, economic, ecological and biological variables at the population level” 
(Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989, p.494). Notably, under this banner of cultural 
perspectives, long-established psychological assumptions about the universality of 
human behaviours have been critically questioned (Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2000).     
           This cross-cultural perspective opens promising avenues of research for 
scholars by which researchers have sought to discover other possible psychological 
models in order to detect how culture impacts upon behaviour. This relatively new 
concern has generated many models that account for the influence of culture on 
individuals. Essentially, the self and identity have attracted the interest of many 
scholars who have suggested models that explain the relationship between identity and 
culture. These models will be explored in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.1.5 How can the concepts of identity and culture be linked?  
2.1.5.1 The Individualism - Collectivism Theory 
           Between 1968 and 1972, Hofstede (1980) administered questionnaires to an 
international sample of 117,000 employees of the technology company, IBM.  He 
aimed to systematically map their cultural differences. Hofstede's project led to a major 
shift in cross-cultural studies. By using factor analysis, Hofstede identified four 
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cultural dimensions in people of 40 countries. These dimensions are power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity.  
           To this day, the dimension of Individualism-Collectivism (I-C) is the most 
frequently-used dimension applied to detect cultural variability among individuals 
(Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989; Kagitcibasi, 1997).  Hofstede (1984) conceptualised this 
dimension as a relationship between individuals and their society; it summarises the 
relationship between them. With individualism, the priority is given to individual 
aspects such as the individual's well-being, autonomy, self-resilience, right to privacy 
and independence (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Conversely, within collectivism, central 
concerns are given to the society, group harmony, obligations and interdependence, 
even if this is at the expense of the individuals who are continually required and 
expected to fit themselves into their society. In Hofstede's study, respondents from 
western societies such as the United States and Western European countries, tended to 
score highly on the Individualism scale, thus theirs can be considered as individualistic 
societies. In contrast, most countries in Africa and Asia are thought to be collectivistic 
societies (Hofstede, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991a).     
            It is important to note that Hofstede did not primarily intend to divide societies 
into two cultural forms, rather he systemically represented a potential orientation that 
might exist in a society. However, this dimension has been commonly used as a 
dichotomous variable in cross-cultural research in psychology. Generally, this 
dimension is at the heart of cultural analysis. As Bond (1994) commented, “the 
cultural-level contrast between individualism and collectivism has exerted a magnetic 
pull on cross-cultural researchers over the past years” (p.69). This is evidenced by the 
fact that more than one third of published papers on cross-cultural psychology have 
drawn on this dimension (Hui & Yee, 1994). 
             However, the I-C dimension has been the subject of intense criticism. Scholars 
have been concerned about the improper use of this dimension, which leads to 
misleading findings when seeking to explain cultural variability in behaviour. Such 
caution can be seen in Triandis' s remark about the extensive use of the I-C dimension, 
“wide applicability also represents a danger. Like the man with a hammer who uses it 
at every opportunity, if we do not sharpen their meaning, we can overuse the 
constructs” (Triandis, 1995, p.2). This model has also been critically described as 
stereotypical, fuzzy and catch-all (Earley & Gibson,1998; Killen,1997; Rohner, 1984). 
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Catch-all here represents the idea that the I-C dimension is composed of very broad 
concepts and lacks concrete methodological approaches to assess cultural differences.  
            Some studies have pointed to findings that conflict with Hofstede’s framework. 
For example, some countries in Asia that might be expected to be collectivist, actually 
appear to resemble European and American societies in their individualistic 
orientations. Other research has shown that a number of societies in northern Europe 
have scored highly on the Collectivism index (Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 
2002). Some researchers have pointed to the lack of homogeneity in the way that the 
I-C dimension has been constructed and measured. It has also been documented that 
societies differ in terms of their manifestation of prevailing orientation. For example, 
Dien (1999) noted that collectivism takes dissimilar forms within Chinese and 
Japanese societies.  
            Regarding the breadth of this framework, recently, attempts have been made 
to design different measures that examine each dimension separately. For example, 
such a measure was created to assess the individual response to the conflict between 
group and individual interests. Here, when an individual preferred group interests at 
the expense of his or her own interests, this was taken as indicative of the collectivistic 
dimension (Chen, Brockner & Katz,1998)  
            Despite criticism, the I-C dimension is still used as a valid and essential theory 
for predicting cultural differences. As such, this theory, along with the moral 
foundations theory (see Section 2.2), helps to inform the hypotheses for this thesis on 
the differences between British and Saudi cultures, in terms of what it means to be a 
moral person. Although Hofstede's theory still dominates, it is not the only model that 
tries to explain cultural differences. There is still room for other theories that link the 
self, or identity, and culture.  
 
2.1.5.2 Independent and Interdependent Self-construal 
            In mainstream psychology, the self has been seen as unique and authentic - or 
at least it ought to be - driven by internal motivations and desires (Triandis, 1995). In 
this respect, the individual's repertoire of opinions and emotions work here as a 
reference to his or her behaviour rather than referring to the opinions and emotions of 
others (Shweder & Bourne, 1984).  Hence, the individual who has a healthy concept 
of their self, is one who is determined, independent and who shows a great deal of 
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resistance to group pressures.  Markus and Kitayama (1994) pointed out that this form 
of western self, or identity, can easily be recognised in some North American cultural 
acts, such as the American Declaration of Independence and the American Bill of 
Rights.  Accordingly, the foremost objections and concerns can be summarised by two 
key questions: is this the only form of identity? What about other cultures, specifically 
non-western cultures; what forms might emerge from those? Admittedly, researchers 
have noted that, in Western cultures, and more particularly among middle class circles, 
people are encouraged to be independent and to think of themselves as a distinct self 
that separated from the surrounding contexts. In contrast, people in most Asian cultures 
do not see themselves as clearly independent from others and from cultural contexts 
(Markus, Matsumoto & Norasakkunkit,1997)  
           In ways similar to Hofstede's theory, other researchers have actively tried to get 
outside the box (the western conception of self) and have achieved a broader 
description of cultural differences in identity. Among those researchers are Markus 
and Kitayama (1991a; 1991b) who have constructed their own theory about the self 
and culture. They suggest that culture has a deep influence on individuals and how 
they perceive both themselves and others. Markus and Kitayama systematically 
conceptualised this idea in their theory of independent and interdependent self-
construal, according to which people in Western cultures perceive themselves as 
independent, autonomous and unique individuals. Consequently, they hold a 
predominantly independent self-construal that is less integrated in their social and 
cultural contexts than those found elsewhere. In contrast, individuals in Eastern 
cultures perceive themselves as more integrated and connected with their cultural 
contexts, so they are more collectivistic. As a result, they have a predominantly 
interdependent self-construal (DeAndrea, Shaw & Levine, 2010; Kastanakis & Voyer, 
2014; Mastumoto, 1999). Social contexts work as a main reference of, and platform 
for self- perception in Eastern countries, whereas in Western countries, the notion of 
self with its sense of individuality and uniqueness, provides a platform for people to 
think about themselves (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b).  
           This theory was examined when Japanese and American participants were 
asked to complete the Twenty Statements Test (TST). In this test, participants describe 
themselves by answering the question, ‘who am I’? The respondents in this case 
answered two versions of this test, the first about themselves and the other one about 
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themselves but in relation to their social contexts. The results revealed that the 
American participants expressed awareness of more psychological attributes about 
themselves than their Japanese counterparts, when both were asked about themselves 
in general. In contrast, the Japanese participants showed awareness of more 
psychological attributes about themselves than the Americans when they were both 
asked about themselves particularly in relation to their social contexts (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991a; Mastumoto, 1999(. 
            Markus and Kitayama’s (1991a) theory was well received because of its 
potential to bridge the gap between one’s culture and the self.  However, the theory 
has also been criticised. Mastumoto (1999), in his critical assessment of self-construal 
theory, argued that the assumption within Markus and Kitayama's theory that 
American samples are individualistic and Japanese samples are collectivistic, was not 
examined empirically. Therefore, any data generated are questionable, as the theory 
was guided by an untested assumption.  As evidence for this, some of the studies on 
cultural differences did not find any cultural differences between these two countries 
(Voronov & Singer, 2002). Two studies have shown that the Japanese were more 
individualistic than the Americans (Mastumoto, 1999).  
            It is worth pointing out here that Markus and Kitayama's (1991a;1991b) theory 
did not assume that all members of any culture should behave similarly under the 
banner of the self-construal, thus heterogeneity in a given cultural context can exist. 
Primarily, the assumption underlying their theory is that the members of any given 
cultural group “are more likely to have been exposed to and have operated within a 
given cultural frame than members of the contrasting group, and thus members of the 
same cultural group may share some similar behavioural tendencies or patterns” 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1994. p.99).  Notably, in this quotation, Markus and Kitayama 
italicised the word ‘some’ in their original paper, in order to further highlight their idea 
that significant differences could be seen, not only between two cultures, but also 
within those cultures (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998).  After almost nine 
years, Markus and Kitayama reviewed this theory and added ideas that echoed 
Mastumoto’s (1999) critique, including issues of measuring aspects of one’s sense of 
self and culture, in order to refine and improve the utility of their theory (Markus & 
Kitayama, 2010).    
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            A substantial overlap exists between Markus and Kitayama’s theory of 
independent and interdependent self-construal (1991a ;1991b) and Hofstede’s theory 
of individualism and collectivism cultural dimensions (1980). Both direct the 
researchers’ attention to aspects of the aspect of the relationship between individuals 
and their cultures and the extent to which individuals are independent from their 
culture. Thus, and in relation to this thesis, this theory of independent and 
interdependent self-construal also suggests that culture exerts a certain influence on 
people’s moral identity and the manner in which they think about themselves and 
others. Therefore, an individual’s moral identity is expected to be influenced by 
cultural contexts.  
 
2.1.5.3 Self-Contained and Ensembled Individualism 
             In a similar vein, Sampson (1988, 1993) proposed another model of the self 
and culture. In this model, Sampson differentiated clearly between English-speaking 
societies and others, such as Japan and China, in relation to the self and culture. He 
argued that people in English-speaking countries such as the USA, UK and Australia 
have self-contained individualism, while other societies, including most eastern 
cultures, show ensembled individualism. In self-contained individualism, people 
perceive themselves as being unique and separate from others, thinking about 
themselves as different from others rather than, for example, having shared or mutual 
identities. In addition, they have a sense of their personal life as being controlled by 
one's own self.  In self-ensembled individualism, which can be seen in eastern cultures 
such as Japan and China, the notion of self is more fluid and interdependent, perceived 
in relation to others and the cultural context. Here, individuals' personal lives are 
controlled by situations and others instead of being controlled than by themselves 
(Sampson, 1988; Dickerson, 2012).  
           Sampson supported his idea by quoting from Smith's writing about Maori 
culture, in which the “individual was not considered the chief agent determining his or 
her (own) life, nor was he considered to be responsible for his experience” 
(Smith,1981, cited in Sampson, 1988, p.17).  According to this model, western self-
contained individualism, when compared to eastern self-ensembled individualism, 
leads to a sense of self with a sharp boundary that stops at one's skin and clearly 
demarks self from non-self. This not the case in other cultures, as other patterns can 
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be observed which are perceived as a “more permeable and more diffuse at its 
boundaries” (Spence, 1985, p.1288). Sampson went further with his model and 
arguably emphasised that the Japanese, for example, reject the idea that the self can be 
defined without relation to one’s social context and that they believe that the concept 
of self autonomy is an extremely western idea (Dickerson, 2012).  
             Regarding Simpson's model (1988), Dickerson (2012) suggested that terms 
such as dialogic self, which conceive the self as a construction originating in the 
dialogue and interplay between the individual and others, can be used synonymously 
with Sampson's concept of ensembled individualism.  Likewise, the term relational 
self can be equated with ensembled individualism as the term implies that the self is 
defined by relationships with groups or others. 
             Nevertheless, the same critical assessment given to Markus and Kitayama’s 
theory also applies to Sampson's theory. Again, there are assumptions made about 
cultures without any empirical testing.   Additionally, Gergen (2009) has argued from 
a social-constructionist perspective that one’s sense of identity or self cannot be 
understood separately from social context. Social construction theory assumes that 
people create the meaning of their existence by rationalising their social world. For 
this reason, language plays a vital role in this process (see Gergen, 2009). In this 
respect, people develop a sense of their identity through their language and interaction 
with others, rather than being very bound to themselves, as Sampson assumed in his 
model.  In fact, and as part of a debate about self and culture, social constructionism 
critically and insensitively questions the notion of self-contained individualism. The 
argument is that our identities are likely to be more relational and grounded in social 
interactions than may usually be thought (Gergen, 2009; Dickerson, 2012).    
           In a similar critique, Hepburn (2003) has pointed out that “adopting an 
individualist stance blots out any recognition of social factors” (p.57). Gergen (2009) 
took Hepburn’s argument further, claiming that the concept of self-contained 
individualism has negative moral consequences. He argued that the idea of self-
contained individualism motivates individuals to be concerned about their own self- 
interests and goals, even if this leads them to hurt others. He criticised how others are 
portrayed in this model; they are considered as aliens and any individual action can be 
easily legitimated.  Gergen has invited us to carefully reconsider the idea of self-
containment, as he emphasising its harmful implications (Gergen, 2009). However, it 
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could also be argued that the idea of people being responsible for their own actions as 
the self-contained, individualism model assumes, has positive effects. With respect to 
personal responsibility, people then could not blame others for their actions as they 
would be more attentive to, and aware of, the consequences of their actions (Dickerson, 
2012).     
            It is worth noting that Sampson (1988) urged psychologists to open their eyes 
to see another version of the self, rather than being 'blind' and merely maintaining the 
western view of self.  Through his concept of self-ensembled individualism, he did not 
intend to overlook the importance of personal freedom, individuality or achievement 
as values. Rather, he wanted researchers to examine how these values might be 
understood and represented in other cultures.   
           In line with the theories discussed previously in this section, Sampson’s theory 
(1988, 1993) of self-contained vs. ensembled individualism attempts to illuminate and 
understand the relationships between someone’s identity and culture, and how cultures 
vary in terms of drawing the boundaries between people’s identities and the 
surrounding cultural structures. In short, Sampson’s theory suggests that moral 
identity, like any possible identity that a person may have, is culturally situated, and 
there is a need to recognise this when researchers examine this identity.  
 
2.1.6 Summary 
          In summary, based on a discussion of the leading theories in cross-cultural 
psychology that examine and explain how people’s moral identity, or self, tends to 
vary across cultures, it becomes apparent that culture influences the way people 
construe themselves and, in turn, their relations with others and society. Overall, the 
rich literature on identity and culture lends support to my argument that there are likely 
to be cultural differences in moral identity.  Having shown that people tend to define 
their self in a way that reflects their cultural contexts orientations, values, and norms 
also suggest that cultural differences can be found in people’s moral concerns as well.  
Therefore, and since the concept of moral identity can be thought as integration of 
identity and morality, it is equally important to review the literature on morality in 
relation to culture.  This is will be the focus of the subsequent section of this chapter.  
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2.2 Morality and culture 
2.2.1 Introduction 
           In the previous section, I explored the relationship between self-identity and 
culture. As this thesis aims to investigate moral identity from a cross-cultural 
perspective, I now turn attention to one of the most complicated domains, which is 
fundamental to the investigation of moral identity. The morality domain has been at 
the heart of ongoing debate in many fields such as philosophy, psychology and 
sociology.  I will only briefly address this debate, as it can easily be seen that there is 
no agreement between scholars on what morality is, nor on how it may be defined and 
investigated. This section will therefore, address the topic of morality and how it may 
be defined. Two main epistemological accounts of morality research in moral 
psychology will be outlined and some cross-cultural models that empirically map the 
diversity of morality will be discussed.  
 
2.2.2 Defining morality 
           It should be noted that the term morality is used to convey various meanings 
from different perspectives. Lukes (2010) suggested that there are two usages of 
morality, namely an intellectually elevated style of usage or narrative, which can be 
found among intellectuals such as educators, theologians and philosophers, and a use 
of the term with little intellectual thought, as adopted by ordinary people in everyday 
life. There are some similarities between the two narratives, but they are not identical.     
           Aspects of morality have been well-established in philosophers' narratives. 
Consequently, it is worth considering albeit briefly, how philosophers have defined 
and discussed morality. Some philosophers have argued that consequentialism, or 
utilitarianism theory, offers the best way to understand morality. Morality here is 
conceived as behaviours that seek, as much as possible, the utmost good for the utmost 
number of people (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006). Following 
this premise, morality manifests itself when people behave in a way that benefits more 
people rather than harming them. However, there seems to be no agreement between 
consequentialists about what this good involves. Another theory is deontological 
theory, which can be described as duty-based ethics, concerned with good acts rather 
than the outcomes of these acts. Therefore, in contrast to consequentialism, morality 
cannot be defined by recognising the consequences of certain actions, rather the 
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morality is the behaviour itself (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Casebeer & 
Churchland, 2003). In virtuous theory accounts of morality, the emphasis is on the 
individual as the responsible agent who behaves in light of virtuous values, such as 
honesty and fairness. This agent aims to ultimately live as a virtuous person, or in other 
words, as a moral character (Kohen, 1995). Weaver (2006) drew from this 
philosophical theory to understand moral identity, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
            Moving to psychology, morality, or the moral domain, has been both 
controversial and prone to dissent. Generally speaking, it has been a common theme 
or topic, when researchers conduct studies in morality, as they have concerns about 
the degree to which individuals treat others well and avoid harming them. These 
common aspects of morality are likely to result from Kohlberg's view of morality as 
justice, and Gilligan's notion that morality can be equated with care as detailed shortly 
in this chapter (Graham et al., 2011).  
            These morality aspects were later integrated into one of the most widely 
acceptable and influential definitions of morality as suggested by Turiel (1983). He 
envisaged morality as “perspective judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining 
to how people ought to relate to each other” (p.3).  In this sense, a moral individual is 
the one who avoids any actions that are prospectively harmful to others, and even more 
actively helps to promote others' wellbeing (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). Thus, being a fair, 
just and pro-social person equates to being moral.  Here, Turiel drew heavily from the 
philosophical literatures of morality, specifically the legacies of Kant, John Stuart Mill 
and John Rawls.  The main idea arising from this is the view of a person who can 
rationalise the world and who deserves to be treated as an end in his or herself, instead 
of being perceived as means to an end, or a tool for use by others.   
            However, Haidt (2008) presented another definition of morality, stating that 
“Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved 
psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and 
make social life possible” (p.70). Haidt argued that his conceptualisation is more 
effective as it can link to morality theories found in anthropology and evolutionary 
psychology. Furthermore, his definition of morality echoes Kohlberg's (1984) and 
Gilligan's (1982) views of morality as individuals who help others, respect their rights 
and strive to be just with them. According to Haidt's definition, these moral behaviours 
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are the outcome of the suppression of selfishness. More details of Haidt's view of 
morality will be provided later in this chapter. 
           Broadly speaking, it is hard to answer the question, what is morality as there is 
a marked absence of agreement between scholars from different disciplines.  In this 
thesis, I adopt Green’s stance (2007) regarding the definition of morality: 
 
                   As an empiricist, I believe that we can study things like life without 
defining them. Of course, we must have some clue about where to 
start, but common-sense concepts and words suffice for that. 
Biologists got their start, not by rigorously defining “life,” but by 
studying the kinds of things that ordinary people regard as living. 
This strategy, I believe, works just as well for the aspect of life that 
we call “morality.” For empiricists, rigorously defining morality is a 
distant goal, not a prerequisite. If anything, I believe that defining 
morality at this point is more of a hindrance than a help, as it may 
artificially narrow the scope of inquiry (p.1).   
 
           In this thesis, and as will be seen later in the first empirical study, I do not 
adopt one single, or specific, prior definition of morality. Instead, I investigate what 
is considered to be moral in both British and Saudi cultures.  However, it is important 
to point out that the divergent definitions of morality might partly result from two 
wider and incompatible epistemological positions of morality; Moral Universalism 
and Relativism. 
 
2.2.3 Moral universalism and relativism 
           From a moral universalism perspective, there is an assumption that individuals, 
regardless of their culture, believe in the same moral principles as a result of moral 
reasoning. Values such as justice, rights and welfare represent this universal morality 
(Vauclair, Wilson & Fischer, 2014). This epistemological position is sometimes 
labelled as moral absolutism or objectivism (Shweder, 2012).    
           In psychology circles, this focus on moral thinking or reasoning, to decide on 
moral issues, was dominant in psychology from 1960 onwards (Shweder & Haidt, 
1993), Kohlberg's theory on moral reasoning (1984) representative of this dominance. 
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Kohlberg alleged that mature moral reasoning should be based on the values of justice 
and fairness, and that these values are universal.  
           Although Kohlberg's (1984) theory has heavily influenced research around 
morality, scholars have raised many critical questions about it. For instance, it neglects 
the content of morality, overlooks the diversity of morality within different cultures 
and is biased against women (Gilligan, 1982; Shweder et al., 1987; Walker & Pitts, 
1998). Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg's theory is based on the moral 
development of men, and that moral reasoning among women was completely absent 
from it. She suggested that women perhaps have their own different moral narrative, 
and that this narrative has not been heard.   
           From her study of American adults and children, Gilligan (1982) argued that 
morality-based justice is more relevant to men, while morality-based care is more 
relevant to women. Justice and care are different moral values, and both should be 
included when morality is investigated. Gilligan's argument focuses on morality 
variations dependent on gender, and variability between cultures.  It can be argued that 
these approaches to investigating morality do not consider the potential impact of 
culture upon the self's sense of morality. Furthermore, it focuses on what morality 
should be for individuals all over the world instead of considering how morality might 
be found and represented. Therefore, defining morality and deciding what belongs to 
morality and what does not, comes from external references and not from individuals 
themselves. This leads to a further narrowing of the moral domain as researchers define 
morality not people (Vauclair, Wilson & Fischer, 2014). Adopting moral universalism 
and the researchers' definition of morality both portray what can be seen as a normative 
account of morality; people's view of morality and their cultural contexts are 
overlooked in most psychological studies of morality.  
           Paolicchi (2007) presented a rich analysis on the dominance of universal 
morality in psychology or, as he argued more precisely, in mainstream western 
psychology. By acknowledging the role of history, he suggested that moral 
universalism resulted from the western individual's desires to change their social 
contexts and gain liberation from any kind of authority, in order to develop as an 
autonomous individual. This universality in morality therefore, was invented by 
western societies. He points out that western individuals aim to distance themselves 
from social contexts and relationships with others and “going towards the ideal of a 
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generalized and abstract universe of a Kantian person who bears equal rights because 
they are equally invested with reason” (Paolicchi, 2007, p. 566). This perhaps explains 
why some anthropologists became more doubtful about moral universalism and linked 
it to “either religious missionary efforts or with secular colonial interventions” 
(Shweder, 2012, p. 87).   
           However, researchers in moral psychology were enormously enamored by this 
idea. They attempted to expand the western perspective of morality to be universal, 
perceived of as an entirely human phenomenon that can be found everywhere. 
Paolicchi (2007) further added that this advocacy of moral universalism had profound 
consequences. It separated individuals from their social contexts and isolated the role 
of emotions on moral psychology studies. This advocacy also limited morality to a 
merely rational process of abstract ideas, while in reality, morality is a wide and 
essential aspect of human daily life. Morality is comprised of different actions which 
involve emotions and personal preferences. The proper treatment of morality is one 
that considers the individual as a moral agent who lives in the social world; thus, 
unlimited and perhaps incompatible forms of morality can be identified. Paolicchi 
(2007) greatly emphasised the importance of considering the individual's self and the 
culture which this individual is surrounded with; morality here should therefore be 
investigated as a dynamic and interactive process between those two units; the 
individual and their culture.    
            In a similar argument, Haidt (2008) viewed moral universalism as a result of 
liberal progress and was greatly influenced by Kohlberg's theory on moral 
development as limited to issues such as justice and rights.  He said this bias did not 
only discount other alternative moral domains, but also ignored conservative and 
religious people in western societies who seem to endorse different moral issues.  Haidt 
(2008) urged psychologists to be more open to the possible variety of moral domains, 
to adopt an ideologically diverse view and move beyond this ethnocentrism.  It is worth 
mentioning that Haidt agreed that the issues around justice and rights can be found in 
different cultures. However, cultures tend to be different in terms of the importance 
that they give to these issues.  As Haidt stated, not all moral systems primarily seek to 
maintain or develop the independence and rights of individuals.  He concluded that 
there is a broader moral domain as well as different degrees of prioritisation of these 
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universal moral issues. He builds on this argument and addressed his model of morality 
as we will see later in this chapter. 
           Likewise, Prinz (2009) developed a comprehensive argument against moral 
universalism in his paper ‘Against Moral Nativism’.  He mainly criticised the idea that 
morality is innate rather than learned from the environment. In his paper, he targeted 
the moral nativism view, and the implication that some moral norms can be found in 
all cultures.  He disagreed with this idea and addressed the issue of harm as a widely 
acknowledged moral norm. Prinz (2009) cited some anthropology studies that showed 
the universal prohibition of harm to be misguided. Individuals not only cause harm to 
others, but they are also sometimes not concerned about harmful behaviours.  
Furthermore, people “in many cases, believe that harming others is morally 
praiseworthy” (Bloom, 2012, p.73). Prinz took his analysis further to suggest that 
people can moralise anything and that morality is a by-product of this capacity. For 
instance, smoking and obesity represent this practice of moralisation in American 
society. This suggests that there are different common norms, and that they depend on 
cultural contexts, rather than absolute universal norms of caring and fairness.  He made 
it clear that what can be found is what he called ‘near universality’ with the 
understanding that it is essential to recognise that these moral norms can take different 
patterns in different cultures.  He also suggested that it is hard to solve the cultural 
differences in morality by rational thinking. This is because these moral norms are not 
a product of deliberate and rational thinking; rather they are products of enculturation 
(Prinz, 2009). He concluded that “people moralise different things because they are 
inculcated into different value systems, systems that have emerged though cultural 
evolution under the pressure of social and ecological conditions that may be specific 
to a particular group” (Prinz, 2009, p. 187). 
           Supporting Prinz's (2009) arguments about the cultural process of morality, 
cross cultural studies, for example, have identified two significant moral concerns. The 
first one is individualising which encompasses moral norms such as justice, rights and 
the welfare of the individuals. These moral concerns are likely to be found in all 
cultures, but specifically prevail mostly in western societies. The second issue is 
binding concerns; this restricts individuals’ rights in order to promote group interests. 
These moral concerns are greatly recognised in non-western societies or collectivistic-
oriented cultures (Vauclair et al., 2014).     
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          All these objections to moral universalism and what cultural studies reveal about 
the various forms of morality across culture, attract researchers to moral relativism as 
an alternative view of morality. Moral relativism suggests that the definition of 
morality is totally subjective and relative, meaning there is no place here for moral 
reasoning.  Moral questions about what is right and wrong can yield different answers 
from different societies.  In this way, it is impossible to apply specific moral answers 
from one society to another (Shweder, 2012).  It is worth mentioning that some 
anthropological moral relativists believe that some universal moral norms can be 
found, even though some extremist versions of relativism reject this. Shweder (2102) 
suggested that the task of those non-extremist moral relativists was to make people 
more aware of other versions of morality that exist in unfamiliar places, and to avoid 
using the local moral framework to judge people’s morality in other societies.  
Furthermore, adopting moral relativism is not the end of the morality debate among 
scholars as moral universalism has found its own way.  Shweder (2012) noted that 
after the human rights declaration and feminist movement, some anthropologists have 
rethought moral universalism, supporting its narrative in relation to women and 
children’s rights, condemning oppressive forms of moral practices.  
           The question that may be raised here is: are moral universalism and relativism 
completely incompatible? Is there any possibility of incorporating these two positions 
in a more fruitful framework?  The moral philosopher David Wong proposed a new 
view of morality which analyses the morality involved in both universal and situational 
accounts. He named the latter account ‘the contextualism’ as he argued that morality 
cannot be assessed without consideration of the details of the context as well as the 
identity of the moral agent (Wong, 2005).  He also accused some anti-universalism 
scholars for maintaining what he called ‘radical permissive relativism’, according to 
which anything could be viewed as moral.  He insisted that “moralities can be both 
human inventions and subject to objective constraints” (Wong, 2009. p. 85), proposing 
the adoption of a naturalist theory of morality which is supported by the recent work 
in evolutionary theory. Wong (2009) argued that people have natural predispositions 
such as self-protection, collaboration with others and behaviours towards non-
relatives, engaging in reciprocal relationships and readiness to punish the one who 
violates the norms of reciprocal exchange practices.  All these human tendencies help 
people to live together, yet they are likely to cause inevitable conflicts. Wong 
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highlighted that culture plays a profound role here as it affords norms and rules to 
regulate these conflicts. Cultural moral norms create a balanced life of self and other 
interests.  However, as we will see later in this section, Wong's idea about balancing 
life seems not to have been accepted, at least in some cultures.   
            Shweder (2012) also suggested the concept of ‘moral pluralism’ or ‘moral 
universalism but without the uniformity’. Shweder thought that the diversity of 
morality to a certain extent represents people’s answers for universal questions such 
as the questions of ‘who am I?’ or ‘who is a member of my group and who is not?’ as 
well as questions about justice and hierarchy. Therefore, when scholars study morality, 
they actually explore how people in different cultures answer these universal and 
existential questions.  
            Acknowledging the importance of individuals as moral actors and the role of 
the cultural contexts in forming moral domains, a number of psychologists (Shweder, 
2003a; 2003b; Haidt, 2007) took a stance against the normative account associated 
with moral universalism. Instead, they have adopted a descriptive approach to studying 
morality. This account of morality is concerned with the moral domain as it is and 
considers the fundamental impact of social and cultural contexts on morality in the 
sense of the individual being the one who identifies what morality is. This approach to 
morality is relatively new. Bloom (2012) points out that in the old moral psychology 
studies, participants were required to solve, or make, a decision about some designed 
moral dilemma. However, new moral psychology, where researchers empirically 
investigate how people think about morality in daily interactions, has only appeared in 
recent decades. In the following sections, some theories that use this descriptive 
approach will be explored. 
 
2.2.3.1 The 'Big Three of Morality' 
          The anthropologist Shweder (2003a; 2003b) strongly argued that morality was 
shaped and influenced by culture. He suggested that culture provides individuals and 
groups with answers to different fundamental questions in the moral domain, such as 
what the right and wrong action in day-to-day situations is. Shweder and his colleagues 
(1997) employed ethnographic methods to investigate self-construal in the United 
States and India. Their work showed that there are significant differences between 
these two groups. American participants based their sense of morality on individuals' 
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rights; this moral view, or judgment, is not the same seen amongst Indian people.  The 
Indian participants formed their moral judgments in term of social rules and 
community duties as well as religion-based morality, about which they were much 
more concerned. Given that the self is not perceived as an independent unity in all 
cultures, this has led to variation in moral concerns among individuals, specifically in 
non-western countries, thus the conception of morality should be broadened to capture 
this range of morality.    
            Shweder, inspired by this study, proposed three major ethics, or what is 
sometimes referred to as 'the big three of morality’.  These three ethics can exist in any 
culture but are different in terms of which morality will be prioritised or emphasised 
as Shweder's work in self-construal revealed (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1997).      
            The first of the 'big three' ethics is autonomy, which includes moral issues such 
as justice, the individual's rights, personal well-being and avoiding harm. Here, the 
individual is considered as an independent agent and has the ability to freely make 
decisions and choices. The individual's freedom is conditional, constrained by the 
promise that individual behaviours do not cause harm to other people or affect their 
own rights (Shweder et al., 1997). There is no kind of obligation to others or general 
social norms, except that “obligations come from being a person” (Shweder, 2003a, p. 
98).         
           The second ethic is community, this including moral themes such as 
interdependence, hierarchy, loyalty, honour and obedience to authority. Here, morality 
is based on a person's membership of social groups.  Community, as a moral code, 
aims to sustain and protect interpersonal relationships and moral obligations to others 
(Shweder, 2003a).     
           The final ethic is divinity, which includes themes such as sanctity, sin and 
purity. The self here is seen as being connected to a higher power, thus the body is 
supposed to be sacred, the main function of morality is to protect this body from 
degradation (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, 2003b). The content of divinity 
does not limit it to any specific religion.  In fact, it can be based on any religious 
traditions, as this type of ethics initially resulted from an analysis of two types of 
religion: monotheistic such as Christian and polytheistic traditions such as Hinduism 
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in India. Divinity is therefore flexible and can encompass various religious tradition 
(Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001).   
           Several studies have used this model to study morality in different cultures. For 
instance, one study showed that American participants based their moral judgments on 
autonomy, while participants from the Philippines used all three ethics in their 
judgments (Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001).  Haidt and his 
colleagues (1993) conducted a study that supports Shweder's model where participants 
from Brazil and the United States were presented with stories about a woman who 
cleaned her toilet using her country's flag, and a man who has sexual intercourse with 
a chicken that he then cooks and eats. The idea behind these stories was to see how 
participants responded to them, as both included violations of codes of moral conduct. 
Participants from the upper classes in both countries considered that both represented 
harmless behaviour, suggesting no violation of the moral code. In contrast, participants 
from less affluent classes in both countries found this behaviour insulting. They found 
the woman's behaviour lacked respect, which is parallel to community ethics, while 
the man's behaviour was dubbed disgusting, which is reflective of the divinity ethic.  
University students from both countries showed more frequent concerns with morality 
issues that related to autonomy over any which related to the other two ethics. In 
general, non-university American adults tended to use autonomy-linked rhetoric more 
than their Brazilian counterparts. Among Brazilian adults, morality essentially 
involved two ethics: autonomy and community. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
utility of this model goes beyond identified moral differences between cultures, as it 
can also detect how morality might vary according to social class or age.   
           It is worth mentioning that all of these studies used ethnographic and coding 
methods to measure the three ethics. A standardised instrument was developed by 
Guerra and Ginger-Sorolla (2010) to measure the big three ethics of morality, giving 
an alternative approach to data collection instead of relying on the ethnographic 
methods alone. Perhaps this will encourage psychologists to use this theory to conduct 
more studies into the content of morality in different cultural settings.  
 
 2.2.3.2 Moral Foundation Theory 
 It is apparent that researchers in morality are limited to issues of harm and fairness or 
individual rights. In fact, these two issues have persisted in, and dominated 
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psychological research, with some exceptions such as Shweder's model; however, this 
model comes from anthropological studies, not from a psychological perspective. 
Critically, scholars have questioned this exclusivity, and speculated about other moral 
concerns or issues in non-western cultures. Some have insisted that by focusing on 
fairness and care, other moral domains have been, and continue to be, overlooked 
(Graham et al., 2011).     
            As a response to this criticism and in order to systemically investigate cultural 
variation in morality, Haidt and his colleagues provided their own theory.   This theory 
has two cornerstones which explains why it is labelled as Moral Foundation theory 
(MFT) and Social Intuitionism (SI). The first assumption of this theory is that most 
moral judgments are made unconsciously and automatically. Haidt believed that those 
moral judgments are innate, as individuals use their 'gut feelings' to decide about moral 
issues. Instead of thinking about a moral dilemma then later making a decision - as 
assumed in rational models - in this theory, moral decisions or intuitions come first, 
the individual then rationally justifying their actions. The second cornerstone is that 
these moral intuitions result from individuals in different cultures being 'pre-wired' 
with a moral ability or capacity, thus said intuitions are considered the foundations of 
morality (Graham et al., 2011; Musschenga, 2013). Moral intuitions here are moral 
judgements that do not result from reasoning or deliberate awareness (Haidt, 2001).  
            Haidt (2012) believed that morality can be considered as a language, in the 
sense that both are universal and major parts of psychological mechanisms, needed to 
adapt to the human environment. However, both can take different forms as they are 
shaped by cultural contexts. Haidt's definition of morality attempted to incorporate 
views from evolutionary psychology and anthropology, to capture the richness of the 
morality domain. His attempt empirically operated in this theory, with the emphasis 
upon social and cultural effects on morality. Haidt adopted a descriptive position in 
his conceptualisation of morality, many scholars insistent on that role as they try to 
understand and explain various social phenomena; Haidt is not an exception here. He 
clearly indicated his descriptive position, as he stated in his book, The Righteous Mind 
(2012), “But in psychology our goal is descriptive. We want to discover how the moral 
mind actually works, not how it ought to work” (p. 120, italics in original script).  
            Moral foundation theory posits five innate foundations, or mechanisms, shaped 
by culture (Graham et al., 2011). The first is care/harm, which includes virtues such as 
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caring, compassion, nurturing and preventing harmful behaviours. The second is 
fairness/reciprocity, which includes notions such as justice, equality and reciprocal 
behaviours. These two foundations are the basis of the individualising approach to 
morality, where the individual is the locus of moral values (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009; Graham et al., 2011). These moral concerns are likely to be found in all cultures 
but are particularly prevalent in western societies because such moral concerns are in 
line with western values such as individuals’ rights, justice and the importance of 
caring for the welfare of the individual (Vauclair et al., 2014).    
          The third foundation is in-group/loyalty, which includes concerns such as 
patriotism, belonging to a group and being loyal and obligated to that group. The fourth 
is authority/respect, which includes human concerns about respect, social order and 
the maintenance of hierarchies. The last foundation is purity/sanctity, which includes 
issues related to self-control of desires, purity, religion and spirituality (Graham et al., 
2009; Graham et al., 2011).  Integrating religion with purity concerns can be explained 
by the fact that they both share the comparable restrictive views of social-moral reality 
and place an emphasis on self-discipline, scared values and duties (Haidt, Koller, & 
Dias, 1993). These last three moral foundations reflect the binding approach to 
morality, which restricts individuals’ freedom to promote group interests. These moral 
concerns are mainly recognised in non-western societies, or collectivistic-oriented 
cultures, where more emphasis is placed on groups interests, social orders, and 
maintaining societal traditions (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Vauclair et al., 2014). For 
example, previous research using moral foundation theory has found cross- cultural 
differences between the East and West in a large study of moral concerns (Graham et 
al., 2011). Eastern participants (from South Asia, East Asia, and South Asia), reported 
slightly higher scores in terms of harm, fairness and authority in comparison to 
participants from Western countries. In addition, the Eastern participants demonstrated 
stronger ingroup and purity moral concerns compared with Western participants (from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Western Europe). Graham and 
colleagues (2011) suggested, therefore, that researchers can use moral foundation 
theory when studying cross-cultural differences in the moral domain.   
           According to the moral foundations theory, all human beings are 'pre-wired' 
with these models, but these models themselves can be encouraged or weakened by 
two factors. These are internal factors, which consist of the individual's personality, 
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and external factors, which include the individual's experiences that have been partly 
shaped and influenced by social and cultural contexts. Both of these factors explain 
why individuals are different regarding their moral views, be that within the same 
culture and/or across various cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Notably, there is a 
similarity between this model and Shweder's model. Harm and fairness are similar to 
the autonomy ethic, while authority and in-group are consistent with the Shweder's 
ethic of community. Purity in MFT corresponds to Shweder's ethic of divinity (Graham 
et al., 2011).               
           Haidt and Graham (2007) used this theory to understand conflicting views on 
politics between conservatives and liberals in the United States. Their analysis 
revealed that liberals tend to prioritise harm and fairness as they are concerned more 
about the individual. In contrast, conservatives place more emphasis on moral 
institutions that concern themselves with relationships between members of society, 
and how those can be used to regulate people's behaviours. They tend to prioritise in-
groups, authority and purity to a significant degree. In terms of moral variations within 
eastern and western cultures, Haidt and his colleagues compared a sample (2,258 
participants) from eastern cultures such as South and East Asia, with a larger sample 
(104,893 participants) from western cultures including the United Kingdom, United 
States and Western Europe. The results indicated that eastern participants, when 
compared with western participants, demonstrated more moral concerns related to the 
in-group and purity foundations. Here, moral concerns about in-groups can be 
understood in the light of collectivism theory, since for individuals in collectivistic 
societies such as Asian cultures, the group comes first and then the individual. With 
regard to moral concerns about purity, it can be justified by considering the importance 
of purity in religious traditions (Graham et al., 2011).  
            Moral foundation theory is a very flexible theory since it does not have any 
prior hypotheses or assumptions about what can be considered moral, leaving room 
for researchers to include various aspects of morality across different cultures. For that 
reason, it can be argued that MFT is a bottom-up model, both theoretically and 
empirically (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). 
 
2.2.3.3 Schwartz’ Value Theory 
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          Values have been a central topic in many social sciences, and researchers 
theorising about and measuring them. Spending more than two decades identifying 
and refining basic values in different regions of the world, the psychologist Shalom 
Schwartz, with others, provided a contemporary framework of values (Vaisey, & 
Miles, 2014). This theory provides great insight into how values vary within and across 
cultures.   
          Values as a concept can be defined as “trans-situational goals that vary in 
importance and serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or group” (Schwartz, 
2007, p. 712).   In this sense, are values and morality similar structures? The answer is 
that morality and values are similar in some respects and different in others. For 
example, both morality and values have evaluative aspects, as people use both of them 
to evaluate situations, others and choices. Furthermore, different societies praise 
people who exhibit morality and values, while people who lack them are likely to be 
disapproved of.  It can therefore be stated that morality and values have profound 
social implications (Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2011). However, some scholars argue 
that values as a concept, are broader than morality.  In this way, different aspects of 
morality can be part of values, while not all values are considered part of the moral 
domain (Schwartz, 2007; Sverdlik, et al., 2011).  
            In Schwartz' theory (1992, 2007), there are 10 identified values: power, 
hedonism, achievement, stimulation, self-direction, benevolence, universalism, 
tradition, conformity and security. These values are structured in a circle and divided 
into two major dimensions based on the potential patterns of conflict amongst values. 
In the first dimension, tradition, conformity and security values represent the 
conservation values which significantly prioritise the stability of society, self-control, 
loyalty and obedience. Conservation values are placed against openness to change 
values which consist of self-direction and stimulation. These values express the ideas 
of exploring life, self-dependency and freedom. The second dimension includes self-
enhancement and self-transcendence values. Self-enhancement is comprised of power, 
achievement and hedonism, putting an emphasis on personal interests such as 
ambitions, self-satisfaction and wealth.  As expected, these values conflict with self-
transcendence values where universalism and benevolence values are located.  The 
former values promote equality and welfare for all people and nature, the latter 
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concerned with the welfare of people who are related to the person or in-group 
members (Schwartz, 2007; Sverdlik et al., 2011; Vaisey, & Miles, 2014). 
           How can this model help to measure morality? As noticed in the components 
of Schwartz's theory, there are many themes which are parallel to the themes present 
in other morality theories. For example, and starting with Kohlberg's (1984) theory, 
which identifies morality in terms of justice and rights issues, universalism values can 
be equated with this moral emphasis. Gilligan's (1982) morality-based care is identical 
to benevolence values as empirical findings showed that women score higher than men 
in care ethics and benevolence values. Both these findings highlight the values of 
caring about family, friends and other groups. Turning to Shweder's (2003a) model of 
the 'big three of morality', autonomy ethics resonate with benevolence and 
universalism values; both stress the importance of avoiding harmful and unjust actions 
and enhancing the individual's rights and well-being. The ethics of community is 
largely parallel with tradition, conformity and security values; all reflect group-
orientated features.  The ethics of community is similar to benevolence values which 
attribute the importance of welfare to in-group members. The ethics of divinity overlap 
with traditional values regarding respect, societal practices and beliefs (Shweder, 
2003a; Sverdlik et al., 2011). Regarding Moral Foundation Theory, benevolence and 
universalism values can be aligned with both the care/harm and the fairness/reciprocity 
foundations. However, it can be suggested that the care/harm foundation is more 
similar to benevolence than universalism values, while fairness/reciprocity 
foundations are more related to universalism than benevolence values. The in-
group/loyalty and authority/respect foundations reflect the values of security, tradition 
and conformity. The in-the group/loyalty foundation is comparable with benevolence 
values in the sense of caring about the wellbeing of in-group members. Finally, the 
purity/sanctity foundation can be linked to some aspects of tradition and conformity 
values, which emphasise honouring group practices and religious customs (Graham & 
Haidt, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Sverdlik et al., 2011).   
           Notably, all moral models highlight half of the values circle. Consistent with 
this observation, Schwartz's (2007) conducted a study to discover which values people 
consider to be moral. More than 80% of respondents perceived benevolence values as 
moral, and more than 70% linked tradition, universalism, security and conformity 
values to morality. In contrast, fewer than 20% thought that power, hedonism, 
 39 
achievement and stimulation values are moral values, and fewer than 30% considered 
more than one of the self-direction values to be moral (Schwartz, 2007).  Sverdlik and 
his colleagues (2011) pointed out that the other half of the values circle also resonates 
with moral domains. In this half, self-enhancement and openness to change are located, 
which are both expected to be viewed as immoral values, for example, self-
enhancement values reflect the idea that the individual's interests should be prioritised 
more than the group's interests. Any behaviour related to these values is likely to be 
seen particularly in the societies that emphasise those foundations as a moral violation 
of the care/harm and the fairness/reciprocity. Given that openness to change values 
place importance on being independent, creative and free, any behaviour that mirror 
these values is likely to be judged as immoral by people who place greater emphasis 
on the purity/sanctity and authority/respect moral foundations.    
           From a cross-cultural perspective, individuals from non-western societies give 
more weight to values such as tradition and conformity in comparison to western 
individuals. This implying that the dominant moral outlook in any given society can 
be predicted from the values which are highly emphasised (Sverdlik et al., 2011). 
Schwartz (2006) further developed the theory of cultural value orientations. In this 
theory, the first dimension is autonomy versus embeddedness. In autonomous cultures, 
people are considered to be independent and unique.  In contrast, in cultures that 
emphasise embeddedness, people are not perceived as separate units, and where 
tradition and obedience values are highly praised.  Egalitarian versus hierarchy is the 
second dimension; people in an egalitarian society are socialised to be concerned about 
equality and social justice as well as others’ wellbeing.  In a hierarchical society, there 
is inequality of power and recourses between people. The third dimension is harmony 
versus mastery; harmonious cultures highlight the importance of nature, accepting 
others and living in peace.  In a mastery orientation, people are encouraged to be 
competitive, assertive and ambitious.  
             Schwartz (2007, p.711) raised the following interesting question: “how 
inclusive our moral universe is, the community to which we apply moral values?” 
Moral inclusiveness reflects the idea that moral values apply to out-groups or to people 
from different nationalities, ethnicities and religions; while moral exclusiveness is the 
opposite; people perceive others as outsiders and do not include them when they apply 
moral values. Schwartz suggested that people within and across cultures, vary when 
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they draw boundaries for application of morality.  His study revealed that people in 
egalitarian societies have more moral inclusiveness than people in societies with an 
embeddedness orientation. Testing democracy as a political system, which emphasises 
people’s rights as well as freedom and application of morality, he found that people in 
democratic societies tend to hold an inclusive conceptualisation of morality. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
            In summary, the theory about morality in relation to culture points towards the 
idea that morality tends to vary across cultures. However, as noted before, moral 
identity research and moral psychology in general, have focused on the morality of 
fairness and caring, or the individualising moral domain.  Despite this, the idea of 
broadening moral domains has not been accepted by some researchers.  In what 
follows, I elaborate further on this. 
 
2.2.5 A critique of moving beyond the individualising moral domain   
           In the previous section, I have touched on the heated debate amongst scholars 
on how we should approach morality and whether it is a universal or a relative domain.  
This debate is actually more dynamic amongst anthropologists, but it has also attracted 
the attention of psychologists since the introduction of the moral foundation theory by 
Graham and colleagues (2011).  However, the influences of Graham and colleagues’ 
paper on the field of moral psychology has led to even more argument about what 
should be included as morality. To some extent, it challenges the longstanding 
dominant view on morality as care and justice and what is concerned the liberal view 
of morality.  Moral foundation theory comes as an expansion to morality, consisting 
of conservative concerns such as respect, obedience to authority and religion-based 
morality (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014).  
             In response to the basic notion of pluralism in the moral foundations theory, 
Harris (2010) refutes the expansion of this moral domain, suggesting that morality is 
only about perceiving harm.  Harris’s argument here is related to what is called ‘moral 
monism’ (Lovett, 2010), where the idea of variations in morality is completely rejected 
in favour of one single version of morality based on rational thinking and related to 
issues around caring and fairness. For instance, Harris (2010) debated Haidt and 
colleagues’ moral foundation theory:  
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                     It seems possible, for instance, that his five foundations of morality 
are simply facets of a more general concern about harm. What, after 
all, is the problem with desecrating a copy of the Qur’an? There 
would be no problem but for the fact that people believe that the 
Qur’an is a divinely authored text. Such people almost surely 
believe that some harm could come to them or to their tribe as a 
result of such sacrileges—if not in this world, then in the next 
(Harris, 2010, p. 89).  
 
           Moral foundation theorists have responded to Harris’s argument by asking 
questions about the possibility of only relying on harm as a foundation to cover the 
diversity of human morality.  For example, Graham and colleagues argue that harm 
cannot explain moral emotion such as disgust and the role that emotion plays in moral 
actions and judgements. Furthermore, harm does a poor job of explaining why 
Muslims are likely to be morally insulted by the desecration of their holy book 
(Graham et al., 2012). These theorists point out that Harris’s account of morality is 
intensely normative, as he is assuming that science should intervene in morality by 
posing its view on human principles. The title of Harris’s book title is How science 
can determine human values, in which he bases, or reduces morality solely to what 
makes people happy and prevents them from carrying out any harmful act (Graham et 
al., 2012). Harris’s argument and morality-based fairness represents what can be called 
liberal morality or ethics.  
           Kugler et al., (2014) also critically questioned this extension of morality. They 
attack and negate the expansion of morality to embrace conservative moral concerns 
such as obedience to authority, loyalty to an individual’s ingroup and conformity to 
society’s traditions and to principles of purity. Kugler and colleagues (2014) clearly 
warned about the plausibility of adding these moral concerns, since they are positively 
correlated to prejudice, hostility, racism and discrimination.  Integrating conservative 
morality or ethics leads to a threat to human life, as those moral concerns - if they 
really are moral - are remarkably similar to an ‘authoritarian personality’, which plays 
an important role in phenomena such as aggression, sexism and homophobia and 
usually results in harmful consequences. Kugler and colleagues (2014) cite many 
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studies to show the dark side of what so-called ‘conservative morality’ is, in order to 
support their argument against moral foundation theory. In contrast, Kugler and 
colleagues (2014) are true believers of the so-called liberal ethics encompassing care 
and fairness foundations. They doubted how researchers could agree with Haidt and 
colleagues about incorporating these kinds of concerns, which are immoral, or at least 
amoral. In the same critical vein, Jot (2009) raised concerns about including 
conservative morality in moral foundation theory.  He refuted this kind of morality and 
warned that it might validate or legitimate people expressing their prejudice and 
sexism, for example. Here, Jot is greatly defending morality-based care and fairness.  
            Haidt and colleagues (Graham et al.,2012) counter this criticism by stating that 
this kind of argument against those three foundations of their theory - loyalty, authority 
and purity -is merely normative, while their theory is purely descriptive. They 
reiterated that their theory “is about the foundations of morality as it is observed around 
the world, not about the moral systems that ought to prevail” (Graham et al., 2012, p. 
35).  Moral foundation theorists do not deny the link between conservative morality 
and authoritarian personality (see Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Graham et al., 
2011), however, they do not elaborate further on any consequences of such 
associations. This silence can be understood as a part of their choice, or adoption of 
descriptive accounts of morality, documenting the variation of moral life around the 
world, without any kind of judgment (Graham et al., 2012).  
            Haste (2013) argues about other problematic issues related to labels that 
Graham, Haidt and colleagues (Graham, et al., 2009) employ in the context of the 
United States, such as liberal, conservative, right and left. Here, Haste (2013) argued 
that there is more diversity in the political environment than those limited labels or 
categories suggest, especially among conservatives, as they are more heterogeneous.  
Furthermore, we can apply these narrow political labels to people outside the USA, 
where the political spectrum is more diverse, such as in the UK and most European 
countries.  Haste (2013) gave the example of how a ‘liberal’ in the UK is also called a 
‘centrist’, perceived of as a party of the left according to social party traditions. Such 
a case raises questions about how both liberals in the UK and the United States can be 
treated in the same manner in terms of the moral concerns that they hold. In this matter, 
Haste called for more consideration about using American political terms when we 
talk about other political environments.  In a similar vein scrutinising these labels, 
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Blum (2013) questioned first the actual meaning of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, as the 
meaning varies depending on political values, the meaning of policy, self-ascription 
and philosophical classifications. He points out that Haidt fails to disambiguate the use 
of those terms in his work on moral foundations theory (Blum, 2013). However, it can 
be said that this argument here criticises one aspect of the application of moral 
foundation theory, the relationship between moral foundation and politics, rather than 
the theory itself.   
            Furthermore, Blum (2013) argued that liberals still show a certain degree of 
loyalty to their families and condemn students disrespecting their teachers. He noted 
that Haidt asked his sample about loyalty and authority in terms of political identity 
rather than in a general sense; therefore, those moral concerns are conditional, which 
explains why liberal participants do not endorse this kind of concern. In contrast, 
fairness and care concerns are both unconditional; they are independent and not solely 
related to evoking certain values or identities, as people are always encouraged to 
endorse those kinds of moral foundations (Blum, 2013). For that reason, fairness and 
care are fit to be taught in moral education rather than conservative morality. 
            Moving to some points that support the other three moral foundations, loyalty, 
authority and purity, as Haidt (2008) argues, psychology as a discipline is ethnocentric 
and dominated by western philosophy, this leading to ignorance and the exclusion of 
those who hold different values and views, either people who are mostly conservative 
and live in the USA, or people in other parts of the world.  As mentioned before, Haidt 
and colleagues (2012) adopted a descriptive account rather than a normative one for 
their moral foundation theory. In this way, they portray what people in different 
cultures identified without any imposition of prior assumptions.  There is much room 
to incorporate many kinds of morality rather than narrowing morality down to fairness 
and care.  
            Interestingly, Haidt is not the only researcher calling for this expansion of 
morality. Shweder and colleagues (1997) introduced the model of the big three of 
morality: autonomy, divinity and community. Moral foundation theory came later in 
support Shweder’s model. The influence of moral foundation theory on psychologists 
can be explained by considering Haidt’s mapping of morality and politics, which is 
not the case in Shewder’s model.  Both models are useful to investigate the variation 
of morality across cultures and not only across the political spectrum.   
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           The debate between people who defend liberal views of morality against the 
other three moral concerns likely resulted from adopting a particular moral view, 
mostly the morality of justice and care.  In general, variations in the moral domain are 
likely to fuel, at least partially, the ongoing disagreement or ‘culture war’ between 
liberals and conservatives (for more details, see Graham et al., 2009). This opinion has 
been supported by a recent study that investigated the predictability of morality for 
political behaviours and attitudes (Miles & Vaisey, 2015). In this study, when 
compared with religiosity and other demographic predictors, morality accounted for 
almost a third of the diversity of political attitudes; the researchers concluded that 
morality seems “to best differentiate self-placement on the liberalism/conservatism 
continuum” (p. 263).  Thus, the discussion about expanding morality, or not, seems to 
be a by-product of general views regarding life and specifically moral views 
themselves. However, another recent study shows that other factors can reduce the 
dark side of loyalty, authority and purity concerns or conservative morality (Smith, 
Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). The authors here showed that other variables can 
elevate the endorsement of these moral concerns. People who highly endorse those 
moral concerns and who also scored highly on moral identity, tended to be more 
tolerant towards people who belonged to an outgroup. Therefore, there is much to 
consider when we investigate conservative moral foundations. 
           To conclude, moral foundation theory begins to stimulate more arguments 
about morality and further studies conducted by the researchers who both support and 
oppose this model. In this thesis, building on the spirit of Haidt’s work, the exploration 
of morality will focus on cultures other than the United States and its political 
ideology.  It will be shown later how morality from a layperson’s view, stretches from 
care/justice concerns to include other moral concerns, specifically among Saudi 
participants who map their moral domains by themselves.   
 
2.2.6 Weaving it together and connecting the dots  
           After having delved deeper into the two combined elements of moral identity, 
identity and morality, it can be concluded that culture is a significant aspect that should 
not be overlooked when researchers seek to understand moral identity and its 
manifestations in different cultures (see Figure 2). 
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           Greenfield (2000a) pointed out that all theories in the psychology of culture 
have common central principles regarding how any given society or culture handles or 
navigates the relationship between the individual and the group. According to this 
view, society tends to prioritise either the person or the group.  Here, the same view 
can be applied when we come to morality and culture, and the common thread running 
through both lines of research concerning identity and morality is the management of 
the relationship between the person and the group. Thus, the unifying literature in 
identity and morality related to culture is the relationship between the individual and 
the group or society.  In consequence, I would argue here that we need to think about 
our moral identity in terms of that relationship as well. To put it differently, the 
question is to what extent a certain culture or society gives importance to individuals 
and groups and how the boundaries between the two can be defined. 
           Nonetheless, temporary moral identity literature has overlooked the theoretical 
and empirical considerations of the role of culture in forming people’s moral identity, 
as is demonstrated in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
          Figure 2. Two theoretical frameworks that inform this thesis about the role of culture in 
forming moral identity 
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Chapter 3 
Moral Identity 
 
    The rules of morality are not the conclusion of our reason 
 (Hume, 1739-1740, p. 325). 
 
             In this chapter, I will discuss various definitions of moral identity, and in the 
course of this, theoretical models of moral identity will be described in detail. I will 
then address a range of concepts that are related to moral identity, in order to 
understand how moral identity and these concepts are addressed in psychological 
research.  Some criticisms of moral identity concept will be outlined. Finally, I will 
summarise the preceding discussions will be summarised. 
 
3.1 Introduction to moral identity  
              If, as suggested by Hume’s quotation above, morality is not ruled by reason, 
then what is it ruled by? Personality and identity theories are used to fill the gap in our 
understanding of moral behaviours.  Here, a further question to be raised is: why have 
identity and self-concepts been left out of morality research in the past few decades? 
It is suggested that if these topics even had a place, it would be located in the margins 
(Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). In reality, the cognitive traditional 
framework has dominated, specifically Kohlberg’s (1984) model of moral 
development.  The fact that Kohlberg himself denied, or did not welcome identity as a 
concept, might contribute to the understanding of moral development.  Kohlberg's 
position here likely represents the general attitudes of researchers towards 
incorporating identity, or self, into their empirical investigations of morality. This 
neglect of identity can be explained by the following reasons.  
             First, Kohlberg (1984) proposed six stages of moral development in children, 
similar to Piaget's well-known stages of cognitive development. These stages are not 
about how individuals reflect upon themselves but rather they are concerned with how 
a child develops moral reasoning and becomes a moral agent. By this principle, there 
is no place for identity in these moral stages.  Second, Kohlberg assumed that moral 
personality traits are difficult to prove as studies did not confirm any kind of moral 
traits consistent across different situations. Furthermore, Kohlberg approached 
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morality from a Kantian perspective which gives more weight to moral judgment 
related to obligation and duty.   As a result of adopting this philosophy, less attention 
was paid to Aristotelian's morality thoughts about the development of a virtuous 
person (Kohlberg, 1984; Narvaez et al., 2006).  Another reason to refuse identity and 
personality as factors behind moral actions is that these concepts were thought of as 
barriers to moral thinking.  In this way, they led to a great bias that suggested that 
individuals should be encouraged to overcome them in order to reach subjective 
judgments. This notion about seeing oneself as a barrier to engaging in moral and 
rational actions can be considered a result of Kantian influence as Kohlberg believed 
that an individual's self is a place of desires and tendencies; thus, any attempt to link 
this self to moral thinking runs the risk of diminishing individual rationality (Narvaez 
& Lapsley, 2009).  One reason for the marginalisation of identity concepts in moral 
psychology research is likely due to the dominance of psychoanalysis theories and a 
lack of support for the idea of the strength of the ego and superego. These were not 
regarded as promising concepts to use to explain moral behaviours (Monin & Jordan, 
2009).  Finally, Kohlberg (1971) thought that the narratives of identity and self-support 
were part of a moral relativism position which leads to poor and inadequate moral 
education. 
            This discounting of identity and self came at a price as it is difficult to build an 
adequate framework of moral behaviours by relying only on cognitive functions.  
Therefore, attention has turned to other concepts such as moral identity. 
 
3.2 Defining moral identity 
           Defining moral identity is not an easy task, as this concept combines two themes 
that are central to psychology: morality and identity. Researchers tend to conceptualise 
the meaning of moral identity in different ways. One of the prominent researchers on 
the topic of moral identity, Augusto Blasi, considered moral identity to be a reflection 
of the degree to which being moral is important and central to one's self (Blasi, 1990). 
In agreement with Blasi's perspective, Colby and Damon (1992) referred to moral 
identity as the unity between individual interests and morality. Likewise, others have 
described moral identity as a moral agent that acts according to a person's thoughts 
about other’s rights and welfare (Moshman, 2013). Aquino and Reed (2002, p.1424) 
offered another definition of moral identity: “a self-conception organised around a set 
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of moral traits”. Consistent with this definition, Bergman (2002) defined moral identity 
as a type of identity that embodies the moral aspects of the individual's self. From a 
sociological standpoint, moral identity is not considered to be a central part of the 
person but is simply one of the multiple identities that a person has (Stets, 2010; Stets 
& Carter, 2011).  
             In contrast to these approaches, some researchers have defined moral identity 
as an individual's willingness to engage in moral roles and actions, such as volunteer 
services (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hart, 2005). This strand sees moral identity as role-
based rather than as identity or self-based.  
             In this thesis, moral identity is understood to be one of many identities that 
any individual may have meaning we can say that all people have a moral identity 
but to a varying degree. In this sense, the moral identity is not necessarily an essential 
identity, and it is based on moral traits and concerns. This view of moral identity is 
deliberately preferred, to make room to investigate what it takes to be a moral person 
in a specific culture. Here, I do not indicate what those moral traits or concerns are 
or what they should be in contrast to the majority of researchers when they narrow 
down moral concerns to be exclusively based on the rights and welfare of others. 
 
3.3 Theoretical models of moral identity 
            Just as there are various definitions of moral identity, there are also diverse 
approaches to the matter of moral identity and in how scholars try to conceptualise this 
identity. Outlines of these approaches and models are important to present the current 
state of moral identity theorisation and for how, as is discussed at the end of this 
chapter, this theorisation has overlooked the importance of cultural factors in shaping 
and forming moral identity.     
3.3.1 Character Perspectives  
            Augusto Blasi (1983, 1984) was the first scholar to introduce the concept of 
moral self. He argued that moral self, or identity, may fill the gap between moral 
reasoning and moral behaviour.  
           Blasi's moral self has three components. The first was judgment of 
responsibility, this component suggesting that prior to engaging in any moral action, 
people do not only judge the situation in moral terms, i.e. informed by morality, but 
also decide whether they have any responsibility to act in a given situation (Blasi, 
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1983). This judgment of responsibility frequently originates from the individual's 
moral self.  The second component, moral identity, was said by Blasi to be informed 
by individual differences in the degree to which being moral is important and crucial 
to the individual's sense of self (Blasi, 1995). Blasi's third component of the moral self 
is self-consistency, this is the human tendency to act in a way that is consistent with 
one's moral self (Blasi, 1984). This last component can be considered as a motivator 
of moral behaviour, because the individual tries, as far as possible, to act upon the 
prompts from his or her moral self. Failure to do this leads to self-inconsistency, 
something which is likely to have negative implications.  
           The importance of these moral identity components and in particular, the 
maintenance of self-consistency, has been used by other scholars to further scrutinise 
of moral identity and how this might affect the ways in which individuals take moral 
actions in day-to-day situations. Examples of such work include Damon (1984), 
Damon and Hart (1992), and Hart, Yates, Fegley and Wilson (1995). According to 
Damon (1984), in the period from childhood to adolescence, an individual's definition 
of self is interwoven with morality. Consequently, when moral values have been 
robustly unified with the self, this unification manifests itself in a moral identity which 
leads that person to engage in given moral actions in different situations (Colby & 
Damon, 1993).  
           Blasi (2004, 2005), has since revised his initial framework and proposed three 
new elements, or requirements, deemed important in order for a person to develop 
moral identity. The first of these is willpower, that generates a sense of self-control 
over temptations and leads people to behave according to their morality. Integrity, the 
second element, was defined as a unity between one's self and one's moral sense. 
People vary in the extent to which they are concerned about this unity and the extent 
to which it guides them in decisions regarding moral actions. The third of Blasi's 
elements is moral desire, which reflects how, and to what degree, people prioritise 
moral goals or values such as honesty and justice in a hierarchical Organisations as 
aspects of their identity. It is noteworthy that this revised model is regarded as more 
accurate than its predecessor, because it specifically demonstrates the conditions 
through which the moral identity becomes the guide for a person's behaviour (Shao, 
Aquino & Freeman, 2008). Generally speaking, Blasi's model has successfully 
contributed to the understanding of the functions of moral systems. This was partly as 
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a result of its success in shifting scholarly attentions away from a focus on moral 
reasoning and judgments, to a perspective which acknowledges the role of identity, or 
personality, on morality (Blasi, 2005).    
           Blasi’s (2005) model has been well received and has led to increased 
understanding of moral behaviour as moral reasoning failed to justify or explain the 
range of moral behaviours such as social activism, caring volunteers and even truly 
extraordinary moral actions such as the rescue or protection of Jews during the 
Holocaust (Shao et al., 2008).  Hardy and Carlo (2005) pointed out that Blasi's model 
encapsulated some important theoretical concepts. First, it considers the role of 
personality, or identity, in moral behaviours and second, it shows how moral identity 
can generate moral actions. Furthermore, Blasi's work suggested that individual 
differences, in terms of moral actions, are not limited to, or by, moral capacity, such 
as the ability to undertake moral reasoning.  People also vary in their desires to act 
morally. Blasi also emphasised the role of self-consistency as a link to, and guides, of 
the harmony between moral identity and moral behaviour. Finally, the notion of moral 
identity clarifies why some people show a steady commitment to their moral values in 
their daily life interactions with others, because this is driven by moral identity.    
            However, some scholars argue that Blasi's (2005) model has limitations, 
specifically that it has failed to recognise and explain exact moral behaviour. For 
example, Blasi's model portrays moral actions as being entirely the products of 
deliberate and mindful thinking, overlooking the idea that there are many day-to-day 
moral actions which are taken automatically and without deliberation (Blasi, 1983; 
Hardy & Carlo 2005; Shao et al., 2008). Furthermore, this model does not consider the 
suggestion that individuals have multiple identities, meaning that it is not clear how, 
and in which situations, the moral identity will be relatively more important to a 
person's identity and guide their behaviour (Shao et al., 2008).  
            In the same vein, Colby and Damon (1992) conceptualised moral identity as a 
unity between the moral self and moral goals. They assumed that in the case of people 
who are seen as moral exemplars, these individuals integrate the sense of morality with 
the sense of self. Consequently, when they show a high degree of moral commitment, 
they do not sacrifice their self, nor do they need to show self-denial. In contrast, such 
people act upon their self-desire as the definition of their self is centred on morality. 
Such people place such an importance upon morality that it prevents them from 
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experiencing any desire conflicts or dilemmas when they engage in moral actions 
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011).    
            Furthermore, and again viewing moral identity from the perspective of 
character, some scholars have equated moral identity with an altruistic personality or 
have seen moral identity as being the core of this personality (Staub, 2005). Human 
traits such as empathy, a sense of social responsibility, the inclination to help others 
and moral reasoning, have, when combined, been termed an 'altruistic personality'. 
This personality has a strong tendency to stimulate pro-social behaviour and avoid 
anti-social behaviour. The role of altruistic personality can be attributed to a person's 
behaviours regardless of whether this behaviour occurs intentionally or unconsciously 
(Shao et al., 2008).   
           While the conceptualisation of moral identity from a character perspective 
seems to rely on traits of personality and morality, some scholars have drawn on social 
cognitive theory to articulate the concept of moral identity.  
 
3.3.2 Social Cognitive Perspectives 
           According to social cognitive theory, personality is shaped by the dynamic 
interaction between cognitive-affective processes and the impacts of everyday life 
situations (Dickerson, 2012; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Therefore, and in terms of moral 
identity, the social cognitive approach aims to scrutinise the social cognitive 
dimensions that causes the moral behaviour.  This approach views moral identity as 
consisting of persistently accessible moral schemas, assuming that people have a 
limited cognitive capacity through which to interact with the world and process 
information. In seeking to overcome this limitation, people initiate a system of 
cognitive categorisations, and schemas are part of this system (Stets, 2010). Schemas 
are mental patterns that represent many aspects of an individual's life. These aspects 
include one's self schema, social interaction schema and role schemas; there is in fact 
a schema for nearly everything. The schema has an important role in organising and 
facilitating information and knowledge about the world. When a schema is frequently 
accessed and retrieved, that action causes the schema to become more activated and 
invoked and therefore is more likely to influence and process the social information 
presented to it (Higgins, 1996).  
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            Hence, and according to this theorisation, moral identity is an organised 
schema that represents moral values, traits and behaviours (Gibbs, 2009; Shao et al., 
2008). People differ in terms of their moral schema or moral identity. When moral 
identity is important to an individual, it is assumed that (through the processes 
described above) this identity becomes easy to access when said individual responds 
to different situations.  As a result, moral identity guides the individual and acts as a 
monitor of moral behaviours (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). This 
frequent activation of moral identity makes moral action become more automatic, and 
unconscious, as such individuals tend to be alert and sensitive to the moral aspects of 
any situation (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Consequently, these individuals interact and 
respond to different situations in light of their moral schemas, or moral identity. Thus, 
this theorisation indicates that individuals have rich and well-grounded moral schemas 
(Lapsley & Narvaez, 2013).  
            Aquino and Reed (2002), as mentioned earlier, took a social cognitive 
perspective and described moral identity as a self-conception which centred upon a set 
of moral qualities or traits. These moral traits or cognitive moral associations 
exemplify a mental schema of what a moral person is perceived of in terms of his or 
her thinking, feelings and behaviours. In this work, Aquino and Reed made a 
distinction between two aspects, or dimensions, of moral identity, namely that the 
private aspect of moral identity or moral identity internalisation represents the 
variability among individuals regarding the importance and centrality of moral traits 
to the self-concept.  In contrast, the public aspect, or the symbolisation dimension of 
moral identity, reflects the degree to which these moral traits are manifestly expressed 
and projected by the individual's behaviours in the world (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao 
et al., 2008).  Aquino and Reed (2002) included these two dimensions of moral identity 
in their moral identity measure. They attempted to capture the moral person's schema 
by asking American undergraduate business students about the moral traits or qualities 
that they felt a 'moral person' should possess. The set of traits derived from that sample 
comprised of caring, compassionate, fair, generous, friendly, helpful, hardworking, 
honest, and kind. Aquino and Reed (2002) emphasised that moral identity is likely to 
have different levels of importance in relation to an individuals' entire senses of self.   
In this way, the greater the degree to which the moral identity is vital to the individual’s 
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self-definition, the more this identity becomes readily accessible and used across a 
range of situations. 
            In light of this, moral identity is influenced by the interpretation of, and 
interactions within social situations (Gibbs, 2009). Notably, Aquino and Reed’s 
conceptualisation of moral identity includes consideration of situational factors as they 
maintain that moral identity can be activated not only by individuals, but similarly by 
situations (Aquino et al., 2009; Stets, 2010; Stets & Carter, 2011). 
            It should be noted that in earlier work on the application of a social cognitive 
approach to moral identity, Aquino and Reed (2002) used the importance of moral 
identity to describe the activation of moral schemas.   Later, Aquino and others started 
using moral identity's centrality in terms that rendered it interchangeable with the word 
'importance' (Aquino et al., 2009). Other researchers have also indicated that when 
moral identity is important and strongly activated, it will become chronically 
accessible. Thus, as Stets (2010) pointed out, moral identity’s chronicity is 
commensurate with moral identity’s importance and moral identity’s centrality. 
Therefore, 'importance', 'centrality' and 'chronicity' have been used interchangeably in 
recent moral identity literature.    
           There are other theoretical standpoints that can be included under the umbrella 
of social cognitive perspectives. For example, some scholars have described moral 
identity as being an important social role within one’s self, rather than conceptualising 
it as a moral aspect or the self's sense of morality, as has been discussed (Hart, Atkins, 
& Ford, 1999).  In other words, some moral social roles are important to the individual, 
hence, moral identity is embodied in the commitment to these moral social roles.  Some 
studies draw from this framework to scrutinise moral identity, for instance, those using 
volunteer services, blood donation and other moral actions, or roles, as manifestations 
of moral identity (Hart, 2005; Hardy & Carlo, 2011).  
           Another theoretical possibility proposes moral identity as comprising moral 
self-representations in autobiographical memory. This autobiographical memory 
encompasses information and emotions that are interrelated to time, role and place. 
Accordingly, moral identity may be shaped by a specific form of autobiographical 
memory that includes the self's moral meanings and emotions. Such autobiographical 
memory contributes to the narrative and memory of one’s moral self (Lapsley, 2008; 
Hardy & Carlo, 2011), meaning that it can be used to predict human moral actions.  As 
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Hardy and Carlo (2011, p.19) suggested, “anticipated consequences of possible actions 
are evaluated based on emotions associated with this moral self-narrative regarding 
similar situations and outcomes in the past”. Focusing on moral identity on 
adolescence, Reimer and Wade-Stein (2004) used a computational language program 
to help analyse adolescents' moral identity narratives. They argued that this approach 
was effective in dealing with complications in moral identity.  However, they conceded 
that it still needed to be validated through greater exploration and further longitudinal 
studies as their own study was merely descriptive. It is of note that there is 
commonality between this approach and the narrative framework which is part of the 
character perspectives. Both use the individual’s narrative to discern the construction 
of moral identity.  
           Another different cognitive approach to the moral self was proposed by 
researchers such as Monin and Jordan (2009). They suggested that the concept of 
‘moral self-regard’ was a part of the individual's self-concept. Here, self-regard reflects 
the question that people ask themselves ‘How moral am I?’ Monin and Jordan (2009) 
argued that this concept does not only considers the influence of situations in moral 
behaviour, but also how situations can shape the moral self, meaning “[it can] 
influence behaviour through this mediator rather than just moderate the link between 
self and behaviour” (p. 347). The adoption of this concept to scrutinise the moral self 
has yielded different lines of research and findings. For example, researchers have 
indicated that ‘moral credentials’ affects the individual's behaviours. Once an 
individual's moral self-regard is enhanced, this might license the individual to behave 
immorally in the short term of the future (Monin & Miller, 2001). Another line of 
research is ‘moral resentment’, this demonstrating how moral exemplars, or heroes, 
might cause other individuals to feel resentment and hostility towards them (Ben-
Ze'ev, 2002).  Individuals perceive highly moral others as a threat to their moral self-
regard because these exceptional moral behaviours call into question their own 
morality. They then strive to reduce this aroused feeling by resenting and derogating 
those exemplars. This dimming of other morality may aid the enhancement of the 
individual's self-regard. Likewise, dismissing others' morality can act as a way of 
compensating for the threat of a general (not moral) self-concept, even in a non-moral 
situation (for more details of moral self-regard research see Monin & Jordan, 2009). It 
can be suggested that this moral self-regard approach focuses more on a ‘person's 
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moment to moment morality’ or the fluctuations of moral self-evaluations; whereas 
other cognitive approaches are more concerned with the relative stability of the moral 
self (Xiaowei, 2012). 
             The final theory regarding moral identity, from a social cognitive perspective, 
is that of the moral ideal self (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). This self is not actual or fulfilled; 
rather it is a possibility, representing the ideal self that the individual wishes to become. 
In contrast, there is also the dreaded self or the self that a person wishes to avoid 
becoming.  What does this mean in terms of moral identity? It means that moral 
identity is represented by the moral self that a person wants to be but might also be 
represented by the immoral self that the person dreads becoming. However, the utility 
of this notion needs to be examined empirically (Hardy & Carlo, 2011).   
            Having reviewed the character and social cognitive perspectives upon moral 
identity, the question arises if these perspectives are entirely in competition with each 
other? If not, is there any potential integrated perspective?  
            In a broad sense, the social cognitive standpoint considers the limitations of the 
character perspectives and offers an explanation for automatic or unintentional moral 
actions in light of the function of the moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley 
& Narvaez, 2013). Moreover, this perspective provides an insight into the interaction 
between the self's moral identity and situations (Aquino et al., 2009). Unlike character-
focused perspectives, the social cognitive framework presumes that moral actions are 
influenced by situational cues. Because it can be argued that “the social-cognitive 
perspective helps to explain both the situational variability and the intra-individual 
stability of moral behaviour” (Shao et al., 2008, p. 518), by adopting a social cognitive 
perspective there is room for competing identities and challenging situations.  
However, scholars who have used the character perspective to explore moral identity 
have argued that it has advantages over the social cognitive perspective. In particular, 
the moral perspective provides a useful theoretical advantage because of a strong 
emphasis upon the distinctive nature of the sense of moral self, while the social 
cognitive perspective postulates moral identity as one of the multiple identities that an 
individual may possess, and which can guide moral actions. This unique position of 
moral identity, when viewed from a character perspective, makes it more productive 
than social cognitive perspectives when scholars seek to explain the extraordinary 
behaviour of moral exemplars such as Mother Theresa, Mahatma Gandhi and many 
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others who have shown a persistent moral commitment, regardless of situations (Hardy 
& Carlo, 2011; Shao et al., 2008). 
           At the same time, there are clearly some similarities between the moral 
perspectives and social cognitive perspectives of moral identity. Both, for example, 
suggest that the importance of moral identity for the definition of one’s self, can exist 
at different levels. In addition, they both acknowledge the role of the human 
predisposition for self-consistency regarding moral identity. For both perspectives, 
maintaining one’s self consistently leads to a strong association between moral identity 
and moral behaviours (Blasi, 1983; Aquino & Reed, 2002). Therefore, some 
suggestions have been made in a bid to reconcile these two approaches. For instance, 
Blasi’s (2005) improved model of moral identity, as has been discussed, assumes that 
there are some pre-requisites to allow moral identity to guide moral actions.  One of 
them is moral desire, which means that a person who has moral values places them 
first in a hierarchical set of desires. Subsequently, becoming a moral person ranks as a 
second desire. Social cognitive theorists see these moral desires as existing among 
several possible desires that are linked to the self-concept and require maintenance of 
the sense of self-consistency. Furthermore, the relative dominance of some desires can 
be explained by the influence of situation. The argument here is that enduring moral 
behaviour can be anticipated if moral desires are frequently provoked and when the 
desire to be a moral person is situated in second place in the hierarchical order of 
desires. This argument incorporates the two perspectives to theorise the role of moral 
identity in moral actions (Shao, et al., 2008).  Another possible integration is related 
to the nature of moral actions.  It has been suggested that moral character offers a good 
explanation of deliberate and intended moral behaviour, but which can also be seen as 
comprising future-oriented moral behaviours. On the other hand, the social cognitive 
perspective can effectively explain unconscious, or automatic moral responses. This 
perspective helps to explain day-to-day or moment-to-moment morality (Hardy & 
Carlo, 2011; Shao et al., 2008). Furthermore, the moral perspective may shed light on 
the stability of moral identity, whereas social cognitive perspectives are more 
concerned with the fluidity of moral identity. Thus, both have their own unique and 
specific theoretical considerations; however, it should not be assumed that they carry 
conflicting suppositions.  Instead, they both appear to be complementary approaches 
to examine moral identity (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Hardy & Carlo, 2011).  
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           However, both theoretical models of moral identity, character and the social 
cognitive perspective, are completely missing the substantive role of culture in the 
formation of an individuals’ moral identity. Morality here is merely a matter of caring 
and fairness moral concerns. Although the social cognitive theory is better than the 
character perspective, in terms of considering the social situations and interactions 
when examining moral identity, this account only focuses on instant social factors in 
a given situation. In other words, the social cognitive approach is considered to be a 
micro-level focus on individuals and their interactions in situations, so it overlooks the 
macro-level analysis of the wider cultural contexts in shaping moral identity. 
 
3.3.3 Relational Perspective 
           Hardy and Carlo (2011) drew on a relational perspective applying ‘strong 
rationality’ whereby the individual's relationships have not merely influenced identity 
but have constructed this identity. In particular, this approach holds that as human 
beings, we are not ‘self-contained objects’ but that we internalise moral goals and 
principles from the world. Basically, this approach describes people as links or 
connections to relationships, all immersed in different actions and practices that are, 
in turn, embedded in social contexts. In this context, relationships are the nucleus of 
one’s moral identity, not the abstractions of moral meaning. This theory enables people 
to be unique and diverse through their distinctive nexus of relationships rather than the 
values that they hold (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Slife, 2004). According to this view, 
there are no common moral beliefs that guide all people; instead there are different 
moral beliefs to the same extent that there are different social contexts. People 
therefore, adopt their morality from their environment. To put it another way, in this 
interpretation, morality is context dependent and people have to be alert to the morality 
that is implanted in their own context. This approach to moral identity is interesting 
because there is nothing called moral identity; one's identity simply must be moral 
because morality is innately positioned in the social world. As a consequence, 
individuals with moral identity are those for whom their sense of their self  aligns with 
the moral truth of the context in which they live. In this perspective, people's moral 
identity is habitually formed by contexts, people valuing their relationships with others 
and community, both serving as a moral guidance in people’s daily life (Hardy & 
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Carlo, 2011). However, this approach currently lacks the credibility of empirical 
validation. 
 
3.3.4. Perspective of Virtue Theory 
           Weaver (2006), working in the realm of organisation studies, attempted to 
define moral identity in light of the philosophical theory of virtue. He argued that this 
theory was relevant as it helped researchers pay attention to neglected factors that 
underpinned the moral identity or moral agency in organisations. Virtue theory 
considers the influences of institutional logics, organisations and the macro-cultural 
aspects of organisations. Virtuous theory, in Weaver's postulation, focuses on the 
individual's dispositions or characteristics which enable the individual to live 
purposefully and direct their efforts towards the accomplishment of goals. In this 
sense, the virtuous person is the one who exercises and builds up these dispositions to 
facilitate the achievement of his or her internal goals. What matters to virtue theory, in 
terms of moral identity, is that here is a person with a moral identity that is centred in 
his or her self-concept and thus he or she deliberately tends to behave in ways that 
manifest this moral identity. Therefore, virtue theory explains the continuity of this 
identity and the moral behaviour that results from it. Furthermore, it attributes 
fundamental importance to the concepts of moral identity and dispositions as being 
products of macro-sociological contexts (Weaver, 2006). Weaver did not assume that 
his theorising conflicted with other moral identity models; rather he tried to identify 
similarities between the virtue theory and social cognitive identity theory. He focused 
on organisational settings and in particular how these organisations might reinforce or 
deactivate moral identity and decentralise the sense of morality through practices and 
interaction with others. It can be argued that the assumptions about human dispositions 
made in virtue theory mean that people's efforts to achieve their goals are relatively 
similar to self-consistency. In particular, both can be considered as morally 
motivational and able to explicate the stability of moral identity (Hardy & Carlo, 
2005).  
 
3.3.5. Sociological Perspective 
          Moral identity has been the subject of much conceptual investigation in various 
disciplines.  For example, sociologists have been attracted to the issues of morality and 
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identity and many voices have contributed to the debate surrounding moral identity. 
From a sociological standpoint, psychologists have disregarded the role of values when 
exploring our understanding of moral identity. Hitlin (2011) argued that values are 
promising sources for those seeking a rich analysis of moral identity, noting that 
“values serve as primary horizons for shaping individual's sense of self” (p. 523). 
Values mirror the goals and principles that channel people's behaviours, applying to 
different aspects of life, meaning that one may refer to work, family and ideological 
values, and so forth (Schwartz, 1994, 2007). Hitlin (2011) insisted on the benefits of 
using values to study moral identity for several reasons. These include the fact that 
values are relatively established properties, although at the same time, not fully settled, 
thus may be subject to change in different situations, even across a life span. 
Furthermore, values make us acknowledge the breadth of what could be called 
morality instead of this being limited to few set of moral qualities such as altruism. 
This potential line of research links moral identity to social and cultural contexts, as 
these include values that become entrenched and then internalised and cultivated by 
people. Finally, values have been extensively measured, as seen in Chapter 2, this 
facilitating the exploration of moral identity.  
           Furthermore, and with respect to renewed interests in the study of morality and 
the self among sociologists, Stets and Carter (2012) have proposed a theory, at the 
same time criticising psychologists for neglecting the emotional and behavioural 
aspects of moral identity, using Identity Control Theory (ICT) (Burke, 1996) to 
investigate moral identity. According to ICT theory, when an individual's identity is 
invoked in a given situation, one of the roles of that identity is to match the person's 
perception of their self in this situation with the sense or definition of their self or with 
their identity standard (Stets & Carter, 2006). The rationale behind the naming of this 
theory becomes clear: it is as if the identity tries to control the perceived self -
perception in a given situation in order to harmonise the meaning of the individual's 
self-identity across different situations. Stets and Carter applied this theory to the 
investigation of moral identity assuming that this identity was not the most important 
of identities to the individuals, rather only being one of them.  Consequently, moral 
identity controls the matching of the self-perceptions in a situation with the self-
meaning but in light of the moral domain.  
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            Stets and Carter (2011) highlighted some similarities between their theory and 
the social cognitive perspective. Both approaches posit moral identity as being one of 
many identities that a person possesses; this identity might (or might not) be important 
and essential to some people or in some situations. The concept of accessible moral 
schema in the social cognitive approach has parallels with that of the salient identity 
in the identity theory. Both moral schema and salient identity work to regulate the 
perception of the self in a given situation and the identity standards. Stets and Carter 
(2011) also identified some differences between these approaches. They claimed that 
the social cognitive approach sees individuals as having either moral identity or not. 
Conversely, in identity theory, people differ in the degree to which being a moral 
person is important to them. Therefore, people are different, and they can be so in any 
degree of the sense of morality. Accordingly, people are likely to behave in ways that 
confirm this degree.  It can be argued that this claim still needs to be substantiated by 
the literature that takes a social cognitive approach to moral identity. When reviewing 
the literature, such a claim cannot be found as psychologists insist that individuals can 
have any degree of a sense of moral self. These authors also claimed that application 
of the ICT approach clarifies the role of moral identity in regulating and controlling 
moral behaviours to a greater degree than that offered by social cognitive theory.  Here 
again, it can be debated that employment of the self-consistency assumption by social 
cognition is similar to the notion of behaviours being controlled by ICT (Hardy & 
Carlo, 2005; Stets & Carter, 2011).  States and Carter agreed only about similarities 
between their theory and the character perspective in this regard. The final difference, 
or advantage of States and Carter's articulation is that the ICT approach provides a 
comprehensive depiction of different aspects of moral identity where cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioural dimensions are connected; this is not a feature of other 
frameworks of moral identity.  
 
3.4 Some concepts related to moral Identity  
           Various recurrent concepts are linked to or even sometimes equated with 
concepts of moral identity. These concepts will be explored in the following 
discussion, along with the issue of whether, and how, they can be related to, or 
differentiated from, moral identity.  This conceptual clarification is important, as it sets 
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the boundaries between the concept of moral identity concept and other similar 
concepts in the literature.     
 
3.4.1 Moral character 
           Historically, the notion of moral character has attracted much philosophical and 
psychological attention. Kupperman (1991) defined an individual's moral character as 
being a structure that involves their “moral pattern of thought and action, especially in 
matters relating to the happiness of others and of…. [themselves], most especially in 
relation to moral choice” (p.13). However, Pritchard (1988) described moral character 
as “a complex set of relatively persistent qualities of the individual person and the term 
has a definite positive connotation when it is used in discussions of moral education” 
(p.471). This definition of moral character reflects the fact that this concept is widely 
used in the educational literature as being one of the most important goals that an 
education system should attain as can be seen in the work of Narvaez and Lapsley 
(2009).   
           Some scholars have used the terms moral identity and moral character as 
interchangeable concepts. For example, Narvaez and Lapsley (2009) claimed that 
researchers who adopted a social cognitive perspective to understand moral 
personality, considered a moral person to be one whose moral identity, or moral 
character, is frequently invoked and accessible. However, others such as Kupperman 
(1991), have affirmed that the concept of character differs completely from that of 
personality, in the sense that personality is about self-image or representation while 
character is related more to the quality of the individual’s life and his or her concerns 
about the other life. Explicitly, as in his description above, Kupperman gave greater 
weight to happiness and moral choices. Other researchers have argued that a person’s 
moral character is essential in terms of understanding that person’s moral identity as 
they believed that moral character is a great indicator of a person’s identity.   
Essentially, when someone has a strong character, this is likely to influence how he or 
she perceives the world in term of morality. This perhaps fundamentally mirrors 
identity (Goodwin, Piazza & Rozin, 2014). Yet there is no empirical evidence to 
validate this assumption.  It can be suggested that the moral character is related to what 
a person actually does in terms of moral actions, rather than that person’s identity or 
sense of moral self (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2013).   
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3.4.2 Moral exemplar 
            A number of empirical studies have emphasised the role of personality in the 
realm of moral behaviours, and how this neglected personal factor can provide a 
substantial explanation of morality (Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Walker & Hennig, 
2004). Some studies have explored the idea of what is often referred to as a ‘moral 
exemplar’, suggesting that exemplary moral individuals tend to express themselves 
more in terms of moral traits and values than others who have a lesser degree of moral 
exemplarity (Colby & Damon, 1992). Furthermore, moral exemplars experience a 
great deal of integration between their moral ideal self and their actual self (Hardy & 
Carlo, 2011; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004). These findings raise questions about how 
it could be possible to distinguish between a moral exemplar and moral identity. 
Essentially, both of these notions try to explain morality in the light of personality 
rather than moral reasoning or thinking alone. However, it could be argued that people 
who are moral exemplars have a strong moral identity and that the importance of 
morality to them is the explanation for why they demonstrate a high degree of moral 
commitment (Colby & Damon, 1992).  
            At this point it could be asked, what is the difference between the concept of 
moral exemplars and the importance, or centrality, of moral identity? In both, people 
are more concerned about moral values and behaviour in light of morality than they 
have regarding any other topics. However, no one has sought to clarify this issue. In 
general, it can be said that moral identity is distinct from moral exemplar concepts as 
the latter is concerned with exceptional people who have highly integrated their sense 
of morality with their selves, and who through their extraordinary actions are 
considered to be an example to others; moral identity is more about how every person 
has a general sense of morality, rather than only a few people who serve as moral 
exemplars.  
 
3.4.3 Moral self  
            Scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and moral 
actions in several ways; for example, they have proposed the concept of the moral self 
as an integration of morality with the self-concept (Krettenauer, 2011). This raises the 
question, is the moral self different, or analogous, to the concept of moral identity?  
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            Self and identity have sometimes been conceived of as interchangeable while 
at other times they have referred to different concepts (Oyserman, et al., 2012). 
However, individuals may structure their self around particular aspects such as gender, 
race or religion. In these cases, individuals tend to have concern about a given aspect, 
and process any information that relates to it. Importantly, they are likely to act 
according to these aspects (Oyserman, 2008). Some researchers have stated that 
personal identity denotes content which is identical to the self-concept (see Oyserman, 
et al., 2012, for more detail about how self-concept and identity can be 
conceptualised). In this sense, a person’s moral self is a self-concept involving the 
person's sense of morality. Here, there is no difference between the use of moral self 
and moral identity in the literature that is relevant to what is called the ‘judgment-
action gap’. Essentially, scholars have used both terms interchangeably, unconcerned 
about establishing any divergence between them (see Bergman, 2002; Jennings et al., 
2014; Nucci, 2004). This approach can be justified as moral identity content focuses 
on the person's sense of morality or moral traits that are essential to the person, and do 
not focus on group membership.  
           However, Hitlin (2011) indicated his preference for moral self-concept over 
moral identity.  He claimed that using the concept of moral identity limited the wide 
range of moral traits, as scholars only tended to focus on some pro-social tendencies 
such as altruism and honesty. He went further and also claimed that when researchers 
studied moral identity, they assumed that people who have other interests, for example 
achievement, were consequently considered immoral people. He concluded that the 
concept of moral identity ignores the fact that people sometimes have incompatible 
values when responding to others, thus the use of moral self-concept is more 
appropriate than that of moral identity. However, most researchers have not assumed 
that people can be simply divided into categories of moral or immoral persons; rather 
they have proposed that people can fall into any part of the morality continuum (Stets 
& Carter, 2011). This undermines Hitlin’s argument in terms of the use of moral self-
concept rather than moral identity.   
 
3.4.4 Moral personality 
           As in the case of identity and self, the term moral personality has been used 
interchangeably with that of moral identity in the psychological literature. However, 
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Hill and Roberts (2010) argued that when it comes to moral development, researchers 
have been more likely to investigate moral identity than personality. They suggested 
that this focus partly resulted from Blasi’s model (1983).  
           However, Hill and Roberts (2010) proposed that identity and personality are 
not identical concepts, encouraging scholars working in the area of moral personality 
development to benefit from, and incorporate work on moral identity. From their 
perspective, this incorporation can be accepted because moral identity is seen here as 
a part of personality (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Hill & Roberts, 2010). Their argument 
is supported by the fact that the theorists have conceptualised two kinds of identity. 
The first one is role identity, which is based on the roles that each person plays, such 
as being a student or a parent. The other one is personal identity; it is not related to any 
roles and encompasses exact characteristics or traits (Owens, Robinson & Smith-
Lovin, 2010; Oyserman, et al., 2012). Scholars who have investigated moral identity 
appear to have agreed on this matter, tending to view moral identity as a type of 
personal identity which is divorced from any social roles (see Stets, 2010: Stets & 
Carter, 2012).   
           In summary, the literature on the moral self and moral personality have been 
given due consideration here. That said, in the first empirical study, I will return to the 
literature on moral character and exemplars, since it is very pertinent to the adopted 
theory - the prototype theory – used in that study. 
 
3.5 Criticisms of moral identity 
           It has been suggested that moral identity is a promising concept to helps 
increase our understanding of moral behaviours (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). However, 
some researchers such as Nucci (2013) have raised doubts and criticisms about the 
utility of moral identity. He argued that researchers of moral identity see the moral 
actions only in terms of an aim as to maintain the consistency between an individual's 
moral identity and moral behaviours. Nucci rejects this notion seeing it as a simple 
reductionism that fails to capture the complexity of moral behaviours. It unsuccessfully 
reduces moral behaviour to “the simple evaluation of whether the action is or not 
consistent with one's sense of self” (Nucci, 2013, p.122). Therefore, all human 
eagerness for fairness, justice and rights are just desires which need to be fulfilled in 
order to keep behaviours consistent with identity (Lapsley & Stey, 2014). However, it 
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can be argued that the notion of self-consistency helps to create a strong connection 
between moral identity and moral actions (see Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1983). 
Moral behaviours in this sense are not only limited to the premise of self-consistency, 
but partially explained by it. Therefore, moral identity here acts as a motivation for 
moral behaviours.  
           In regard to Nucci’s objections, he believed that the current moral identity 
frameworks need to be improved and expanded in order to capture the impact of 
situations on moral identity. Nucci (2013, p. 127) asked “does our moral identity shift 
with each context? Is it the case that as the self-same person it is the salience of 
morality that shifts with contexts?” Part of the answer to these questions can be found 
in the social cognitive approach to moral identity.  Some scholars have indicated that 
moral identity can either be stimulated, or deactivated, by social situations, conducting 
studies to test this hypothesis (see Aquino et al., 2009).  Nonetheless, it is not clear 
how daily life situations may affect moral identity in terms of altering moral aspects 
that people integrate into themselves, suggesting that this idea needs to be investigated 
empirically.     
             Nucci (2013) also called for further consideration of the role of identity in the 
creation of one's sense of morality, or what he called ‘moral openness’. He offered an 
alternative appraisal for the relationship between identity and moral behaviours 
arguing that every person has his or her own moral reading of situations and that this 
reading is affected by many factors such as opinions, experiences, and interests.  He 
further claimed that humans have the capacity to rethink morality, an action which 
may modify our moral actions in different situations. In this case, and from his 
perspective, the argument that identity influences moral behaviours becomes more 
conceivable.    
            Going further Nucci (2013) claimed that the greatest gap in moral identity 
frameworks was the lack of satisfactory explanations of children's morality. In the 
current theorisation of moral identity, there is the idea that an individual’s moral 
identity is likely to lead to moral actions in early adolescence. Because of this, Nucci 
argued that children should be seen as moral actors implying that moral identity is not 
necessarily constructed in adolescence. He assumed that this apparent gap mirrors the 
influence of Kohlberg's theory about moral development stages. Given that moral 
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identity was initially theorised in response to criticisms of Kohlberg's theory, his 
influence has unexpectedly made its way into moral identity articulation. 
            Nucci (2013) highlighted the fact that researchers failed to notice that moral 
identity can motivate people to act dysfunctionally. He stated that “it is possible that 
we can so define ourselves in terms of morality [and] we actually freeze our morality 
in dysfunctional ways” (p. 128). He proposed that someone who may strongly unite 
his or her sense of self to morality becomes as a result what he called a ‘one-
dimensional moral zealot’. His examples of this include anti-abortionists and animal 
rights extremists who might engage in aggressive behaviours in the name of morality.  
A similar point was made by Moshman (2013) who invited scholars to further consider 
some cases in which strong moral identity can generate hostility. This idea or criticism 
will be empirically examined later in this thesis  
            The last strand of scholars' criticisms of moral identity is the idea that the 
discrepancy between moral reasoning and moral behaviours may not be of any concern 
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Researchers who adopt this opinion assume that in any 
situation there are many judgments that can be made, not only moral ones. Hence, it 
can be the case that moral judgments do not lead to moral behaviours. These 
researchers seem to be unwilling to add another layer of analysis, such as identity, to 
the moral behaviour account. However, Hardy and Carlo (2011) responded to this idea 
by asking what makes some individuals give more weight to moral judgment and 
ignore other kinds of judgments in any given situation? They then suggested that a 
strong moral identity is likely to be the key answer. They added that moral identity 
provides a richer explanation of individual differences in identifying what morality is 
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011).    
 
3.6 Mind the (culture) gap 
            As is evident from this chapter, while scholars in moral identity literature have 
debated many issues in terms of the conceptualisation of moral identity, closer 
examination of this research has allowed us to identify some knowledge gaps. One of 
these knowledge gaps that needs to be filled is the role of culture in terms of shaping 
and forming moral identity.  In the different models that have been explored here, the 
only model that considers the influence of a social and cultural context is Hitlin’s 
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proposed model of values (2011), which comes from a sociological, not psychological 
perspective.  
           This neglect of social (and cultural) roles in moral identity is one of the 
neglected social dimensions of social psychology, particularly the American ones. In 
tracing this idea back to the late twentieth century, Greenwood (2004) argued that 
American social psychologists were highly committed to the idea of the individual’s 
autonomy and responsibility. These social psychologists have viewed any 
acknowledgment of the role of social context in behaviour as a threat to the notion of 
individualism. This explains why the social and cultural factors have been denied, or 
abandoned, to a greater extent in social psychology. Echoing Greenwood, other 
researchers have pointed out that social psychology research: 
 
often reflects a Western concern that the social group will somehow 
overwhelm or disempower the autonomous, agentic self. Thus, American 
researchers tend to discuss forms of social influence with pejorative 
labels such as conformity, obedience, groupthink, deindividuation, social 
loafing, risky shift, and diffusion of responsibility (Fiske et al., (1998), 
p. 919) 
 
           Greenwood (2011) has made the same argument about moral psychology. He 
argued that moral psychologists do not pay attention to the social dimension of 
morality. He also believes that moral psychologists have focused more on 
interpersonal influence, and sometimes mistakenly equating social influence and 
interpersonal influence. They do differ in some ways, for example, the interpersonal 
influence operates in the present of others, while the social influence can operate in 
the absence of others. Interestingly, such a focus on relationships can be observed in 
some of the moral identity models that have been explored in this chapter, where 
scholars stress the importance of relationships in forming people’s moral identity, such 
as Hardy and Carlo’s (2011) relational perspective of moral identity.   
           The existing theorisation of moral identity evidently speaks to Greenwood’s 
(2011) observation on the absence of a social dimension in the moral psychology 
literature.  Greenwood proposed that paying more attention to the social dimension 
corroborates the proposition that there are cross-cultural differences in moral 
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behaviours. Thus, and in the case of moral identity, adding a cultural perspective lens 
to our examination of moral identity suggests that moral identity traits, or components, 
include more than just concerns about caring and fairness. The first step to examine 
this suggestion is to uncover prototypical constructions of moral persons in Britain and 
Saudi cultures. This will be the focus of the next chapter.  
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   Chapter 4  
        Study 1: What Defines the Moral Person? The Prototypic  
    Moral Person in Britain and Saudi Arabia 
 
               Since a prototype is usually based on group-generated exemplars, it   
describes the normative associative meaning of a term. It reflects a 
form of ‘collective wisdom’ (Vauclair, 2010, p.211). 
  
4.1 Introduction 
            Previous chapters have demonstrated that there are some theories that expand 
morality beyond caring and moral concerns such as the moral foundations theory. 
However, these variations are generally overlooked in moral identity research. For 
example, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale has been widely used in 
several studies. This scale presents participants with nine moral traits, which were 
generated from an American sample, using the prototype approach. These traits 
include caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest 
and kind traits and are used to activate moral identity. There is a question, though as 
to which moral traits are important to a particular culture, or indeed to any culture that 
differs from the United States. The nine moral traits on Aquino and Reed's scale merely 
reflect the care/harm and fairness/reciprocity moral foundations according to moral 
foundation theory (Graham & Haidt, 2011). Caring, compassionate, friendly, generous 
and helpful traits represent the morality of care, whereas fair, hardworking and honest 
traits represent the morality of fairness (Carter, 2010). These traits cannot be directly 
used to measure moral identity within alternative cultural contexts without examining 
the normative assumptions about what constitutes a moral person in other cultures. 
Given that the general aim of this thesis is to investigate moral identity cross-culturally, 
it is necessary to begin the research by identifying the moral traits that constitute the 
concept of a moral person in both British and Saudi cultures.  
           To do this, I have adopted the prototype theory or approach, which was 
developed by Rosch through her research on category systems and as a rejection of the 
classical model of categories (Hampton, 2006; Medin, 1989). Rosch (1975) proposed 
that categories are ‘fuzzy’ and do not have any clear boundaries, which goes against 
the classical view of categories as having definitive boundaries (Medin, 1989).  
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According to prototype theory, for everyday or mental concepts, people tend to 
organise their information around exemplars, or what can be termed as ‘prototypes’ 
(Rosch, 1975). Given that the features of any concepts do not occur arbitrarily in 
individual’s minds, the frequent co-occurrence of a group of features around a certain 
concept leads to the establishment of a prototype; these features can be termed as 
typical features (Horowitz & Turan, 2008; Prinz, 2002; Rosch, 1975). The features or 
prototypes for any concept are gradable, with some features perceived as more central 
or salient, while others are perceived as peripheral or less central (Horowitz & Turan, 
2008).  
           Kelley (1992) pointed out that employing the prototype approach in 
psychological research will help bridge the gap between common-sense, or folk 
psychology, and scientific psychology.  In addition, the prototype approach provides 
researchers with a useful explanatory tool as the literature shows that, when a prototype 
is active, it influences individuals’ perceptions and behaviours (Smith & Medin, 1981; 
Walker & Pitts,1998). This theory has been applied in the study of a number of lay 
person’s concepts, including love (Fehr, 1988), anger (Fehr & Baldwin, 1996), 
intimacy in friendships (Fehr, 2004), forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 2004) and 
vengeance (Elshout, Nelissen, & Van Beest, 2015).   
           With respect to moral concepts, previous research into moral character, 
naturalistic moral conceptions and moral exemplars has generated a list of moral traits 
that are thought to be representative of particular moral concepts or moral prototypes 
(e.g., Goodwin, et al., 2014; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Vauclair et al., 2014; Walker & 
Pitts, 1998). These studies adopted a prototype theory or approach, which suggests that 
people tend to organise their information around exemplars or what can be termed as 
a prototype (Vauclair, 2010). It has been argued that, when active, this prototype has 
a great influence on individual perception and behaviour (Walker & Pitts, 1998).  With 
respect to morality and identity, Lapsley and Lasky (2001) suggest that the prototype 
approach may offer greater insight into moral identity as by using this approach, the 
traits associated with a moral person will be identified by the participants themselves 
without imposing any definitions or conceptions of morality on the participant 
(Vauclair et al., 2014). This fits with the previously mentioned trend in moral 
psychology (Chapter 2), where scholars investigate how people perceive and define 
morality (Bloom, 2012).    
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            Regarding the research on culture, it has been suggested that the prototype 
approach may provide valuable insights into how culture shapes the person-concept 
prototype (Vauclair et al., 2014).  This approach aims to uncover the attributes that a 
group of people associate with a certain concept, these generated attributes mirroring 
the normative meaning of said concept, or what can be called a ‘collective wisdom’ 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008, p. 1059). Therefore, Fu and Chiu (2007, p. 659) argued that 
prototypes, or exemplar individuals, can be seen as “public carriers of culture as well 
as vehicles of intergenerational transmission of cultural values”. This implies that 
examination of the moral prototype is essential when examining how culture 
influences our conception of what constitutes a moral person.   
            In terms of investigating moral prototypes cross-culturally, Vauclair and 
colleagues (2014) examined the layperson’s thoughts on moral character and found 
that honesty was a shared trait in samples from two individualistic countries (Germany 
and New Zealand) and from two collectivistic countries (Brazil and the Philippines). 
In addition, other central traits - being friendly, good and just - were central in three of 
these countries. All of these traits represent individualising moral foundations, 
consistent with the proposition that this approach is universal to all cultures. Some 
moral traits, such as being loyal, religious and well-mannered, were only found in the 
collectivistic samples in this study.  Since these traits reflect binding moral foundations 
to morality, the findings are in line with the assumptions of moral foundations theorists 
and support using individualising and binding moral foundations as tools to map the 
generated moral traits by the two samples in this study.  
            The current study aims to identify the moral traits that come into the minds of 
British and Saudi participants when they think of what constitutes a moral person. No 
previous study has examined the concept of a moral person in both British and Saudi 
cultures.  A bottom-up approach is used to identify the general patterns of moral traits 
regarding to perceptions of the moral self in British and Saudi societies. The bottom-
up approach emphasises discovering what already exists or has occurred, the 
researcher moving from data to theory (Johnson & Christensen, 2012). Current moral 
identity scales focus on traits related to caring and fairness as the only prototypical 
traits of a moral person (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This study examined whether or not 
these traits are truly the prototypical traits of a moral person in both British and Saudi 
cultures. Informed by moral foundation theory, this study will also examine whether 
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or not these free-listed moral traits support the assumptions of moral foundations 
theory (Chapter 3) regarding morality in either society, specifically in terms of the 
importance of individualising versus binding moral foundations. Ultimately, the 
findings of this first study are of great importance, because they will provide essential 
information that will inform the subsequent studies in this thesis (Terzino, 2007).  
Specifically, the results will help determine whether or not there is a need to re-
examine and refine the current moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or if there 
is the need to develop a new and more culturally inclusive moral identity scale.   
           The theories and findings outlined previously justify two central hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is that individualising moral foundations, such as caring and 
fairness, would be prototypical moral traits in both countries (common moral traits 
hypothesis). However, it was also predicted that there would be differences in the 
moral traits listed for each country (based on the frequency with which traits were 
listed). The second hypothesis predicts that there will be differences between the two 
samples in the dominant moral dimension (dominant moral approach hypothesis). It 
was anticipated that moral traits related to the individualising moral approach would 
be more dominant in the British sample, as British culture can be categorised as 
individualistic (Graham et al., 2009; Hofstede, 1980), whereas Saudi culture is 
classified as collectivist (Hofstede, 1980). Because of this, it was predicted that traits 
related to binding moral foundations would be dominant in the Saudi sample, along 
with traits related to the individualising moral approach. These two hypotheses were 
tested against an alternative competing hypothesis that moral traits, such as caring and 
fairness, would be the only prototypical moral traits in a Saudi sample. This hypothesis 
was drawn from moral identity research where, as previously discussed, the moral 
identity measures in the literature only included moral traits related to the morality of 
caring and fairness.  The prototype approach is particularly useful in cases in which 
there are competing theories in the existing literature. In this sense, prototype theory 
can be used to judge which theories are the best in terms of mapping out layperson’s 
concepts (Fehr, 2005).   
 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Participants 
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          The participants were 80 undergraduate British students from the University of 
Surrey and 80 undergraduate Saudi students from King Saud University. No 
participants were excluded from either sample. Eighty-one percent of the British 
participants were female. 68 % of the participants were 18–21 years old, 26% were 
22–25 years old and 6% were 26–29 years old (M =23.5). The ethnic composition of 
the British sample was predominantly white British (69%). In terms of religious 
affiliation, 43% of the participants were Christian. Approximately 38% of the sample 
were non-religious, the remainder were Muslim (10%), other (5%), Buddhist (3%) and 
Hindu (1%). Regarding the Saudi sample, approximately two thirds of the Saudi 
sample was female (64%). With regard to the participants’ ages, 54% were 18–21 
years old, 38% were 22–25 years old, 6% were 26–29 years old and 2% were 30–33 
years old (M =25.5). All Saudi participants were ethnic Arabs and followers of Islam.   
           The British participants received course credits in return for their participation. 
The Saudi university had no course credit system for students, thus no course credits 
were offered to them.  
 
4.2.2 Procedure 
           Participants first provided demographic information and were then asked the 
following open-ended question: ‘Which qualities or traits do you think a moral person 
should have? You can list more than three points.’ For the Saudi sample group, the 
question was translated into Arabic, a back-translation technique was employed to 
ensure the equivalent question in Arabic.  Participants were given a maximum of 20 
minutes to think and were then asked to write down all the traits that they believed 
defined a moral person. 
          Both samples were presented with the same question; however, there were some 
differences in the questions regarding demographic information. While the British 
participants were asked to provide information about their ethnic background, 
religious doctrines and political orientation, their Saudi counterparts were not. There 
were many reasons for this decision.  First, there is no diversity of ethnicities in Saudi 
Arabia; almost all of the Saudi Arabian population is of Arab ethnicity (De Bel-air, 
2014). With regard to religious doctrines, Islam is the only religion that is allowed to 
be demonstrated and practised in Saudi Arabia.  As the state law requires all Saudis to 
be Muslims, consequently, all Saudi Arabians are followers of Islam (see US 
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Department of State, 2004). With regard to the political context of Saudi Arabia, the 
political system is a monarchy, and therefore there are no political parties in Saudi 
Arabia (Angrist, 2010).  
 
4.2.3 Analytical process 
            The traits generated by the Saudi sample were translated by the researcher. 
They were then reviewed by two colleagues, both of whom are bilingual Saudi 
researchers who speak Arabic and English and were blind to the study’s hypothesis.  
            The two lists of moral traits generated by the British and Saudi participants 
were analysed by the researcher, together with a volunteer colleague, using standard 
judgment rules (Fesher, 1988; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Walker & Pitts, 
1998). Compound phrases were divided into separate traits, as each trait can be said 
to be a stand-alone trait (e.g. ‘being kind and passionate’ was split into ‘kind’ and 
‘passionate’). Converted nouns were turned into adjectives where possible (e.g. 
‘helping’ became ‘helpful’) and all modifiers were dropped (e.g. ‘very religious’ 
became ‘religious’). Subtle differences between two traits were maintained 
whenever possible; for example, ‘fair’ and ‘just’ were treated as separate traits.  
Some traits were listed that did not seem to be related to morality, such as ambitious 
and resilient. However, the decision was made to include such traits, since the current 
study tries to avoid making any assumptions or judgments about what constitutes a 
moral person in either culture. Traits listed that related to religion in the Saudi 
sample, were grouped together and named ‘religiousness’. Inter-rater reliability 
between the researcher and the volunteer colleague, and their agreement on listed 
traits, was calculated. Krippendorff’s α was .85 for the British sample and .81 for the 
Saudi sample. These alpha values indicate a considerable agreement between the 
assessors (Krippendorff, 2004). Lastly, the frequencies of the moral traits in both 
samples were added up and expressed as percentages.   
          
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Data Screening 
           The normality of traits frequencies was investigated. The absolute values of 
skewness and kurtosis falling within the range of ± 1.96 indicated that scores were 
normally distributed (M = 4.39, SD = 1.63 and M = 3.76, SD = 1.33 traits, 
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respectively). The British and Saudi participants generated 351 and 
301 traits respectively (see Appendix A). British participants produced more 
responses on average to the prompt than Saudi students (M = 4.39, 3.76 traits 
respectively), t(158) = 2.47, p =.01.  Saudi participants generated several traits that are 
related to religious concerns, such as following Prophet Mohamed and religious 
principles, whereas the British participants did not.  The results are explained below. 
       4.3.2 Common moral traits. Nineteen traits, generated by at least eight participants 
in each country (10% of each country’s sample), were used for analyses (see Table 1).  
It was hypothesised that there would be common, or universal, moral traits generated 
by both samples. The results support this hypothesis showing that honest and caring 
traits (individualising moral traits) were the most common traits, mentioned most 
frequently by both samples. It was also predicted that there would be differences in the 
moral traits listed by each sample. The results show that among the 19 listed traits, 11 
moral traits were mentioned by participants in only one culture. For the remaining 
eight traits, Chi-square tests revealed significant differences in the frequencies of six 
of them, all except for the caring and appreciative traits. 
        4.3.3 Dominant moral approach. It was predicted that individualising moral traits 
would be predominant in both samples. It was also predicted that binding moral traits 
would be predominant in the Saudi sample. Following a previous study on cultural 
conceptions of morality (see Vauclair et al., 2014), a scree plot was used in order to 
identify the central traits (the most frequent and accessible moral traits), those traits 
thus considered the dominant traits.  Only those moral traits that were mentioned by at 
least 10% of the participants in both samples were included in both cultural samples.  
The scree plot for both samples is given in Figure 3. In this figure, the point where the 
slope starts to level off indicates the central moral traits (the highest frequent traits); 
thus, the remaining traits are those with small frequencies and are considered as 
peripheral traits. In the British sample, the slope levelled off after the ‘open-minded’ 
trait. Therefore, the most frequently mentioned moral traits, or the most prototypical 
moral traits were honest, caring, kind, helpful, fair, considerate and open-minded. 
These results confirmed the hypothesis that the individualising approach to morality 
was clearly dominant in the British sample.  In the Saudi sample, the slope levelled off 
after the caring trait, thus the most prototypical moral traits were traits related to the 
 76 
binding approach - respectful, and religiousness - followed by traits related to the 
individualising approach -  honest, truthful and caring. 
 
 
        Table 1. Moral traits free-listed by at least 10% of the British sample (N = 80) and 
the Saudi sample (N=80) 
 
 Note. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p≤.001 
Moral traits 
Frequencies of moral traits  
 χ² 
 
    
      P British 
sample 
Saudi 
sample 
                                              Moral traits mentioned by both samples   
Honest 39 31 2.02    
Respectful 8 46 39.18***    .001 
Caring 34 17 9.01**    .004 
Kind 23 7 11.04***    .001 
Helpful 20 10 4.43*     .04 
Considerate/Considering  16 1 15.26***     .001 
Appreciative 6 10 1.00  
Sympathetic 10 1 8.16**     .004 
                                       Moral traits mentioned by British Sample only  
Open-minded 15 0   
Selfless 13 0   
Knowing what is right 12 0   
Unbiased 11 0   
Fair 19 0   
Empathetic 10 0   
Not judgmental 8 0   
Trustworthy 8 0   
                                          Moral traits mentioned by Saudi Sample only  
Religiousness  0 53   
Truthful 0 19   
Forgiving 0 12   
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          Figure 3. Scree plots of frequency of moral traits freelisted by both samples  
     
       4.4 Discussion 
           The purpose of the present study was to generate traits that constitute the 
concept of the moral person in British and Saudi samples. The two central hypotheses 
regarding common moral traits, and the dominant moral approach in the generated 
traits, were tested in both samples. The results confirm both hypotheses of this study. 
They suggest that there were common, or universal, moral traits in both samples, such 
as caring and honest traits. However, the results also indicate that there were 
differences in the frequency with which moral traits were listed between the samples. 
This study also confirmed the second hypothesis regarding the dominant moral 
dimension in each sample. In the British sample, the listed moral traits represent the 
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individualising approach to morality, whereas the moral traits in the Saudi sample 
represent the binding approach, followed by the individualising approach. The results 
did not confirm the competing hypothesis and the normative assumption in the 
literature regarding the moral traits that make up individual’s moral identity, which are 
limited to the individualising moral domain.  
           Beginning with the common traits hypothesis, the results support this 
hypothesis, showing that honest and caring traits were the most frequently mentioned 
traits in both samples (20%). These shared moral traits indicate that some moral traits 
are universal (Vauclair et al., 2014) as they appear in different cultures, including non-
Western cultures (Hauser, 2006). The results for honesty were in line with a recent 
study by Vauclair et al. (2014), which examined the layperson’s thoughts on moral 
character finding that honesty was considered a central moral trait in samples from two 
individualistic countries (Germany and New Zealand) and from two collectivistic 
countries (Brazil and the Philippines). Caring and honesty traits are widespread, 
supporting Helkama’s (2004) suggestion that the benevolence and universalism values 
in Schwartz’s (2006) theory can be found in many different cultures.  In this study, the 
honesty trait is related to universal values that emphasise the promotion of equality 
and justice, whereas caring reflects benevolent values that highlight the significance 
of pro-social behaviours and sensitivity to others’ needs. According to Schwartz’s 
(2006) theory of values, caring reflects self-transcendent values that focus on how a 
person treats others, which is the opposite of self-enhancement values, in which more 
importance is attached to the individual’s interests (Schwartz, 2007).  Likewise, caring 
and honesty resonate with the autonomy ethics of Shweder’s (2003a) morality model, 
which can also be found in different cultures.  Similarly, caring can be aligned with 
the care/harm traits of moral foundation theory, whereas honesty is related to 
fairness/reciprocity (Graham & Haidt, 2011). 
           However, cultures are likely to vary with reference to the weight and 
importance they give to different moral traits (Haidt, 2008). This is partly the case 
here, despite the fact that the caring and honest traits are shared by both samples. The 
differences were found to be statistically significant with regard to caring, but not with 
regard to the honest trait, as seen in Table 1.  
          With respect to the hypothesis for the dominant moral dimension, the results 
lend support to this hypothesis. While there are common traits that were mentioned by 
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both samples, there are other traits that the British participants generated to describe 
what it means to be a moral person which their Saudi counterparts did not, and vice 
versa. For example, in the British sample, the caring trait was more important to the 
British participants than to their Saudi counterparts. Other central moral traits were 
listed more frequently in the British sample, including kind, helpful, and considerate, 
traits that are strongly related to the care trait (Hardy, 2006). The differences between 
both samples were significant for these traits (see Table 1). This supports the idea that 
being a caring person is more central to the sense of the moral self in the British 
sample. In this regard, Graham and colleagues (2009) suggested that morality of care 
is one of several intuitions that epitomises the classical liberal philosophy, in which 
the wellbeing of the individual is important.  Being honest and fair were also among 
the traits that were deemed to be central for the British sample.  This finding about the 
dominance of traits related to care and fairness is in line with the Big Three theory of 
morality, which suggests that the ethics of autonomy are more central in individualist 
cultures (Shweder et al., 1997). This kind of morality serves to enhance the 
individual’s wellbeing; people are seen as independent and free in their behaviour 
unless this causes harm to others or violates other people’s rights. Therefore, the ethics 
of autonomy can be seen as oriented towards the individual (Shweder et al., 1997).  
Another trait that is central to the British sample and completely absent from the traits 
listed by Saudi participants, is the open-minded trait. This trait was also found to be 
central in a German sample, with Germany considered to be an individualist culture 
(Vauclair et al., 2014). This trait can be considered as one of the prototypes of the just 
exemplar, a person who is unbiased and fair (Dungan & Young, 2012), and is mainly 
related to virtues such as honesty and fairness (Baehr, 2011). It is therefore likely to 
be part of the fairness/reciprocity foundation. It is worth noting that open-mindedness 
is also seen as part of the rights-based morality, which indicates that individuals are 
open minded and flexible when it comes to what they consider to be moral (Vauclair 
et al., 2014).    
           All the most frequently mentioned traits in the British sample reflect the 
individualising approach to morality. This was to be expected bearing in mind that 
British society is an individualist culture (Hofstede, 1980). The most important 
attributes of individualism are its emphasis on people’s freedom, their wellbeing and 
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independence. Such features are therefore in line with the moral traits listed by the 
British sample (Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2007).  
           The results of Saudi sample refuted the proposed competing hypothesis that was 
drawn from the literature on moral identity, in which the prototypical traits are 
exclusively based on caring and fairness related features.  For instance, among 
common moral traits mentioned in both samples, the respectful trait is the one most 
frequently mentioned trait in the Saudi sample. There were statistically significant 
differences between both samples with regard to this trait. This is consistent with the 
moral discourse of a binding approach where emphasis is put on obligations and 
maintaining social traditions (Vauclair et al., 2014). Cross-cultural studies (Vauclair 
& Fischer, 2011) have suggested that this type of binding morality is demonstrated to 
a greater degree by people who are less Westernised, such as those from India and 
Brazil. Based on the Saudi sample, the findings of this study support this suggestion.  
Other dominant moral traits relate to religious concerns. Those traits were the second-
most prototypical traits among the Saudi sample and were completely absent from the 
British sample. This result was to be expected as Saudi Arabia is recognised as one of 
the most religiously oriented Islamic states in the world (Angrist, 2010). For some 
people in society, the moral and religious domains are inseparable. Given that religion 
provides people with a guide to what is required and encourages certain behaviours 
and values in life (Haidt et al., 1993), this may contribute to the embeddedness of 
religion in moral discourse, particularly within religious societies such as Saudi 
Arabia, as in the case of this study (Miller, 2001). Respectfulness and religiousness 
emerged as important traits for being a moral person among the Saudi sample. Both 
traits reflect the binding approach to morality, where more importance is given to the 
group and individuals are seen as members of a group and also “part of [a] larger 
interdependent collective enterprise with a history and standing of its own” (Shweder, 
2003b, p. 1120). This was to be expected considering the collectivistic orientation of 
Saudi culture. The significant features of collectivism are the prioritisation of group, 
duties and obligations. Such qualities are therefore consistent with the traits listed by 
the Saudi sample (Shulruf et al., 2007).  In addition to the moral traits that relate to the 
binding approach, honest, truthful and caring traits were among the most frequently 
listed traits in the Saudi sample, these traits represent the individualising approach to 
morality. It can therefore be concluded that both approaches to morality were central 
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in the Saudi sample, the binding approach coming first, followed by the moral 
individualising approach.  
           The purpose of employing the prototype approach in this study was to compare 
the generated traits with the traits that were listed in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral 
identity scale. This approach has significantly challenged theorists’ views of the moral 
individualising approach as being the sole content of people’s moral identity, has 
uncovering moral traits that have previously gone unnoticed in the current moral 
identity literature (Fehr & Russell, 1991). Such results suggest that using the current 
moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) in the subsequent studies in this thesis 
would not likely be informative enough regarding individuals’ accounts of their moral 
identity, particularly in collectivistic cultures such as Saudi society.  
 
4.5 Limitations and conclusion 
          Although this study has uncovered the general patterns of moral dimensions 
regarding the moral person in British and Saudi societies, it also has some limitations. 
First, the samples in this study comprised undergraduate students who are not 
representative of the population in either country. This leads to limitations for the 
generalisation of results. In addition, the results may reflect the sample age, 
considering that about 92% of participants in both samples were between 18 and 25 
years of age. However, a previous study has found no differences in the listed moral 
traits between groups that differed in age (Walker & Pitts, 1998). There were unequal 
numbers of females and males in both samples. This was particularly the case with the 
British sample (82% of the sample were female). This may have had an impact on the 
results. However, a meta-analysis conducted on gender differences in moral 
orientation did not reveal any meaningful gender differences on morality (Jaffee & 
Hyde, 2000).     
            It is worth noting that there are two stages within the prototype approach 
(Horowitz & Turan, 2008). The first stage is when the features of any given concept 
are generated by the participants, who are known as ‘the nominators’.  This step is 
usually followed up by the work of another group of participants, called ‘the raters’, 
who are asked to rate the importance, or the prototypical nature, of the generated trait 
with respect to the given concept (Horowitz & Turan, 2008). Hence, while this study 
revealed important and informative findings, it only examined prototypes of the moral 
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person; the traits of the moral person need to be investigated further. Instead of 
following the typical second step of the prototype approach, which is described by the 
work of ‘the raters’, in this next study, I will move beyond this step and use a different 
approach to obtain further evidence on how the traits of a moral person may vary 
depending on the cultural context, specifically when using identity-invoking stimuli.   
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 Chapter 5  
           Study 2: How Can Moral Foundation Theory and the Perceived Cultural 
                                  Importance Approach Inform Cross Cultural 
                                              Studies of Moral Identity? 
 
 
               What is needed, according to moral foundations theorists, is to 
move, ‘beyond Kohlberg’s ethics of justice and Gillian’s ethics of 
care’, classic approach to moral psychology that Haidt dismissed as 
product of ‘liberal bias’ (Kugler et al., 2014, p.414). 
 
5.1 Introduction 
            As seen in Study 1, a bottom-up approach was adopted to decipher the moral 
traits of British and Saudi participants. In this study, however, moral identity was 
investigated from a different angle: a top-down, or what can be considered a 
confirmatory approach.  Such an approach is considered more specific and represents 
a move from theory to data (Johnson & Christensen, 2012).  
           The results of Study 1 revealed that there are more traits than just fairness and 
caring that should be included when conceptualising and measuring of moral identity. 
Rather than merely having participants rate the importance of the generated traits of 
Study 1, I decided to examine how moral identity among the British and Saudi people 
might be activated by different sets of moral traits.  In Study 2, these investigations 
utilised Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale; however, by using various, 
listed moral traits, I more closely tested moral identity content in both cultures more 
accurately, instead of relying solely on the rates of the moral traits.   
           In this study, the moral traits that derived from a moral foundation dictionary 
were used. These traits comprise a word list for each moral foundation (for the 
complete word list, see Graham et al., 2009).  Aquino and Reed’s moral traits (2002), 
those used in their Moral Identity Scale, were also included. Half of these traits, 
including Aquino and Reed’s moral traits, represent individualising moral foundations, 
the other half binding moral foundations. Previous research using moral foundation 
theory found differences between the East and West, with a large study of cross-
cultural differences in moral concerns (Graham et al., 2011). Eastern participants (from 
South Asia, East Asia, and South Asia) reported slightly higher scores in terms of 
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harm, fairness and authority in comparison to participants from Western countries. The 
Eastern participants also demonstrated stronger ingroup and purity moral concerns 
compared with Western participants (from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Western Europe). Because of this, Graham and colleagues (2011) 
suggested that researchers can use moral foundation theory when studying cross-
cultural differences in the moral domain.   
           This study also examined those moral traits considered important in the 
participants’ own culture. This shared knowledge, or common sense, generally guides 
people’s behaviours and influences their thoughts about themselves and other 
members of their society, although individuals vary in their perceptions of, or reading 
of these consensual views (Wan, 2012; Wan, Chiu, Peng & Tam, 2007). Accordingly, 
researchers have argued that self-concepts, values and behaviours are not entirely the 
product of what individuals truly believe. Nor are they based solely on introspection; 
they are also shaped by looking outwards at their social contexts (Zou et al., 2009). 
This approach, exploring people’s perceptions of their cultural knowledge, has been 
called the intersubjective representation approach (Wan, 2012), perceived cultural 
importance (Zou et al., 2009) or the intersubjective culture approach (Chiu, Gelfand, 
Yamagishi, Shteynberg  & Wan, 2010).  Individuals’ perceptions of shared knowledge 
in their society are considered to be “an important explanatory variable in carrying 
cultural patterns” (Zou et al., 2009, p. 580). Therefore, this study uses this approach to 
determine whether certain moral traits that are used to activate participants’ moral 
identity reflect people’s perceptions of what is culturally or consensually believed to 
be the traits of a moral person. This enables us to see the influence of culture in terms 
of the traits that activate moral identity. In addition, this study considered how this 
might differ between conditions within a single culture, as well as between conditions 
across both cultures. 
           This study also examined whether there is a relationship between the set of 
moral traits that activate participants' moral identities and the participants' perception 
of the cultural importance of those traits. Some studies have indicated that personal 
views tend to be similar to the perceived social consensus on different topics, although 
the correlation between these was not high (Fischer, 2006; Wan et al., 2007).  If this 
idea is taken further and a positive correlation is assumed, then the influence of country 
or culture on moral identity may be mediated by the perceived cultural importance of 
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moral traits. This idea was also tested in this study. A study carried out by Zou et al., 
(2009) showed that the cultural differences found in a different form of cultural 
cognation, were mediated by participants’ perceptions of the degree to which these 
forms are shared in their culture. Based on this, the influence of country or culture on 
moral identity may be mediated by the perceived cultural importance of moral traits, 
which was tested in Study 2. Furthermore, reverse mediation was also tested whereby 
perceived cultural importance was the outcome variable and moral identity the 
mediator. This alternative mediation was considered for two reasons. The notion that 
the self and culture constitute each other, whereby culture influences how we perceive 
ourselves, suggests that people sometimes reinforce the ideas and practices of their 
sociocultural surroundings as well (for a review on the mutual constitution of self and 
culture, see Markus & Kitayama, 2010). The second reason was the false consensus 
bias, where people tend to think that their ideas are widely spread and shared in their 
society (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).  
           Overall, three hypotheses were developed, based on the results of the first study, 
moral foundation theory and the perceived cultural importance approach literature. 
The first hypothesis predicted that within both cultures, the scores on the moral identity 
and perceived cultural importance scale would be highest among British groups in 
individualising moral conditions (care/harm, fairness/ reciprocity and Aquino and 
Reed’s (2002) moral traits), compared to moral binding conditions (in-group/loyalty 
traits, authority/respect traits, and purity/sanctity traits). Regarding Saudi culture, 
instead of a specific prediction, I explored whether Saudi participants in the binding 
conditions would score higher, or equivalent, to those in the individualising conditions.  
            The second hypothesis, in terms of a comparison between the two samples and 
based on prior research (Graham et al., 2009), is that scores on the moral identity and 
perceived cultural importance scale would be higher in the Saudi sample than in the 
British sample across all moral traits conditions, with the largest differences found in 
moral binding conditions.   
            For the third hypothesis, it was predicted that the moral identity scale would be 
positively correlated to the perceived cultural importance scale across all six 
conditions in both samples. Accordingly, I examined whether the perceived 
importance of traits mediated country differences in moral identity and whether moral 
identity mediated country differences in the perceived cultural importance of traits.  
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5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
          The British participants were 247 adults ranging from 18–86 years of age (M 
=29.5, SD =11.21; 110 males, 137 females). The ethnic composition of the British 
sample was predominantly White British (200 or 81%). The reminder of the sample 
was 2 White Irish, 7 White Scottish, 2 White Welsh, 9 other White background, 2 
Black African, 1 Black Caribbean, 6 Indian, 1 Pakistani, 5 Chinese, 2 other Asian 
background, 1 Arab, 8 other ethnic groups and 1 no ethnicity reported. The Saudi 
participants were 292 adults ranging from 18–65 years of age (M =33.9, SD =10.92; 
105 males, 187 females). As with Study 1, the Saudi sample was not asked about 
ethnicity, as almost all of the Saudi Arabian population is of Arab ethnicity (DeBel-
air, 2014).  
           A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted as age scores not normally distributed, 
to determine if there were significant differences between the samples. The median 
age for Saudi participants, 34 years, was significantly higher than that for British 
participants of 26 years (U = 37.66, z = -4.889, p = .001, r =.22). The two samples also 
differed significantly by gender; χ² (1) = 4.10, p =.04, whereby there were more female 
Saudi participants (64% females) than female British (55.5 % females). 
            In exchange for their participation, participants in each country were entered 
into a prize draw for one of ten £10 Amazon gift cards.  
 
5.2.2 Design 
          This study was a 2 (culture) x 6 (moral traits) between-subjects design.  
Participants in each culture were randomly assigned to one of six conditions.  
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
          The study was administered using online survey software, namely Qualtrics 
Surveys. This study was advertised on notice boards across the University of Surrey, 
UK and King Saud University, Saudi Arabia. The link was also posted on SONA (a 
participant recruitment system) and various social networks such as Facebook and 
Twitter.  In addition, participants were recruited via a snowball sampling method and 
through word of mouth advertising. 
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           Participants were informed that the study was about social attitudes. Two 
demographic questions about nationality and age were included to verify that 
participants completing the questionnaire matched the study criteria: ‘participants 
must be either British or Saudi citizens (over 18 years of age)’. Ineligible participants 
were prevented from completing the study through the End of Survey tool, which is 
part of the online survey software. Information sheets and consent forms were 
presented to participants before their responses were collected. 
 
5.2.4 Materials  
            Participants were first presented with one of six groups of moral traits that 
varied by condition. In Aquino & Reed’s (2002) condition, traits were Caring, 
Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest and Kind. 
In the five moral foundations conditions traits were Caring, Compassionate, 
Sympathetic, Peaceful and Protective (care/harm condition); Fair, Honest, Just, 
Tolerant and Fair-minded (fairness/reciprocity condition). These three conditions 
represent the individualising moral approach. The remaining three conditions were 
Group loyal, Devoted, Patriot, Communal and Familial (in-group/loyalty condition); 
Obedient, Respectful to Authority, Dutiful, Lawful and committed to the Traditions of 
Society (authority/respect condition); Pure, Chaste, Pious, Humble and Abstinent 
(purity condition). These three conditions represent the binding moral approach.  
           All participants read the following description drawn verbatim from Aquino & 
Reed’s scale: 
  The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be 
someone else. For a moment, visualise in your mind the kind of person 
who has these characteristics. Imagine how the person would think, 
feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would 
be like, answer the following question (2002, p.1427). 
 
One reading the above, the participants completed the ten, 5-point Likert scale items 
from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale.  Sample items include; ‘It would 
make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics’, and ‘The types of 
things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these 
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characteristics.’ Responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), high 
scores indicating the activation of moral identity. 
     Next, participants completed a four 5-point Likert sale measure of the perceived 
cultural importance of the moral traits. High scores indicate greater cultural 
importance: 
            These characteristics are important in [British/Saudi] society. 
   It is important that people in my society have these characteristics. 
            These characteristics are important to a typical [British/Saudi] person. 
   These characteristics represent what [British/Saudi] people think a moral  
   person is like. 
          Demographic information was reported after the questionnaires were completed, 
the participants were thanked and debriefed. 
           The Saudi questionnaire was the same as the British but written in Arabic 
language. Both questionnaires were translated by the researcher and reviewed by two 
Saudi researchers, who are native in the Arabic and who also speak English.  Reverse 
translation was also used to ensure that the questionnaire read the same in both 
languages. 
 
5. 3 Results 
5.3.1 Reliability 
           Across all six conditions in both samples, the reliability coefficients for the 
moral identity scales ranged from .59 to .93 while for the perceived cultural importance 
scales, the range was from .76 to .90 (see Table 2). The moral identity and the 
perceived cultural importance scales were averaged to form the scale scores. 
5.3.2 Data screening 
          Skewness values and kurtosis values showed that the neither the moral identity 
nor the perceived cultural importance scales were normally distributed in either 
culture, and transformations failed to normalise these data. Scree plots, absolute values 
of skewness, and kurtosis were employed to identify the outliers (Field, 2013). 
Regarding the moral identity scale across both samples, there were few outliers, those 
present not extreme enough to influence the data. 
          Since the nonparametric tests were conducted on both scales because of the non-
normality of data, the outliers were not deleted as the medians appeared to be robust 
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to the outliers than the mean (see Field, 2013; Miller, 1993). Descriptive analysis was 
employed to inspect for missing data, this analysis revealing some missing data.  
Missing items were replaced with the mean value of the respective scale. 
 
        Table 2. Reliability coefficients, medians and differences in moral identity and 
perceived cultural importance scales for all six conditions within and between 
the British and Saudi samples 
Note. For columns values marked with subscripts, medians that do not share subscripts are significantly    
different from each other by p < .05 according to Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc tests. U=Mann-Whitney test. 
EF= effect size for the differences between British and Saudi samples in each conditions (groups).  *p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
          Due to the age and gender differences reported previously, and to rule out any 
possible influence that such differences might have had on the results, Spearman’s 
correlation was used to investigate the correlation between age and moral identity and 
perceived cultural importance in each condition, in each country. Spearman’s 
correlations ranged from 0.01 to 0.32 (p < 0.05), revealing that age was not 
significantly corelated with moral identity or perceived cultural importance.   A Mann-
Whitney U test was conducted to see if there were any differences between males and 
Conditions (Groups) 
Moral identity  
British sample Saudi sample  
 
     U 
 
 
  EF 
 
n 
 
α 
 
Mdn 
 
n 
 
α 
 
Mdn 
Aquino & Reed’s traits  50 .78 3.70 c 50 .59 3.85 918.50* -.22 
Care/Harm traits   40 .73 3.65 b, c 45 .61 3.80 794.50 -.10 
Fairness/Reciprocity traits  42 .77 3.70 c 46 .65 4.05 700.50* -.24 
In-group/Loyalty traits  39 .85 3.30 a, b 44 .85 3.85 515.00** -.34 
Authority/Respect traits  43 .93 3.10 a 54 .85 3.70 649.00*** -.38 
Purity/Sanctity traits  33 .88 2.70 a 53 .77 3.80 242.00*** -.60 
Conditions (Groups) 
Perceived cultural 
importance 
British sample Saudi sample  
 
U 
 
 
   EF 
 
n 
 
α 
 
Mdn 
 
n 
 
  α 
 
Mdn 
Aquino & Reed’s traits  50 .81 4.00 a 50 .70 4.87 794.50*** -.32 
Care/Harm traits   40 .74 3.87 a, b 45 .67 4.75 394.50*** -.49 
Fairness/Reciprocity traits  42 .74 4.25 a 46 .73 4.75 585.00*** -.35 
In-group/Loyalty traits  39 .73  3.50 b, c 44 .81 4.62 285.50*** -.58                                                       
Authority/Respect traits  43 .86 3.50 b 54 .82 4.25 568.50*** -.44 
Purity/Sanctity traits  33 .90 2.50 c 53 .88 4.50 225.00*** -.63 
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females in each condition, in each country. The analyses showed there were no 
significant differences.  Accordingly, there was no need to control for age or gender in 
subsequent analyses. 
5.3.3 Within cultures analysis 
           To test the within culture hypothesis, a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed over 
the six conditions in the British and the Saudi samples to determine if there were 
differences in the moral identity and perceived cultural importance scales scores within 
each culture.  
           In the British sample, the differences between the six groups in moral identity 
scores were statistically significant, H (5) =58.25, p = .001. To limit the probability of 
making Type I errors, pairwise comparisons were then performed using Dunn’s 
procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Demšar, 2006).  
Statistical significance was accepted at the p < .0033 level (.05 divided by 15). As 
predicted, post hoc tests indicated that the scores for the individualising moral 
conditions were statistically higher than for the moral binding conditions, with the 
exception of the care/harm moral traits, which were not statistically higher than 
authority/respect moral traits (see Table 2). Regarding the perceived cultural 
importance scores, the difference between the six groups was statistically significant, 
H (5) = 64.218, p = .001, supporting the hypothesis that the scores on perceived 
cultural importance scales would be higher in individualising moral conditions than 
binding moral conditions.  Post-hoc tests showed that the scores for the individualising 
moral conditions were statistically higher than for the moral binding conditions, with 
the exception of care/harm traits which were not statistically higher than the 
ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect traits (see Table 2).  
           In the Saudi sample, no significant difference was found between the six 
conditions in moral identity scores, H (5) = 8.310, p =.140. Regarding the perceived 
cultural importance scores, while the differences between the six groups were 
statistically significant H (5) =12.56, p = .027, post-hoc tests did not reveal any 
statistically significant differences in the perceived cultural importance scores.  
   5.3.4 Between cultures analysis 
            Regarding differences between the two samples on the moral identity scores, I 
hypothesised that the moral identity and the perceived cultural importance scores in 
the Saudi sample would be higher in all conditions, with the largest differences found 
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in moral binding conditions. A Mann-Whitney U test was run to test this prediction. 
Broadly consistent with the hypothesis, the results show that in both scales, the Saudi 
participants scored higher than their British counterparts, except for the Care/Harm 
traits condition in the moral identity scale, where there were no differences found 
between the samples (see Table 2). The results also revealed that the largest differences 
between the samples were in the moral binding conditions. 
5.3.5 Correlation and mediation analysis 
          I predicted that the moral identity scale would be positively correlated to the 
perceived cultural importance scale. The correlation analysis revealed a positive 
correlation between the moral identity and perceived cultural importance scales in all 
six conditions in the British sample, with the exception of the Aquino & Reed’s 
condition and also the fairness/reciprocity condition (see Table 3). In the Saudi sample, 
there was a significant correlation between moral identity and perceived cultural 
importance in all conditions, except the fairness/reciprocity condition. 
 
       Table 3. Correlation between moral identity scales and perceived cultural  
                      importance scale in the six conditions  
 
 
                   
    
           
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Note;*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p≤.001. 
 
 
           Mediation analyses were then performed to investigate the extent to which the 
effect of the predictor, country (British and Saudi) on the dependent variable or the 
outcome (moral identity) was mediated by the mediator (perceived cultural 
importance). Mediation analysis requires a significant correlation between the 
 
Conditions(Groups) 
British sample Saudi sample 
 
n  rs n   rs 
Aquino & Reed’s traits 50 .22 50 .42** 
Care/Harm traits 40 .51*** 45 .43** 
Fairness/Reciprocity traits 42 .21 46 .08 
In-group/loyalty traits 39 .48** 44 .63*** 
Authority/Respect traits 43 .65*** 54 .54*** 
Purity/Sanctity traits  33 .62*** 53 .352* 
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dependent variable (i.e., moral identity), the mediator (i.e., perceived cultural 
importance) and observed group differences in both variables (Preachers & Hayes, 
2004). Accordingly, this analysis could not be carried out in the fairness conditions 
where the analysis revealed no significant correlation between moral identity and the 
perceived cultural importance.  
            In all five remaining conditions, the regression coefficient (𝑎) showed that 
country predicted significant variances in perceived cultural importance (the 
mediator). The regression coefficient (𝑏) showed that perceived cultural importance 
predicted significant variance in moral identity (the outcome) as can be seen in Figure 
4. The effect size was estimated here using kappa-squared where 0.01, 0.09 and 0.25 
represent small, medium and large effects, respectively (Field, 2013).                 
            As predicted, in the two individualising conditions (see Figure 4), perceived 
cultural importance mediated a significant indirect effect of country on moral identity, 
ab =1.47, 95% CI [0.46, 3.19], with an insignificant direct effect (0.95) and a 
significant total effect (0.93*) in Aquino and Reed’s moral traits condition; and ab = 
2.48, 95% CI [1.22, 4.46], with an insignificant direct effect (1.51) and a significant 
total effect (0.97*) in the care/harm condition. These mediation effects (indirect 
effects) are both medium-to-large, Ƙ2 =0.15, 95% CI [0.05, 0.28], Ƙ2 =0.22, 95% CI 
[0.12, .0.36], in Aquino and Reed’s moral traits and care/harm conditions respectively 
(Field, 2013).  
            Likewise, in the binding moral traits conditions (see Figure 4), perceived 
cultural importance mediated a significant indirect effect of country in moral identity 
in the three binding conditions: 1) ab = 5.78, 95% CI [3.70, 8.28], with an insignificant 
direct effect (0.80) and a significant total effect (4.98**) in the in-group/loyalty 
condition; 2) ab = 4.18 (95% CI [2.04, 6.44], with an insignificant direct effect (2.92) 
and a significant total effect (7.10***) in the authority/respect condition; 3) ab = 5.20 
(95% CI [2.68, 8.41], with a significant direct effect (5.64**) and a significant total 
effect (0.93***) in the purity/sanctity. In all three conditions, this mediation effect was 
large, Ƙ2 = 0.37 (95% CI [.0.26, 0.49], Ƙ2 = 0.25 (95% CI [0.13, 0.36], and Ƙ2 = 0.28 
(95% CI [0.14, 0.42] in the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity 
conditions, respectively. 
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       Figure 4. Mediation model for the effect of perceived cultural importance 
                    in the relationship between country and moral identity.  
 
Note. A&R = Aquino & Reed’s traits; CH= care/harm traits; IL= in-group/loyalty traits; 
AR=authority/respect traits; PS= purity/sanctity traits. 𝑎: the effect of the independent variable on 
the mediator. 𝑏: the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable. 𝑐′: the direct effects of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. c: the total effect of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable. ns: not significant. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
           These results confirm hypothesis 3 regarding the mediating role of perceived 
cultural importance in the relationship between both countries and moral identity, 
especially in the binding conditions.  
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           As mentioned before, reverse mediation was also tested where perceived 
cultural importance was the outcome variable with moral identity as the mediator.  In 
Aquino and Reed’s moral traits condition, the indirect effect of country on perceived 
cultural importance was mediated by moral identity : ab =.61, 95% CI [0.14, 1.57] and 
this effect was medium-to-large Ƙ2 =0.10, 95% CI [0.03, 0.23]. In the care/harm 
condition, moral identity did not mediate the effect of country on perceived cultural 
importance:  ab =.21, 95% CI [- 0.23, 0.83].   In all three of the binding moral traits 
conditions, moral identity mediated the significant effect of country on perceived 
cultural importance, ab = 1.36, 95% CI [0.58, 2.37], ab = 1.71, 95% CI [0.91, 2.71], 
and ab = 2.39, 95% CI [1.00, 4.31] in the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and 
purity/sanctity conditions respectively. These mediation effects were medium-to- large 
in the in-group/loyalty and authority/respect conditions, Ƙ2 = 0.18 (95% CI [.09, 0.31], 
Ƙ2 = 0.24 (95% CI [0.13, 0 .36] respectively. The mediation effect was large in the 
purity/sanctity condition, Ƙ2 = 0.25 (95% CI [0.11, 0.45].   
 
5. 4 Discussion 
            Study 2 examined how moral identity can be activated by various sets of moral 
traits that include, and go beyond, the fairness and caring traits that have usually been 
used to measure moral identity. This study also investigated the importance of moral 
traits in terms of cultural beliefs, regarding what constitutes a moral person and 
whether the importance given to these traits aligns with the participants’ moral 
identities in British and Saudi cultures.   The results suggest that the moral identity of 
British participants was activated more by traits related to the individualising approach 
to morality, this supported by the study’s hypothesis. The moral identity of Saudi 
participants was activated equally by traits related to both the individualising and 
binding approaches to morality, which was expected. These results are in agreement 
with the results of Study 1, as well as moral foundation theory’s predictions regarding 
cross-cultural differences.  
          There was also a positive correlation between moral identity and the perceived 
cultural importance scales but with a few exceptions.  With respect to the comparison 
between the two cultures, the results indicate that the Saudi participants scored higher 
on the moral identity scale than their British counterparts for all study conditions, 
which confirmed the study hypothesis. The results also demonstrate that perceived 
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cultural importance mediates the relationship between country and moral identity, 
except in fairness conditions.  Moral identity mediated the significant effect of country 
on perceived cultural importance, except in fairness and care conditions. In the 
remainder of this section, I will address and interpret these results. 
           Beginning with the culture hypothesis, the findings confirmed the main 
hypothesis about the British sample. The results showed that the British participants’ 
moral identities were activated more by traits representing the individualising 
approach to morality than by those representing the binding approach (Graham & 
Haidt, 2011). With regard to perceptions of the cultural importance of moral traits, 
British participants again gave more importance to the moral traits that reflect the 
individualising approach to morality. These results are in agreement with the 
underlying assumptions of the moral foundations theory, whereas the individualising 
approach to morality prevails in Western countries (Haidt et al., 1993). However, 
contrary to the predictions of moral foundations theory, participants’ scores on the 
care/harm condition traits were not significantly higher than participants’ scores on the 
ingroup/loyalty condition traits on the moral identity scale.  Similarly, the importance 
of the care/harm traits scores were not significantly different from those of the 
ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect traits. These results can be understood better by 
examining some of the moral traits presented in the in-group/loyalty and 
authority/respect conditions, such as communal, familial and dutiful traits.  It may be 
the case here that these groups of traits tap into similar moral traits, where people tend 
to be caring and avoid harmful behaviours, in particularly towards their family and 
community members, also abiding by obligations to be caring towards others, resulting 
in no significant differences between them.  In general, the findings are consistent with 
the findings of Study 1 and other studies that show Westerners to be more concerned 
about moral issues related to harm, fairness and justice (Haidt, et al., 1993).  
          The common sense of the British participants diverged on these two conditions. 
It is possible that this occurred because of issues related to fairness and justice, as 
represented by the fairness condition and by Aquino and Reed’s traits, which include 
three traits related to justice. In other words, it may be that personal feelings, or the 
experience of justice, play a more important role for the British participants than the 
perceived importance of these traits in British society. As a result, although fairness is 
an important component of the British participants’ moral identity, as seen in the 
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results supporting hypothesis 1, the British participants may not consider their society 
as a fair society. This in turn leads to disassociation between their scores on moral 
identity and the perceived cultural importance of moral traits related to justice and 
equality. It is well documented that perceptions of justice influence individual attitudes 
and feelings (Bakhshi, Kumar & Rani, 2009); thus, it may be the case that perceived 
justice in British society influenced the evaluation, or importance, that participants 
gave to fairness traits regarding their society. 
            The hypothesis regarding the Saudi sample was confirmed, the results 
revealing no differences between the six conditions in the moral identity and the 
perceived cultural importance scales.  For the Saudi participants, moral identity was 
equally activated by both individualising and binding moral approaches, both 
perceived as equally important, this supporting the study’s hypothesis. However, it is 
worth mentioning that the reliability of both the moral identity and the perceived 
cultural importance scales was lower in the first three conditions, (the individualising 
approach) in comparison to the rest of the conditions (the binding approach).  It might 
therefore be suggested that these moral foundation traits are less coherent or consistent 
than the other foundation traits, however, at this point, such an explanation is purely 
speculation and requires further investigation. 
             Study 2 supports the hypothesis about cross-cultural comparisons. The results 
showed that there were no differences between the British and Saudi samples for the 
care/harm foundation.  The Saudi participants’ moral identity scores were significantly 
higher than the British participants’ scores for the other two conditions that represent 
the individualising moral approach. However, the effect sizes for these differences 
were small. Regarding perceived cultural importance, the Saudi participants’ scores 
were also significantly higher than those of their British counterparts. These results are 
consistent with those of Graham et al., (2011) who found that eastern participants 
scored higher on care and fairness concerns in comparison to western participants. 
These results are not consistent with the results of Study 1, where the frequency of 
moral traits that relate to the individualising approach were significantly higher for 
British sample. These inconsistent results may be explained by the different methods 
used in each study. In the first study, participants were free to list the traits they thought 
represented a moral person without being given any external cues; in the second study, 
participants were presented with moral traits and a moral identity scale and asked to 
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score the listed statements. Therefore, the differences might be the result of the nature 
of the tasks (free listing traits vs rating statements).                                                        
           Support was also established for the hypothesis about the moral binding 
approach.  Here, the Saudi participants’ scores were significantly higher than those of 
the British participants. These differences were greater in conditions with traits that 
represent the binding approach to morality, with the exception of perceived cultural 
importance of care/harm traits, as shown in Table 2.  Among these three conditions, 
the purity/sanctity traits condition had the largest effect size on both scales. These 
results are in line with our main prediction and with Study 1, by which Saudi 
participants listed traits related to the binding approach to morality for a moral person. 
These cultural differences also were consistent with Graham et al., (2011)’s study, 
which used moral foundation theory to compare moral concerns in the East and West. 
The same pattern of results was found where Eastern participants expressed greater 
concerns with regard to binding moral foundations than Westerners (Graham et al., 
2011). Triandis and Suh (2002) pointed out that people in a collectivist society see 
themselves as a part of a large group and are more concerned about norms, duties and 
responsibilities to their group members. This assertion about people from collectivist 
societies is supported by the findings in this study. Traits relating to the binding 
approach to morality appear to activate cultural elements only in the Saudi participants. 
This may explain the significant differences between the British and Saudi samples in 
terms of the binding approach to morality. The evidence so far suggests that reliance 
only on Aquino and Reed’s (2002) traits to measure moral identity does not allow us 
to identify the differences between British and Saudi samples with regard to the 
contents of moral identity.  
          Regarding the relationship between the moral identity and perceived cultural 
importance scales, as mentioned earlier, previous studies measuring perceived shared 
knowledge and individual views found a positive, but not high, correlation between 
moral identity and the perceived cultural importance of moral traits (Fischer, 2006; 
Zou et al., 2009).  In this study, the same pattern (positive but not high) was seen 
between the two scales over most conditions, except for the fairness/reciprocity traits 
in both samples and Aquino & Reed’s traits in the British sample, where no significant 
correlations were found.  It is possible that the absence of these correlations occurred 
because of issues related to fairness and justice, as represented by the fairness 
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condition and by Aquino and Reed’s traits, which include three traits related to justice. 
The suggested post hoc, speculative explanation of the results is that the British and 
Saudi participants may not consider their society a fair society.  
          The findings also reveal that country influenced moral identity through 
perceived cultural importance in all conditions except the fairness/reciprocity 
condition. The mediation analysis revealed no significant correlation between moral 
identity and perceived cultural importance in this condition. Interestingly, the 
relationship between country and moral identity through perceived cultural importance 
was strongest in the binding approach to morality (in-group/loyalty traits, 
authority/respect traits and purity/sanctity traits). In other words, perceiving the 
cultural importance of these moral traits explained the differences between both 
countries in activating moral identity. Thus, it can be concluded that those moral traits 
are more culturally situated than the other traits which are considered to be universal 
(the individualising approach to morality) (Graham et al., 2011). Reverse mediation 
was conducted whereby moral identity mediated the significant effect of country on 
perceived cultural importance, except in the fairness and care conditions. However, it 
is important to note that the effect size of mediation was larger when perceived cultural 
importance was the mediator as opposed to when the moral identity was the mediator. 
Such results lend more support to the importance of perceiving the cultural importance 
of moral traits that form people’s moral identity in terms of explaining differences 
between the British and Saudi sample in moral identity scores. 
 
5.5 Limitations and conclusion 
           The limitations in this study now need to be acknowledged.  First, although 
reverse translation was used for the wording of the scales used in the study, it was not 
possible to ensure that this method completely eliminated all language-related issues 
that could influence the meaning of scale items or the moral traits. To address this, in 
the next study, a more laborious translation method will be used.  Secondly, the results 
of this study may be affected by social desirability bias. This should be considered 
when interpreting the study results and the design of future studies. A social 
desirability bias scale will be included in the next study.   
          To conclude, this study goes beyond previous research in moral identity by 
examining the influence of different moral traits in activating moral identity and also 
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by demonstrating how participants perceive these traits in terms of their cultural 
importance. This has resulted in a novel contribution to the flourishing research into 
moral identity. In this study, I have integrated and connected two different theoretical 
approaches; the first one is the moral foundation theory that seeks to map the cultural 
diversity of morality (Graham et al., 2011). I drew upon moral foundations theory to 
uncover these variations in the contents of moral identity in the two different cultural 
contexts.  The results show that this theory captures the diversity of morality in a more 
effective manner than Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale. The hope is that by 
using the moral foundations theory, this research can serve as a starting point to rethink 
moral identity and culture. The other theoretical approach is the perceived cultural 
importance approach (Zou et al., 2009), a useful explanatory mechanism for 
investigating cultural differences.  Taken together, this can be considered to be the first 
research to shed light on the influence of culture upon moral identity. The results 
showed that culture tends to shape participants’ perception of their moral identity, 
through a perception of the importance of moral identity or a collective shared 
knowledge about what constitutes a moral person. The notion of perceiving cultural 
importance can be seen as analogous to Keesing’s (as cited in Zou et al., 2009, p. 591) 
depiction of cultural competence as someone’s “theory of what his fellows know, 
believe, and mean, his theory of the code being followed, the game being played, in 
the society into which he was born”.  Here, participants seemed to be following their 
cultural code about moral identity. 
          The joint results of Studies 1and 2 highlight the importance of measuring 
cultural variations in moral identity, something which has been completely overlooked 
in the few existing moral identity scales. Moving beyond moral individualising 
domains is necessary, and important, for both cross-cultural studies and also for 
studies, which examine these variations within a single culture. For example, previous 
studies have pointed out that conservatives and people from low social classes tend to 
value moral concerns such as purity and loyalty, even in western and individualistic 
countries such as the United States (Graham et al., 2011). With this in mind, neglecting 
these variations leads to a misrepresentation of some people’s accounts of their moral 
identity. To remedy this limitation, it is necessary to develop a moral identity scale 
that considers a variety of moral identity contents. This will be the task of the next 
study. 
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                                                          Chapter 6 
              Study 3: The Moral Identity Scale: Development, Translation,  
                                           Reliability, and Validation 
 
 
                  One of the primary challenges of studying moral identity is that it is 
difficult to adequately measure such a rich construct (Hardy & Carlo, 
2011, p. 502).  
 
6. 1. Introduction 
            Because the overall aim of this research is to examine of the role of culture on 
moral identity, this study, the third in this thesis, focuses on the development of a moral 
identity scale and its psychometric properties.   
           This study was informed by the previous two studies. The first study found that 
binding and individualising moral traits were prototypical of the moral person in Saudi 
culture, while individualising moral traits were prototypical of the moral person in 
British culture. The second study has also revealed that when various moral traits are 
used to activate participants’ moral identity, significant differences exist between 
British and Saudi samples in terms of the three missing moral foundations (binding 
moral approach) that are missing from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale: 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. The results of both studies have 
highlighted the importance of measuring cultural variations in moral identity, this 
completely neglected in the few moral identity scales currently in use. To remedy this 
limitation and to measure moral identity in both cultures more accurately, there is a 
need to develop a moral identity scale that considers the variety of moral identity 
content.  
           As such, and for this study, data was gain collected from both British and Saudi 
Arabian participants. The development and translation into Arabic of the moral 
identity scale is also included. The exploratory factor analysis, reliability analysis, and 
validity analysis were examined.  Differences between the British and Saudi sample 
were examined to determine whether or not the new moral identity scale confirms the 
findings of studies 1 and 2.  
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           In the interest of clarity and given the fact that I used 16 measures to validate 
the new moral identity scale, I decided to include the hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between the new moral identity scale and the set of validity measures 
within the materials section.  For the sake of additional clarity, the hypotheses are 
detailed on Table 4, which presents the measures of validity along with their predicted 
correlations with the new moral identity scale.  With respect to the differences between 
the British and Saudi samples for the new moral identity scale scores, the hypotheses 
were based on the previously discussed literature, as well as the findings of Study’s 1 
and 2. In the individualising moral items, the Saudi participants’ scores should be 
slightly higher than those of their British counterparts.  Likewise, the Saudi sample 
should score higher than their British counterparts on the binding moral items, external 
moral motivation subscale and the internalisation and symbolisation subscale (full 
descriptions of these subscales within the new moral identity scale, are fully detailed 
in section 6.2.3).   
           In the following section, I will discuss how I developed and translated the new 
moral identity scale.  
 
6.2 Development of the moral identity scale 
6.2.1 Review of the literature 
          The aim of this literature review is primarily to review existing moral identity 
scales to determine whether there is truly a need for the proposed scale: its necessity 
will be explained in the following section. The aim is to understand how other 
researchers have designed their scales and, of equal importance, to be aware of any 
problems or criticisms of existing scales.  Lastly, the literature review is intended to 
be both thorough and broad enough to determine the boundaries of the proposed scale, 
in other words, to identify the potential concepts expected to correlate with the moral 
identity scale, as well as those likely to be unrelated.  It is important to identify existing 
measures of those concepts in order to validate the proposed moral identity scale at a 
later stage.  
          The literature on identity and self-measurements was reviewed (e.g., Cheek & 
Briggs, 2013; Lo, Helwig, Chen, Ohashi, & Cheng, 2011; Nario-Redmond, Biernat, 
Eidelman, & Palenske, 2004; Remen, Chambless, & Rodebaugh, 2002; Schwartz et 
al., 2012).  Research on moral identity and the moral self (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
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Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011; Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Woodbury, & Hickman, 
2014; Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, &  Aquino, 2010; Liu, 2012; Reynolds & Ceranic, 
2007) and any other closely related constructs such as values, moral motivation and 
moral character, was also examined (e.g., Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013; 
Hitlin, 2011; Krettenauer, 2011; Schwartz, 1994). Literature regarding cultural 
variations in morality, mostly focusing on moral foundation theory (Graham et al., 
2011), was also reviewed. This was necessary because part of the moral identity scale 
will cover the variation in the content of moral identity.  
 
6.2.2 Existing moral identity scales: why create another one? 
           In the moral identity literature, I found four moral identity scales.  The first one 
is Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale which is widely used, its reliability 
and validity also assessed (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). In fact, 65% of studies included in 
a recent meta-analysis of the ability of moral identity to predict moral behaviours used 
this scale (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016).  This scale is divided into two subscales: the 
internalisation subscale (e.g., I strongly desire to have these characteristics) and the 
symbolisation subscale (e.g., The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me 
as having these characteristics). Participants are asked to imagine themselves or other 
persons who have moral traits, which are represented only by the fairness and caring 
traits and generated from an American sample. Three moral foundations; 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity are completely absent (Graham 
et al., 2011). This means that there is need for a scale that taps into different kinds of 
morality.  
          Another matter regarding Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale is its symbolization 
subscale; some researchers have criticised it for lacking consistency with the construct  
of moral identity and the predictive ability of moral actions (see Hardy et al., 2014).  
For example, study found that the internalisation aspects of moral identity were more 
predictive of moral outcomes than symbolization aspects (Aquino & Reed 2002; Reed 
et al., 2007; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). One of the explanations for these results was 
that “it could be that people symbolically express their moral identities in ways other 
than what was measured with the items used to tap the symbolization dimension” 
(Reed & Aquino, 2003, p. 1283-1284). Another study revealed, somewhat 
surprisingly, that symbolisation is negatively linked to ethical behaviour (Reynolds & 
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Ceranic, 2007).  As mentioned above and compared to the internalisation subscale, the 
symbolisation subscale can be considered to be less consistent with the concept of 
moral identity ( Hardy et al., 2014; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007).  As a result, some 
researchers have chosen to use only the internalisation subscale (e.g., Aquino et al., 
2011; Hardy et al., 2010; Hardy et al., 2014; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). 
           A second measure of moral identity is the Good-Self Assessment (Barriga, 
Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001) which has been used by some researchers (for 
example, Johnston, 2009; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). This scale consists of 16 moral and 
non-moral traits. The moral traits are considerate/courteous, honest/truthful, 
kind/helpful, understanding/sympathetic, generous/giving, sincere/genuine, fair/just, 
and responsible/dependable. The traits considered non-moral, but still favourable, are 
funny/humorous, logical/rational, creative/imaginative, careful/cautious, 
outgoing/sociable, athletic/agile, and active/energetic. Participants are presented with 
the question “How important is it to you that you are...?” Eight of the questions end 
with the moral traits, the reminder with the non-moral traits. Participants respond using 
a four-point Likert scale (1 = not important to me, 4 = extremely important to me). 
Moral identity scores are calculated on this scale by subtracting the average of the non-
moral trait scores from that of the moral trait scores. Positive scores indicate a greater 
endorsement of moral traits, whereas negative scores indicate a greater endorsement 
of non-moral traits (Barriga et al., 2001). This scale has the same limitations as Aquino 
and Reed’s (2002) scale due to the absence of the same three moral foundations; in-
group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, this scale merely lists moral traits; there are no items which measure how 
participants might internalise these traits in their moral identity. The conclusion here 
is that this scale is insufficient to measure moral identity.  
           Another way to measure more identity is commonly used by sociologists where 
participants are presented with 12 moral traits and for each trait, its negative trait is 
also listed (e.g., Carter, 2010; Stets & Carter, 2006; Stets, Carter, Harrod, Cerven, & 
Abrutyn, 2008). Those traits are:  honest/dishonest, caring/uncaring, unkind/kind, 
unfair/fair, helpful/not helpful, stingy/generous, compassionate/hard-hearted, 
untruthful/truthful, not hardworking/hardworking, friendly/unfriendly, selfish/selfless, 
and principled/unprincipled.  The researchers use a use 5-point Likert scale for each 
trait (e.g. 1= very dishonest, 5 = very honest).  The higher scores mean a higher moral 
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identity (positive moral traits). Researchers standardise the moral identity scores 
whereby the mean = 0 and standard deviation =1. Again, the two limitations identified 
in the previous moral identity scales can be seen here, as the three previously 
mentioned moral foundations are absent. Moreover, this scale does not measure how 
moral identity is central to the individual.  
           Recently, Black and Reynolds (2016) developed the Moral Identity 
Questionnaire. This 20-item scale is divided into two subscales. The first subscale is 
moral integrity, which measures the degree of consistency between people’s moral 
principles and their actions. The other subscale is moral self, which assesses the extent 
to which people identify with moral principles. The moral principles in this scale are 
all parts of the individualising moral approach, such as avoiding harm, being fair and 
honest while binding moral concerns are completely missing from the scale. 
           To summarise, it is evident that these four scales do not measure cultural 
variations in moral identity. The proposed moral identity scale will, in response, 
measure variations in moral identity contents.  New items will be generated to measure 
the symbolisation aspects of moral identity.  Regarding the other limitations in the 
moral identity scales, the developed scale will measure the centrality of moral identity 
to the individual’s self-concept.  Because the existing scales do not measure external 
motivations for moral identity, this dimension will also be addressed, further details 
will be discussed in the following section.   
 
6.2.3 Moral identity subscales: morality variations, internalisation, 
symbolisation, and external moral motivations  
           Informed by the literature review, the decision was made to create a new moral 
identity scale that addresses all the problems or concerns mentioned above regarding 
the existing moral identity scales. The first subscale captures the cultural variations in 
moral identity that were missing from the existing moral identity scales, specifically 
binding moral concerns. This subscale consists of 18 items (5 sub-subscales) that were 
adopted from moral foundation theory covering the five moral foundations (Graham 
et al., 2011); care/harm, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity/sanctity. It should be noted that all the items used are positive, and words or 
traits with a negative prefix were avoided, for example, ‘caring about others’ was used 
instead of ‘not caring’. The reason for this is that in the first study, almost all the traits 
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that participants in both samples listed were positive this implying that the imagined 
moral person has positive moral traits rather than an absence of negative traits. 
Participants were presented with different items that represent variations in morality 
and asked to what degree these items were true for them.  A 7- point Likert scale was 
used for each trait (1 = not true for me, 7 = very true for me), with high scores 
corresponding to the high importance of the measured moral traits to one’s moral 
identity.  
           The second subscale is a ten-item internalisation subscale. The items included 
in this subscale measure the importance of morality, or the role that morality plays in 
the individuals’ identity and sense of themselves.  A six-point Likert scale was used in 
which 0 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, with high scores indicating strong 
moral identity. This subscale includes aspects missing from some of the existing moral 
identity scales and measures the centrality of moral identity by including such items 
as ‘being moral is a reflection of who I am’.  In this sense, the second subscale differs 
from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale, which only included 
measurement of the importance of having certain moral traits; for example, ‘I strongly 
desire to have this characteristic’.  
           The third subscale is a five-item symbolisation subscale. The items included 
measure how individuals translate their moral identity into actions. A six-point Likert 
scale was used in which 0 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, with high scores 
indicating strong moral identity.  An attempt was made to generate items that strongly 
relate to moral identity, for instance, ‘I am willing to put time and effort into expressing 
my sense of morality to others’ and ‘I value morality when it comes to making decisions 
in my life’. 
          The fourth subscale measures the external moral motivations to be a moral 
person.  No previous attempt has been made to explore these in terms of moral identity.  
It is worth mentioning that Blasi (1984) sees moral identity as motivation-based, where 
people who have a strong moral identity become motivated to engage in different 
moral behaviours to stay consistent with themselves. This is known as a self-
consistency tendency and it is the third component of moral self, according to Blasi 
(1984).  Here, self-consistency serves as a motivator to moral behaviours.  However, 
the motivation that Blasi discusses is the motivation to commit to moral behaviour 
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rather than the motivation to be a moral person in the first place, which is the focus of 
this subscale, more specifically the external ones.  
          Moral motivation has been researched by Hardy, Padilla-Walker, & Carlo’s 
(2008), who explored the internalisation of moral values among adolescents. The 
participants were asked to rate the importance of various motives for engaging in 
different moral actions. Those actions represented the moral values of caring, honesty, 
and kindness. Each action was followed by four motivations or reasons that represent 
the four levels of self-integration as posited by self-determination theory (see, 
Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997).  Those motivations are external, introjected, identified, 
and integrated reasons. In an external reason, behaviour is controlled by external 
resources such as avoiding punishments or desiring for rewards.  Introjected reason 
points to the concerns that individuals might have about the impression they give to 
others.  In contrast, the identified reason is when people think it is important to be a 
moral person. Lastly, integrated reasons are where people engage in moral actions 
because the values of those actions become part of oneself (self-unification) (Hardy et 
al., 2008; Krettenauer, 2011).    
            In the five-item external moral motivations subscale in this study, two items 
representing external and introjected moral motivation found in Hardy et al., (2008) 
were adopted, with amendments made to the items to suit the measurement of moral 
identity. External motivation refers to the external consequences that might result from 
not following moral principles such as punishment, and introjected one means the 
‘negative impressions one might leave on others’ (Krettenauer, 2011). Here, as in 
Krettenauer’s (2011) study, introjected moral motivation is considered to be an 
external motivation.  Three items representing other external moral motivations were 
also added. These items were added because they measure motivations, an important 
aspect of being a moral person, and because they have not previously been measured. 
Examples of added items include; ‘I strive to be a moral person because I am a 
religious person’, which corresponds to the purity moral foundation, and ‘I strive to 
be a moral person because of my society’, which is consistent with the ingroup moral 
foundation.  A six-point Likert scale was used in which 0 = strongly disagree and 5 = 
strongly agree, with high scores indicating strong external moral motivations. It is 
worth noting that the focus in this subscale is on external moral motivation only; the 
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internalization subscale in this study represents the other moral motivations, identified 
and integrated motivations.     
           Finally, it is important to mention that there is no grand total for moral identity 
scale, as the score for each subscale is calculated separately.  
 6.2.4 Items generation  
          The structure of this scale and the identification of its subscales, guides the 
process of writing items for each subscale.  It is essential that each item should mostly 
echo the targeted construct (see DeVellis, 2012).  As such, the items are generated 
using the following guide rules that researchers follow when a new scale is developed 
for use in cross-cultural research (Behling, & Law, 2000; Brislin, Lonner, & 
Thorndike, 1973 as cited in Khalaila, 2013).  These rules are to use short sentences, to 
write scale items in an active voice and to use nouns rather than pronouns.  Researchers 
are also advised to avoid using colloquial terms, metaphor, ambiguous terms, 
possessive expressions and writing two different actions in one sentences.  Similarly, 
researchers are discouraged from using the subjunctive mood where verbs express a 
desired, or possible, actions.  Adopting these rules is fundamental to “writing readily 
translatable material” (Yu et al., 2004). The final version of this scale was reached 
after several periods of writing, rewriting and reviewing by the researcher.  
 6.2.5 Content validity: experts’ assessments 
           In order to establish the content and face validity, the moral identity scale was 
reviewed by the experts (Rattray & Jones, 2007, p. 317).  Content validity is described 
as “the extent to which a specific set of items reflects a content domain” (DeVellis, 
2012, p. 59).  Experts were chosen based on their knowledge and area of work, some 
of them in the field of morality, others in moral identity research.  The experts were 
asked to provide comments or feedbacks on the moral identity scale in terms of the 
relevance of each item to the target construct and if there were any ambiguous or 
unclear written items or generally inappropriate items. The scale was sent to 16 
experts, 10 sets of feedback returned. The scale was then revised by the researcher in 
light of the experts’ comments. The main comments were regarding the clarity of some 
items and the statements used to rate the scale. Other questions were regarding the 
method that will be used to translate the scale, this detailed in the next section. 
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6.3 Translating the moral identity scale 
           More thorough procedures were taken to translate the English version of moral 
identity and the other scales used to validate the moral identity scale, into the Arabic.  
One of the big challenges in cross-cultural psychology is translating research’s 
materials. Peña (2007) in her paper ‘Lost in Translation’ argued that most cross-
cultural research merely focuses on achieving linguistics equivalence, which in itself, 
is not adequate to do justice to this scale translation. There are other types of 
equivalence that are essential to consider when translating any scale such as functional, 
cultural, and experiential equivalences (for more details about those types, see 
Kristjansson, Desrochers, & Zumbo, 2003; Peña, 2007).  That is why relying only on 
direct and back translation is likely to be problematic and may cause a real threat to 
the scale validity or quality, and as a consequence, the results of the research that uses 
this scale (Khalaila, 2013; Kristjansson et al., 2003). In this research, Vallerand’s 
(1989) methodology was used to ensure that the scale is equivalent in both languages 
(see Kristjansson, et al., 2003; Banville et al., 2000).   
           The next section details the steps that were taken to translate the new moral 
identity scale, and the other scales used to assess the validity of the moral identity 
scale, in this study (the scales, sixteen scales in total, will be detailed latter in the 
method sections). 
6.3.1 Verification of focal concept relevance  
          It is important to ensure that the concepts presented in the questionnaire are 
relevant to the target culture and to consider how these concepts are expressed and 
manifested in said culture (Kristjansson, et al., 2003).  All the English scales were 
reviewed by the researcher and a colleague who are bilingual Saudi researchers and 
speaking both Arabic and English.  Some items in the scales, that are used to assess 
the validity of the new moral identity scale, were found to be irrelevant to Saudi 
culture. For example, in the religious orientation scale, “If not prevented by 
unavoidable circumstances, I attend church”. As Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, 
there are no churches; the decision was made to omit this item from both the Arabic 
and the English versions in order to achieve comparability in the scale for both 
samples.  As a result of this process, both samples received the same set of scales with 
the same number of items. Both the researcher and colleague agreed that the items for 
moral identity and the other scales were suitable for Saudi culture.  
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6.3.2 Translation of the instruments and development of preliminary versions 
           According to Vallerand’s (1989) methodology (see Kristjansson, et al., 2003), 
this step consists of three stages.  These stages are important in order to reduce bias or 
problems that might be caused by using only back and direct translations.  Researchers 
are advised to employ professional translators who are knowledgeable about the target 
culture and have sensitivity to the different meaning of words and expressions to 
remove problematic words or items from the proposed scale.  Following Vallerand’s 
(1989) recommendation, the three stages were as follows (see Kristjansson et al., 
2003):                  
           First stage: All the research’s scales were independently translated by the 
researcher and colleague, both bilingual Saudi researchers speaking Arabic and 
English.  Two versions of the Arabic set of scales were generated.  These two Arabic 
versions were later combined and reviewed by the professional translator.  Any 
disagreements between the two versions were resolved through discussion with the 
translator.  At the end of this stage, one Arabic version of all scales was produced.   
           Second stage: This stage comprised the back translation of the Arabic version 
of all the scales.  Two different translators were employed to translate those scale backs 
to their source language. The two English versions were reviewed by the researcher to 
produce one common English version of the Arabic set of questionnaires. 
           Third stage: The original English versions of the questionnaires and the back-
translated versions were then reviewed and assessed by a committee of experts which 
included two Saudi translators and two psychologists.  All four were bilingual, one a 
native British speaker.  The aim of this stage was to ensure that the same meaning of 
scale items was maintained rather than falling into the trap of verbatim ‘literal’ 
translation (Banville et al., 2000). All the committee’s suggestions were considered. 
There were no major amendments that needed to be made to either the original or to 
the back-translated version.  As a result, no important differences were found between 
the two English versions. The main concerns here were differences in meaning that 
might influence participants’ responses rather than the minor differences in the 
structures of scales items.  
6.3.3 Committee review and evaluation of the preliminary versions    
          In this third stage, another committee was employed to ensure that the Arabic 
version of all scales held the same meaning as the original English version (Hambleton, 
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2002; Kristjansson, et al., 2003). They also assessed the appropriateness of the scale 
items for Saudi culture.  The committee included one translator, two psychologists and 
the researchers.  At this stage, some minor changes were made in some to make it more 
readable and easier to understand in Arabic.  Finally, the Arabic version of the scales 
were ready for the next stage.  
6.3.4 Pre-testing the instrument  
           The Arabic version was pretested in a small and convenient Saudi sample; 14 
participants over 18 years of age. There was no need for a larger sample because there 
would be no statistics applied (Banville et al., 2000). The sample was asked to provide 
their feedbacks and constructive comments on the scale items in terms of clarity and 
comprehensibility (Kristjansson, et al., 2003).  Most of the comments were regarding 
the length of the scales and the time it took to answer them.  No problematic items 
were identified by the sample.  The translations stages for the Arabic translations ended 
with this stage.  However, there were more stages involved for the Arabic translation 
ended with this stage. However, there were more stages involved for the translation of 
the new moral identity scale since it is a new scale. 
6.3.5 Pilot testing the instrument 
           The Arabic version of the new moral identity scale was tested and retested by a 
sample of twenty-five Saudi participants who are bilingual in both languages. This 
stage is called the ‘test-retest by bilingual subjects’ (Banville et al., 2000).  The 
participants were asked to complete the Arabic and English versions. After three 
weeks, they were asked to complete them again (Banville et al., 2000). The English 
and Arabic versions were correlated, a t-test conducted to establish concurrent validity 
as recommended by Kristjansson and colleagues (2003). The results demonstrated a 
significant correlation between both scales, with Pearson correlations ranging from .78 
to .83 at p < 0.01, for all the moral identity subscales.   The t-test revealed no significant 
differences between the Arabic and English versions. These results indicate that both 
versions are similar with no significant differences found between them. The reliability 
of the Arabic versions was assessed, the correlation between the scores on this version 
at both times ranging from 0.72 to 85 at p < 0.01.  This strong positive correlation 
indicates that the Arabic version has stability over time.   At the end of this step, it was 
decided that the Arabic version of moral identity was appropriate and ready for use in 
this research.  
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6.4 Methods 
6.4.1 Participants 
           The British sample comprised 448 adults ranging from 18–67 years of age (M 
= 31.74, SD = 11.36; 160 males, 284 females and 4 other). The ethnic composition of 
the British sample was predominantly White British (354 or 79%). The reminder of 
the sample was 3 White Irish, 21 White Scottish, 6 White Welsh, 10 other White 
background, 1 Black African, 6 Black Caribbean, 2 other Black background, 12 Indian, 
2 Pakistani, 1 Bangladeshi, 6 Chinese, 7 other Asian background, 1 Arab and 16 other 
ethnic groups. The Saudi Sample comprised 490 adults ranging from 18–66 years of 
age (M =31.47, SD =10.50; 164 males, 326 females). Similar to previous studies in 
this thesis, the Saudi sample was not asked about ethnicity, as almost all of the Saudi 
Arabian population is of Arab ethnicity (DeBel-air, 2014). 
            An independent t-test was performed to determine if there were significant 
differences in age. The groups did not differ significantly by age, t (907) = .385, p 
=.07.  The two samples also did not differ significantly in the gender variable, χ² (1) = 
5. 07, p =. 08. 
            In exchange for their participation, all participants in each country were entered 
into a prize draw for one of twenty, £10 Amazon gift cards.  
 
6.4.2 Procedure 
           The study was administered through an online survey using Qualtrics Surveys 
software. It was advertised on notice boards across the University of Surrey, UK and 
King Saud University, Saudi Arabia.  The link was also posted on SONA (a participant 
recruitment system) and various social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. 
Participants were also recruited via a snowball sampling method and through word of 
mouth advertising.        
           Participants were informed that the study was about social attitudes. Two 
demographic questions about nationality and age, were included to verify that 
participants completing the questionnaire matched the study criteria: ‘participants 
must be either British or Saudi citizens (over 18 years of age)’. Ineligible participants 
were prevented from completing the study through the End of Survey tool, which is 
part of the online survey software. Information sheets and consent forms were 
presented to participants before their responses were collected.  
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          The total number of measurements used in this study, including the new moral 
identity scale, was 17. In order to minimize participants’ fatigue from having to 
complete all of these measures, they were divided into five groups. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of each of the five groups, each group containing the moral 
identity scale, the balanced inventory of desirable responding (Paulhus, 1991), and 
three or four measures used to test the validity of the moral identity scale.  
          In order to test-retest the moral identity scale’s reliability, the scale was sent 
again after a four-week interval, to the same participants who completed it the first 
time. This repeated measurement of moral identity helped to assess the consistency 
and stability of the moral identity scale over time.  Participants were given the option 
to participate for a second time, as clarified in the information sheet. When participants 
chose to participate for a second time, they were asked to enter their email address and 
also to provide a unique code combining letters and numbers.  They were then sent an 
email after four weeks containing the link to the moral identity scale and asked to 
provide the code they entered before. This code was used to match the test-retest 
participants’ responses.  
 
6.4.3 Materials  
          Table 4 shows all materials used in Study 3, as well as the predicted correlations 
between each validity measure and the new moral identity scale.  
6.4.3.1 The new moral identity scale 
          Since this scale might elicit demand characteristics (Needham-Penrose & 
Friedman, 2012), a number of distractor items were included to disguise the real 
propose of this study.  Demand characteristics are defined as “being aware of what the 
researcher is trying to investigate, or anticipates finding, and what this implies for how 
participants are expected to behave” (McCambridge, de Bruin, & Witton, 2012, p.1). 
The distractors were taken from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Gray-Little, 
Williams, & Hancock, 1997) and the Self-Construal Scale (Hardin, Leong, & 
Bhagwat, 2004).   
6.4.3.2 Convergent validity measures  
          Convergent validity was assessed by including two additional scales as this type 
of validity examines the correlation, which is supposed to be high, between different 
scales that measure the same construct (Reitsma, Scheepers, & Janssen, 2007) 
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Table.4 Validity measures with the predicted correlations of each scale and the new   
moral identity scale 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures used 
to test validity 
The new moral identity scale 
Morality Variations 
subscale 
Moral 
Internalisation 
and Symbolisation 
subscales 
External moral 
motivations 
subscale 
Convergent validity measures 
Moral identity scale 
(Aquino & Reed, 
 2002) 
-Positive correlation -Positive correlation 
 
 
Self-Worth Scale, 
Virtue subscale 
-Positive correlation   
Nomological validity measures 
Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire 
(Graham et al., 2011) 
-Each foundation in the 
moral foundation 
questionnaire would be 
positively correlated 
with its representative 
items in the subscales of 
variation of morality in 
both samples. 
 -Weak correlation 
with care/harm and 
fairness/reciprocity 
moral foundations. 
-Positive 
correlation 
with 
ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, 
and purity/sanctity. 
Community, Autonomy, 
and Divinity Scale, 
CADS (Guerra, 2008).   
- Positive correlation with 
care/harm and 
fairness/reciprocity 
- Positive correlation 
between community and 
divinity and the rest of the 
items. 
  
Religious Orientation 
Scale (Allport & Ross, 
1967) 
- Positive correlation with 
ingroup, authority and 
purity items, but no 
correlations with fairness 
and care items  
-Positive correlation in 
Saudi sample but weak 
positive relationship in  
British sample 
-Positive correlation 
 
 
Altruism Scale  
(Rushton et al.,1981) 
 
 
-Positive correlation 
 
 
The Toronto Empathy 
Questionnaire (Spreng 
et al., 2009).   
 -Positive correlation 
 
 
 114 
Table.4 (continued)  
 
Measures used 
to test validity 
The new moral identity scale 
Morality Variations 
subscale 
Moral Internalisation 
and Symbolisation 
subscales 
External moral 
motivations 
subscale 
 Nomological validity measures 
The Auckland                                                                                                    -Positive correlation 
Collectivism Scale              
(Shulruf et al., 2007) 
The Big Five Inventory 
(John & Srivastava, 
1999 
 -Positive correlations 
with extraversion, 
agreeableness, 
conscientiousness and 
openness to new 
experiences. 
 
The Balanced Inventory 
of Desirable Responding 
(Paulhus, 1991). 
 Positive correlation 
with self-deceptive 
enhancement subscale 
in British sample and 
positive correlation 
with  
impression-
management subscale 
in Saudi sample. 
  
Levenson’s Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale 
(1995). 
 
 
-Negative correlation 
 
 
Negative Reciprocity 
Norms Scale 
(Eisenberger et al., 
2004). 
 -Negative correlation 
 
 
Moral attentiveness 
scale (Reynolds, 2008). 
 -Negative correlation 
 
 
  Discriminant validity measures 
Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (Mattick 
& Clarke, 1998). 
  -No correlation 
 
 
 The Attitudes Toward 
Self (Eisner,2008) 
 -No correlation 
 
 
 
General Self-Efficacy 
Scale (Schwarzer & 
Jerusalem, 1995) 
 -No correlation 
 
 
           
               
  
 115 
 Those two scales are: 
            1.Moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  In this scale, participants 
answered ten items measuring their moral identity using a 5-point Likert rating scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), where a high score indicated a high 
activation of moral identity.  As mentioned previously, this scale is divided into two 
subscales; Internalisation (α = 0.73) and symbolisation (α = 0.82) subscales.  An 
example of an internalization items is, ‘It would make me feel good to be a person who 
has these characteristics’.  An example of a symbolization items is, ‘The kinds of 
books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics’. It was 
expected these subscales would be highly correlated with the internalization and 
symbolization subscales of the developed moral identity scale in this study.  
            2.Self-Worth Scale, Virtue subscale (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 
2003).  The Self-worth scale is composed of seven subscales that measure the source 
of self-esteem. One of these is the virtue subscale. This is a five-item self-report 
measure that based on the notion that when the individuals stick to moral principles, 
as a result they will see themselves as moral and worthwhile persons (Crocker et al., 
2003).   Participants are instructed to rate each item using a 7-points Likert rating scale 
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), where higher scores correspond to 
a stronger moral sense. Crocker et al., (2003) reported a reliability of .82 for the virtue 
subscale. It needs to be pointed out that this scale does not exactly measure moral 
identity, however, its five items are closely related to the concept of moral identity, 
more specifically the internalization subscale.  For example, ‘My self-esteem depends 
on whether or not I follow my moral/ethical principles’.  For this reason, the decision 
was made to employ this test to assess the convergent validity of the moral identity 
scale. 
6.4.3.3 Nomological validity measures 
            Nomological construct validity was tested by investigating the correlation 
between the moral identity scale and eleven other measures that are theoretically 
expected to be correlated in a certain way (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). The details of 
those measures are as follows:  
          1.Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). This scale is 
included to test its relationship with the morality variations subscales in the moral 
identity scale. In this scale (16 items), participants are asked about whether stated 
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concerns are perceived as morally relevant concerns. Sample items include ‘Whether 
or not someone suffered emotionally’, ‘Whether or not someone violated standards of 
purity and decency’, and ‘Whether or not someone was cruel’.  Graham and colleagues 
reported a reliability for this subscale which ranged from 0.67 to 0.71 (Graham et al., 
2011). All items were assessed on a 6-point Likert rating scale (0 = not at all relevant, 
5 = extremely relevant), with high scores indicating strong morally relevant concerns. 
This scale captures different moral concerns, or what are called moral foundations. 
Those foundations are care/harm, fairness/reciprocity, in group/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.  It was expected that each foundation in the 
moral foundation questionnaire, would be positively correlated with its representative 
item in the variation subscales of morality in both samples.  In addition, because 
external moral motivations focus on external reasons to motivates someone to be a 
moral person such as fear of punishment, it was expected that the foundations of 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity would be strongly correlated to 
the external moral motivations.   A weak correlation was expected with care/harm and 
fairness/reciprocity moral foundations.  
        2. Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale: CADS (Guerra, 2008).  This is a 
22-item scale that developed to measure moral concerns, or behaviours based on 
anthropologist Shweder’s theory of morality (Guerra, 2008). This scale is composed 
of three moral codes (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010): Community (α = 0.93) 
Autonomy (α= 0.86) and Divinity (α= 0.94). A sample of a community item is ‘It is 
socially approved’, an autonomy item, ‘It allows a person to defend herself/ himself’, 
a divinity item, ‘It is God's will’. Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert rating scale, 
ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (of the utmost importance), with a high score 
reflecting the participant’s high endorsement of the intended, measured moral code. It 
was anticipated that the autonomy code would be positively correlated with care/harm 
and fairness/reciprocity items in subscales of variation of morality in the moral identity 
scale, while community and divinity, would be correlated with the rest of the items in 
the same subscale of moral identity (Graham & Haidt, 2011; Shweder, 2003).  
         3. Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967). This scale consists of 
two dimensions, intrinsic orientation (α = in the mid of .80s) where people see religion 
as an end in itself, and its opposite dimension, extrinsic orientation (α = in the low of 
.70s) where religion is perceived as a means to an end (Brewczynski & MacDonald, 
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2006; Hill & Hood, 1999). An example of an intrinsic orientation items is, ‘I read 
literature about faith’, an example of an extrinsic orientation item, ‘I pray chiefly 
because I have been taught to pray’. All the items were assessed using a 5-point Likert 
rating scales ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly disagree, with higher 
scores corresponding to high levels of religiosity. In general, the relationship between 
morality and religion is complicated (see Bloom, 2012). However, for some people, 
especially in a collectivistic society such as Saudi Arabia, there is a strong relationship 
between morality and religion as seen in Study 1, where traits related to religion were 
prototypical of a moral person. This is not the case in an individualistic society such 
as Brittan, as also seen in Study1. An American study showed no relationship between 
moral identity and religiosity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Therefore, both the religious 
orientation subscales included here were expected to be strongly positively related to 
the internalisation and symbolisation subscales of moral identity among Saudi 
participants, while for British participants, a weak positive relationship between the 
same subscales of moral identity and religion, or no significant relationship at all, was 
expected.  
            Regarding the moral variations scale in both samples, it was expected that the 
fairness and care items would not correlate with any of the religious orientation 
subscales as they are considered to be universal principles; not related to religion, more 
relevant to liberalism (Graham et al., 2011). Intrinsic and extrinsic religious 
orientations should be correlated to ingroup, authority and purity items. This is because 
religious and conservative people tend to value group, authority, and purity concerns. 
(Graham et al., 2009).  
             It was also predicted that the both religious orientations subscales would be 
positively correlated to the external motivations scale. This is because, as mentioned 
above, religious people tend to give more importance to ingroup and authority 
(Graham et al., 2009), and external moral motivations reflect these concerns.  
        4. Altruism Scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981). This is a twenty-item 
scale presenting a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84. This scale was developed to 
measure individuals’ intentions in relation to altruistic behaviours, i.e. ‘I have done 
volunteer work for a charity’. All items are rated on a 5-point Likert rating scale 
anchored at 1 = never and 5 = very often, with high scores reflecting a high degree of 
altruism. Many studies have pointed out that morality, among other variables, can 
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predict altruistic behaviour (Rushton et al., 1981). Thus, it was expected that there 
would be a positive relationship between the altruism scale and the internalisation and 
symbolisation subscales in both samples.   
           5. The Auckland Collectivism Scale (Shulruf et al., 2007). This is an 11- item 
self-reporting instruments that developed to measure collectivist attributes where the 
central concerns are given to the society, group harmony and obligations, even if this 
is at the expense of the individual. There are two subscales to measure these attributes, 
Advice and Harmony (α =.76).  A sample item of the scale is ’It is important to consult 
close friends and get their ideas before making a decision’. All the scale items were 
assessed using a 6-point Likert rating scale (1= never or almost, 6 = always), with high 
scores representing a high level of collectivism. This scale is included to validate the 
external moral motivations subscale. External moral motivations were expected to be 
positively correlated to the collectivism scale in both samples.  
           6. The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (Spreng, McKinnon, Mar & Levine, 
2009). This is a 16-item self-report questionnaire (α =.87), that measures empathy, 
which is defined as the individual’s ability to understand another’s emotions and 
identify with them (Spreng et al., 2009). An example item of this scale is ‘I get a strong 
urge to help when I see someone who is upset’. All items were rated on a 5-point Likert 
rating scale (0 = never, 4 = always), with a high score reflecting a high level of 
empathy. Morality is  considered to be the root of empathy (Hill & Roberts, 2010) as 
empathy, together with other variables, is considered a kind of morality (Hoffman, 
2000). Accordingly, it was predicted that the internalisation and symbolisation 
subscales in both samples would be positively correlated to the empathy questionnaire. 
            7. The Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). This 44-item scale 
consists of five subscales that measure personality traits: extraversion (e.g., talkative), 
agreeableness (e.g., has a forgiving nature), conscientiousness (e.g., does a 
thorough job), neuroticism (e.g., gets nervous easily), and openness to new 
experiences (e.g., likes to reflect, play with ideas).  The items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert rating scale (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly), with high scores 
indicating a high level of that specific trait. Matsuba and Walker (2004) conducted a 
study on moral exemplars and pointed out that that those people who demonstrated 
moral exemplarity also score highly in the agreeableness category in the big five 
inventory, these moral exemplars are characterised by an openness to new experiences 
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and extraversion (Walker & Pitts, 1998). Other studies have shown that among 
younger individuals, high ratings in conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional 
stability, which is the opposite trait to neuroticism, are correlated with moral qualities 
(Roberts, Robins, Caspi & Trzesniewski, 2003).  In light of these studies, the same 
pattern of correlations for these five traits is expected with the internalisation and 
symbolisation subscales in both samples.  
           8. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). The 
second study in this project shows that moral identity scores are skewed, which means 
that people rate themselves as highly moral people. These favourable views that 
participants have about themselves, might reflect the social desirability bias.  Because 
of this, a social desirability scale is included here to assess the degree to which moral 
identity scores are affected (Paulhus, 1991).  This scale is divided to two subscales: 
impression management (20 items) with a Cronbach’s alpha’s range from .78 to .86, 
and self-deceptive enhancement (20 items) with a Cronbach’s alpha’s range from .68 
to .80 (Paulhus, 1991). An example of an impression management item is, ‘ I always 
obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught’, and an example of a self-deceptive 
enhancement item is, ‘I am a completely rational person’. All items on this scale are 
assessed on a 7-point Likert rating scale (1 = not true ,7 = very true), with high scores 
indicating high levels of social desirability. It is suggested that people in an 
individualistic society tend to display self-deceptive behaviours, while people in a 
collectivistic society are more likely to show impression-management tendencies 
(Johnston & Lee, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991b).  It was therefore expected that 
for the British sample, the internalisation subscale would positively correlate to the 
self-deceptive enhancement subscale. In contrast, for the Saudi sample, the 
impression-management subscale would positively correlate to the internalisation 
subscale.   
            It is worth mentioning that two items from the self-deceptive enhancement 
scale were removed due to their unsuitability for the Saudi sample. Those times were 
about voting systems and driving cars. There is no voting system in Saudi Arabia and 
women are not allowed to drive, thus the items were removed from the scale for both 
samples in order to make the scale comparable.   
           There are further points are important to note here regarding social desirability 
bias, Shao and others pointing out that because moral identity measures successfully 
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predict moral behaviours, there is no serious threats of this bias (Shao et al., 2008).  In 
a similar vein, Reynolds (2008) mentioned that scales that assess any morally related 
constructs are not likely to be affected by social desirability bias if they avoid 
statements about “behaviours imbued with moral expectations (e.g., lying or stealing)” 
(p.1032).  In the case of the new moral identity scale here, and in light of these two 
suggestions, it can be said that the scale tends to be less distorted by the social 
desirability bias.  Furthermore, considering that the moral identity scale is a self-
administrated scale and that respondents’ answers are completely anonymously, this 
also reduces the influence of social desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985). Participants 
were also told that there were no right or wrong answers in order to make them feel 
less pressured to answer the questions in a certain way.   
                       9.  Levenson’s Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 
1995). This is a 26-item scale consisting of two subscales, the first primary 
psychopathy (16 items) with an acceptable internal consistency; with a Cronbach’s 
alpha, .82. This subscale assesses the manipulative personality and selfish use of 
others.  An example of an item is, ‘For me, what's right is whatever I can get away 
with’. The second subscale is secondary psychopathy (10 items), with an alpha of .63. 
This scale was developed to assess impulsive behaviour (Levenson et al., 1995). An 
example of an item is, ‘I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people’.  
All items were rated on a 3-point Likert rating scale, from 1 = disagree to 3 = agree, 
with high scores corresponding to high levels of psychopathic traits. The relationship 
between psychopathy traits and moral identity has been investigated (Glenn, Koleva, 
Iyer, Graham, & Ditto, 2010), the results indicating that people who scored higher on 
the psychopathy scale also have a weaker moral identity.  Thus, it was predicted that 
the internalisation and symbolisation subscales would be negatively correlated with 
the psychopathy scale in both samples.  
           10. Negative Reciprocity Norms Scale (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & 
Rohdieck, 2004). Negative reciprocators are defined as a person’s tendency to retaliate 
against someone who has mistreated them (Eisenberger, Lynch, & Rohdieck, 2002). 
This scale consists of nine items (α =.93). An example of an item is, ‘I am willing to 
invest time and effort to reciprocate an unfair action’.  All the items were rated on a 
7-point Likert rating scale (1 = not true for me, 7 = very true for me), with high scores 
reflecting a greater potential for intentional retaliation.  It was suggested that people 
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with a strong moral identity are likely to perform negative actions when receiving 
mistreatment from others (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Thus, the internalisation and 
symbolisation subscales in both samples would be negatively correlated to the scale of 
negative reciprocity norms.  
           11. Moral attentiveness scale (Reynolds, 2008). This is a 12-item scale that 
consists of two subscales, the first comprising perceptual moral attentiveness (α = .87), 
where individuals perceive and recognise moral elements in their daily life. An 
example of an item is ‘My life was being filled with one moral predicament after 
another’. The second subscale is reflective moral attentiveness (α=.84), which 
measures the extent to which individuals reflect on their moral behaviours (Reynolds, 
2008). An example of an item is ‘I like to think about ethics’. Each item of this scale 
is scored on a 7-point Likert rating scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree, high scores indicating higher levels of moral awareness. It was 
expected that the internalisation and symbolisation subscales, in both samples, would 
be positively correlated to the moral attentiveness scale.    
6.4.3.4 Discriminant validity measures 
           Discriminant validity was mesured by including three scales that are believed 
to be theortically unrealted to the new moral identitiy scale, or that reveal a low 
correlation between them and the new moral identity scale (Reitsma et al., 2007). The 
details of those scales are as follows: 
           1. Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick, & Clarke, 1998).  This is a 20-item 
scale (α = 0.94), that developed by Mattick, & Clarke (1998) to assess individuals’ 
fear of social interaction.  An example of an item is, ‘I feel tense if I am alone with just 
one other person’.  This scale is a five-point Likert rating scale, where participants are 
instructed to use a response ranging from 0= does not apply to me at all, to 4 = very 
much applies to me. Higher scores correspond to greater levels of social anxiety.  It 
was presumed that the internalization and symbolisation subscales would not correlate 
with the social interaction anxiety scale.  
          2.The Attitudes Toward Self (Eisner, Johnson, & Carver, 2008). This 10-item 
scale is designed to measure three sources of vulnerability which are thought to be 
related to depression; the holding of overly high standards (α= 0.75), self-criticism (α= 
0.69), and the person’s tendency to generalise from one single failure to the broader 
sense of self-worth (α= 0.79).  For instance, ‘When even one thing goes wrong I begin 
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to wonder if I can do well at anything at all’.  The scale items were rated from 1 = I 
agree a lot to 5 = I disagree a lot, with high scores reflecting high levels of vulnerability 
to depression. Considering what this scale measures, it was hypothesised that it would 
not be related to the internalization and symbolisation subscales 
           3. General Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). This 10-item 
scale aims to measure the perception of self-efficacy in in terms of its ability to predict 
an individual’s ability to cope with daily stresses as well as their adaption following 
stressful events (Schwarzer, & Jerusalem, 1995). An example of an item is, ‘I can 
always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough’. Cronbach’s alphas 
ranged from .76 to .90, with a high of 80 for most of the samples over 23 countries.  
Each item on this scale was rated from 1 = not at all true, to = 4 extremely true, with 
high scores representing higher levels of self-efficacy. It was hypothesized that this 
scale would not be related to the internalisation and symbolisation subscales.   
 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Data screening 
          First, the normality of variables was investigated. The skewness and kurtosis of 
each variable was assessed, and transformations considered. The absolute values of 
skewness and kurtosis were examined because both samples were large (Field, 2013). 
Most of the scales’ scores were normally distributed, with the absolute values of 
skewness and kurtosis falling within the range of ± 1.96.  However, some of the scales’ 
scores were negatively skewed, thus a data transformation method was applied. Scree 
plots, absolute values of skewness, and kurtosis were employed to identify outliers 
(Field, 2013), some of which were not extreme enough to influence the data. The ones 
judges as extreme enough to be of concern, more than three standards deviations from 
the mean, were removed from the data sets.  As a result, an acceptable normality of 
distribution was established for all the study scales.  Descriptive analysis was used to 
identify missing data which were subsequently replaced with the mean value of the 
respective scale.  
6.5.2 Exploratory factor analysis  
           Factor analysis for all subscales was performed using direct oblimin rotation 
whereby factors are correlated. For an item to be retained, it had to load .40 or more 
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in only one factor and the same item loading had to be less than .40 on the second 
factor.  
         Beginning with the results of the British sample, the moral variations subscale 
analysis is presented in Table 5. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index was .87 and 
Bartlett's test of sphericity was 3523.24, p < .001, meaning that the correlation matrix 
was suitable for factor analysis. Through inspection of the scree plot, three factors 
presented with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor comprising eight items, 
represented the in-group/loyalty and authority/respect items together, explaining 32.59 
% of the variance.  It is worth noting that the conforming to sexual norms item which 
was related to purity items, was loaded here in the ingroup and authority factor. The 
second factor, consisting of six items, represented the care/harm and 
fairness/reciprocity items, explaining 15.62% of the variance. The third factor, 
consisting of four items, represented purity items and contributed to about 8.50 % of 
the variance.  As a whole, these three factors explained 56.72 % of the variance.  
          For the internalisation and symbolisation subscales, the symbolization items had 
cross-loadings below .25 on the internalisation factor and the other two factors. The 
decision was made to delete the symbolisation items since they did not have loadings 
of .40 or more on only one factor (Dilorio, 2005).  The internalisation items had 
loading on one factor.   The KMO index was .92, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was 
3161. 80, p < .001.  The correlation matrix was appropriate for factor analysis, the 
results of which are presented in Table 5. One factor with 10 items presented with 
eigenvalues greater than 1; this factor explained 62.05% of the variance. 
          The last subscale for the British sample focuses on external moral motivations, 
the results presented in Table 5. The KMO index was .70, and Bartlett's test of 
sphericity was 364.11, p < .001 meaning that the correlation matrix was suitable for 
factor analysis. One factor formed by five items with eigenvalues greater than 1, 
represented the external moral motivations subscale, explaining 43.01% of the 
variance. 
          Turning to the Saudi sample, the analysis of the moral variations subscale 
analysis is presented in Table 6.  The KMO index was .86, Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
2615.44, p < .001, meaning that the correlation matrix was suitable for factor analysis. 
Through inspection of the scree plot, four factors presented with eigenvalues greater 
than 1. The first factor, consisting of seven items, represented both the in-group/loyalty 
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and authority/respect items and explained 32.30% of the variance. The second factor, 
consisting of four items, represented fairness/reciprocity items and explained 14.51% 
of the variance.  The third factor, also consisting of four items, represented purity items 
and explained 6.54% of the variance.  The item ‘conforming to purity standards’ which 
is related to purity items, failed to reach an adequate factor loading. The fourth factor 
comprising two items, represented care/harm items and explained 5.99% of the 
variance. Together, those four factors explained 59.36% of the variance. 
          For the internalisation and symbolisation subscales, the symbolization items had 
cross-loadings below .30 on the internalization factor and the other two factors. The 
decision was therefore made to delete the symbolization items since they did not have 
loadings of .40 or more on only one factor (Dilorio, 2005). The internalization items 
had loadings on one factor, the KMO index .83, Bartlett's test of sphericity 1229. 90, 
p < .001, indicating that the correlation matrix was suitable for factor analysis. The 
analysis is presented in Table 6. One factor consisting of 10 items presented with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1; this factor explained 50.04% of the variance. 
           The results of the exploratory factor analysis for the external moral motivations 
subscale can be seen in Table 6. The KMO index was .67, Bartlett's test of sphericity 
813.10, p < .001, meaning that the correlation matrix was appropriate for factor 
analysis. One factor, consisting of five items, with eigenvalues greater than 1, 
represented the external moral motivations subscale, explaining 51.81% of the 
variance.  
         The new moral identity scale factors need to be evaluated in term of the 
equivalence between the British and Saudi samples.  Equivalence analysis helps assess 
the similarity of the structure of the measurement factors across different groups, and 
this similarity is considered to be an indication of the similarity in the meaning of 
measured concepts across these groups (He & Van de Vijver, 2012). Procrustes 
analysis was therefore conducted to examine the similarity between the factors in both 
samples. In this analysis, the factors for one of the cultural groups is rotated towards 
the other group, in this case, the British sample factors were rotated towards the Saudi 
factors (Fischer & Fontaine, 2011), the congruence between the factors computed. 
Factors are considered to be similar or equivalent when the coefficient values are larger 
than the cut off value (.85) (Fischer & Fontaine, 2011).  It has been suggested that two 
factors with coefficients values ranging between .85 and .94 indicate that the similarity 
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is fair, while values greater than .95 suggest that the two factors are equal (Lorenzo-
Seva & ten Berge, 2006) or excellent (He & Van de Vijver, 2012).  
          The congruence coefficients between the two factors indicated that there were 
similar, but not equal. The coefficients for the moral variation sub-subscales were .90 
for the care/fairness items, .92 for ingroup/authority items, and .89 for the 
purity/sanctity items. No rotations were performed on the reminder of the moral 
identity subscales because each subscale has only one extracted factor. To perform 
rotations, there should be at least two factors (Welkenhuysen-Gybels & van de Vijver, 
2001) therefore the congruence coefficients were calculated directly. The coefficients 
were .94 and .93 for the internalisation subscale and external moral motivations 
subscale, respectively. 
 
 6.5.3 Internal validity 
 6.5.3.1 Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients 
          The means, standard deviations, and alphas for the moral identity subscales are 
presented in Table 7. All scores displayed satisfactory to excellent reliability except 
care/harm items in the Saudi sample and in-group/loyalty items in the British sample. 
For the moral variations subscale, the alpha was calculated for some items together as 
can also be seen in Table 7. This was done according to the results of the exploratory 
factor analysis. 
 
6.5.3.2 Test-retest reliability 
          Seventy-Six British participants and eighty-nine Saudi participants completed 
the moral identity scale for a second time, as detailed in the procedure section. The 
scale was completed between from 36 to 48 days after the completion of the first 
questionnaire. Test-retest Pearson’s correlations between the first and second scores 
for each subscale are presented in Table 7.   
          A t-test was conducted to see whether there were significant differences between 
the means for each subscale at time 1 and time 2. The results revealed no significant 
differences for any subscales. 
 
 
 
 126 
Table 5. Factor loadings for the moral identity scale, British sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 
 
 
 
Brief Item Descriptor 
Factor loadings for morality variations 
subscale 
Factor I  
Authority 
and In-group 
Factor II 
Caring and 
Fairness  
Factor I 
Purity 
12 Respectful of authority .83 .03 -.05 
10 Conforms to traditions .78 -.01 .12 
9 Obedient .78 -.05 -.01 
13 Respectful of social order .72 -.05 .09 
8 Proud of country .67 .09 .01 
11 Respectful of family traditions .67 -.02 .17 
7 Loyal  .53 .27 -.27 
18 Conforms to sexual norms  .42 -.04 .30 
2 Kind .08 .77 .08 
4 Fair .01 .77 .04 
1 Caring .04 .76 .06 
5 Just .04 .66 .03 
3 Honest .03 .65 .13 
6 Open-minded -.11 .57 -.15 
14 Acts in a way that God would approve of -.01 .07 .84 
15 Religious -.05 .10 .82 
17 Chaste .13 -.06 .74 
16 Conforms to purity standards .25 .01 .71 
 
 
 
Item 
 
                            Brief Item Descriptor 
 
Factor loadings for the 
internalisation subscale 
Factor I 
 
3 Desire to be a moral person .87 
6 Being moral is an important reflection of who I am.  .86 
2 Being moral is an important part of my identity. .84 
7 Making sacrifices in order to be a moral person .82 
10 Being a moral person is not a priority. .81 
13 Being a moral person is one of many aspects that make up my identity. .79 
8 Feel fulfilled by being a moral individual .75 
12 Perceive myself to be a moral person .71 
11 Being moral has little to do with how I feel.  .70 
5 Being moral is not important to me. .61 
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Table 5.  (continued) 
Note. Bold-faced loadings indicate which factor each item was retained for. 
 
 
Table 6. Factor loadings for moral identity scale, Saudi sample 
 
 
 
 
Item 
Item Descriptor 
Factor loadings for the 
external moral 
motivations 
Factor I 
1 I strive to be a moral person to impress other people. .90 
4 I strive to be a moral person to avoid any punishments. .88 
5 I strive to be a moral person because I am a religious person. .83 
7 I strive to be moral person for my family.  .79 
 8 I strive to be moral person for my society. .48 
 
 
Item 
                   Brief Item Descriptor 
Factor loadings for the moral variations 
subscale 
Factor I 
Authority and 
In-group 
Factor II 
Fairness 
 
Factor III 
Purity 
 
Factor IV 
Caring 
 
10 Conforms to traditions .84 -.10 -.06 -.09 
11 Respectful of family traditions .71 -.09 .14 -.04 
7 Loyal .65 .21 .16 .07 
9 Obedient .63 -.03 .17 .04 
13 Respectful of social order .54 -.06 -.14 .03 
12 Respectful of authority .54 .05 .22 .03 
8 Proud of country .48 -.07 .26 .07 
5 Just .05 .76 -.08 -.06 
4 Fair .10 .69 .02 -.02 
6 Open-minded -.16 .54 -.01 .11 
3 Honest  .24 .44    -.26  .35 
18 Conforms to sexual norms .11 -.07 .69 -.02 
17 Chaste .06 .11 .54 .08 
14 Acts in a way that God would approve of .20 .11 .49 .04 
15 Religious -.20 .10 .42 .04 
2 Kind .04 .05 .04 .65 
1 Caring .05 -.09 .02 .65 
16 Conforms to purity standards -.06 .17 -.29 .20 
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Table. 6 (continued) 
      Note. Bold-faced loadings indicate which factor each item was retained for.  
 
 
6.5.4 External validity 
           The results of the external validity analysis are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10. 
The results were arranged according to the moral identity subscales rather than the 
type of validity in order to make them easier to follow.  
           Nomological validity assessments were performed on the moral variations 
subscale. As seen in Table 8, each group of moral variations items were positively 
correlated with related moral foundations.  As expected, the three CADS moral codes 
correlated with each group of moral items with the exception of the fairness/ 
reciprocity items, which did not correlate with autonomy in the Saudi sample. Both 
religious orientation subscales correlated significantly with the moral identity scale as 
 
 
 
Item 
                                         Brief Item Descriptor 
 
Factor loadings for the 
internalisation 
subscale 
Factor I 
 
8 Feel fulfilled by being a moral individual .73 
2 Being moral is an important part of my identity. .62 
6 Being moral is an important reflection of who I am. .66 
3 Desire to be a moral person .65 
10 Being a moral person is not a priority. .57 
7 Make sacrifices in order to be a moral person. .57 
5 Being moral is not important to me. .56 
12 Perceive myself to be a moral person .55 
13 Being a moral person is one of many aspects that make up my identity. .53 
11 Being moral has little to do with how I feel. .52 
 
 
 
Item 
Item Descriptor 
Factor loadings for 
the external moral 
motivation 
Factor I 
1 I strive to be a moral person for my family.  .83 
4 I strive to be a moral person for my society. .83 
5 I strive to be a moral person to avoid any punishments. .67 
7 I strive to be a moral person to impress other people. .62 
 8 I strive to be a moral person because I am a religious person.  .59 
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predicted, with the exception of the fairness/ reciprocity items, which were correlated 
with both religious orientation subscales in the Saudi sample.   
 
 Table 7. Moral identity descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients, 
and test-retest Pearson correlations for each subscale   
Note. *p < .05. **p < .001. Cronbach’s alpha was conducted on the whole sample for each 
country, while Pearson’s correlation coefficient was conducted on samples of 76 British and 89 
Saudi participants. 
  
          The assessment of the validity of the internalisation subscale is displayed in 
Table 9. Convergent validity was established as the internalisation subscale was 
positively and highly correlated with Aquino & Reed’s (2002) moral identity subscale 
and the self-worth scale (virtue subscale). Regarding nomological validity, the 
internalisation subscale was positively correlated with all scales, as demonstrated in 
Table 9. However, unexpectedly, no significant correlations were found between any 
of the personality traits of the big five inventory and the internalisation subscale.  For 
the British sample, the internalisation subscale unexpectedly correlated to the 
impression management subscale, but not to the self-deceptive enhancement subscale.  
The results in Table 9 also show that there was no relationship between the 
internalization subscale and measures of discriminant validity, as expected.  
          Regarding the external moral motivations subscale, all expected associations 
with this subscale were found, as presented in Table 10.  There was a high correlation 
between the intrinsic and extrinsic religious subscales and the external moral 
motivations subscale. This might be affected by the following item in the external 
Moral Identity Subscales 
      
BR SA 
M SD α r M SD α r 
Care/Harm items 11.63 1.94 .86 .82** 10.87 2.47 .60 .68** 
Fairness/Reciprocity items  23.34 2.98 .71 .70** 22.47 4.08 .73 .71** 
Care/Fairness items(together) 34.97 4.35 .80 .77**     
In-group/Loyalty items 12.37 4.17 .63 .69** 13.94 3.41 .65 .71** 
Authority/Respect items 17.45 6.15 .85 .78** 17.46 5.13 .82 .78** 
In-group/Authority(together) 29.77 9.46 .84 .76** 31.40 7.87 .85 .75** 
Purity/Sanctity items 14.88 6.68 .83 .72** 26.79 5.59 .74 .70** 
Internalisation subscale 33.20 9.22 .84 .80** 43.55 6.22 .80 .83** 
External moral motivations 10.60 4.33 .66 .71** 14.43 6.38 .76 .70** 
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Table 8. Correlation between the morality variations subscale and nomological validity measures (moral foundations questionnaire, 
CADS, and the religious orientation scale) 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .001. Values in bold indicate the relationships between the morality variations subscale and nomological validity measures as discussed 
in the measures section. Other correlations between the morality variation subscale and moral foundation questionnaire and CADS were also calculated 
also (values without boldface).   
 
 
                     Morality variations subscale   
Nomological validity measures 
Care/ 
Harm 
items 
Fairness/ 
Reciprocity  
items 
In-group/ 
Loyalty 
items 
Authority/ 
Respect  
items 
Purity/ 
Sanctity  
items 
BR SA BR SA BR SA BR SA BR SA 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire           
     Care foundation .34** .37** .27** .21* -.04 .13 -.08 .16 .12 .05 
     Fairness foundation .31** .22* .41** .35** -.04 .14 .01 -.03 .04 .11 
     In-group foundation .11 -.15 .10 -.16 .53** .47** .32** .36** .38** .34** 
     Authority foundation .12 .06 .09 -.11 .33** .29** .42** .37** .35** .33** 
     Purity foundation -.29** -.07 -.23** -.16 .25** .38** .41** .29** .69** .50** 
Community, Autonomy & Divinity Scale  
     Autonomy .29** .19* .22* .17 .07 -.17 -.12 -.12 -.12 .02 
     Community -.11 .11 -.06 .16 .32** .49** .53** .46** .31** .41** 
     Divinity -.01 .20 -.03 .30* .34** .39** .33** .40** .37** .45** 
Religious Orientation Scale           
     Intrinsic religious orientation .08 .14 -.01 .19* .19* . 29** .20* .21** .61** .57** 
     Extrinsic religious orientation .01 .10 .06 .21* .24* . 46** .27** .42** .58** .43** 
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Table 9. Correlation between the internalisation subscale and convergent, 
nomological, and discriminant validity measures 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .001 
 
 
 
             Validity measures 
 
Internalisation subscale 
BR SA 
Convergent validity measures   
Moral identity scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) .68** .71** 
Self-Worth scale (Virtue subscale) .61** .59** 
Nomological validity measures   
Intrinsic religious orientation .11 .43** 
Extrinsic religious orientation .13 .48** 
Altruism scale .45** .38** 
The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire .55** .49** 
Self-Report Psychopathy -.23* -.20* 
Negative Reciprocity Norms scale -.22* -.26* 
Moral attentiveness scale .50** .44** 
The Big Five Inventory 
      Neuroticism subscale .04 -.18 
      Extraversion subscale .02 .13 
      Agreeableness subscale .17 .04 
      Conscientiousness subscale .16 .19 
      Openness to new experiences subscale -.06 .04 
Self-deceptive enhancement subscale .11 .09 
Impression management subscale .17* .26* 
Discriminant validity measures   
Social Interaction Anxiety scale .04 .11 
General Self-Efficacy scale .10 -.13 
Attitudes Toward Self scale -.15 -.07 
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Table 10. Correlation between the external moral motivations subscale and nomological   
validity measures 
 Note. *p <.50. **p <.001 
 
 
 
 
   Table 11. Test for the comparison between both samples in moral identity scale 
  Note. P values in bold indicate significant differences between British and Saudi samples in moral 
identity subscales. 
 
 
 
 
 Nomological validity measures 
 
External moral motivations 
BR SA 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire   
    Care foundation .18* .10* 
    Fairness foundation .13* .16* 
    In-group foundation .38** .41** 
    Authority foundation .50** .40** 
    Purity foundation .34**      .30** 
Collectivism .33** .38** 
Religious Orientation Scale 
    Intrinsic religious orientation .76** .63** 
    Extrinsic religious orientation .65** .51** 
Moral Identity Subscales 
 
         BR 
 
SA 
 
t-test 
 
          
          
    P 
M SD M SD 
Moral variations subscale       
     Care/Harm items 11.63 1.94 10.87 2.47 5.15 .001 
     Fairness/Reciprocity items  23.34 2.98 22.47 4.08 0.83 .42 
     In-group/Authority items  29.77 9.46 31.40 7.87 2.85 .004 
     Purity/Sanctity items 14.88 6.68 26.79 5.59 -.29.30 .001 
Internalisation subscale 33.20 9.22 43.55 6.22 19.75 .001 
External moral motivations subscale 10.60 4.33 14.43 6.38 -.5.15 .001 
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moral motivations subscale: ‘I strive to be a moral person because I am a religious 
person’.  The correlation was calculated between the religious orientations subscale 
and the external moral motivations subscale without including this item. The 
subsequent correlations between the intrinsic religious and external moral motivations 
subscale were significant; .19 and .37 for the British and Saudi samples respectively. 
The extrinsic religious correlations were also significant; .20 and .46 for the British 
and Saudi samples respectively. 
 
 6.5.5 Comparison between British and Saudi samples in moral identity scale  
           A t-test was conducted on the moral identity scale to see whether the differences 
in this scale corresponded with the previous two studies, the results presented in Table 
11.  While British participants scored higher than Saudi participants in terms of care 
items, Saudi participants scoring higher than British participants for in-group/authority 
items, purity items, the internalization subscale and the external moral motivations 
subscale. Regarding the fairness items, no differences were found between the two 
samples. 
 
6.6 Discussion 
          The aim of the current study was to develop a moral identity scale and to assess 
its psychometric properties. The results indicate that the moral identity scale was 
reliable and valid in both samples. In this section, I will firstly discuss the results of 
the exploratory factor analysis, followed by the results of the reliability analysis and 
validity analysis. Finally, I will discuss in detail the differences between the two 
samples, with respect to the moral identity subscales.  
          Using an exploratory factor analysis, three factors were retained for the British 
sample, while four were retained for the Saudi sample. In both samples, 
ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect items were loaded together as one factor. This 
suggests that these two groups of moral items are closely related to each other. When 
the items representing in-group/loyalty and authority/respect items are examined, it is 
observed that the same concepts underpin them such as loyalty, obedience, protecting 
social harmony, and appreciating the one’s group. This might explain why those two 
items were loaded in one factor.  Care/harm and fairness/reciprocity items were loaded 
in one factor for the British sample, while in the Saudi sample, they were loaded in 
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two separate factors.  This suggests that care and fairness were overlapping concepts 
for the British participants. Together, they form an individualising approach to 
morality (Graham et al., 2011). However, for their Saudi counterparts, these two 
concepts were perceived as distinct from each other.  
         The item pertaining to conforming to sexual norms, which is related to purity 
items, loaded in the ingroup and authority factor in the British sample.  In the Saudi 
sample, this item loaded in the purity factor. This means that the British participants 
see conforming to sexual norms as an expression of conforming to society, while Saudi 
participants perceived conforming to sexual norms as related to purity and religious 
concerns more than society-related concerns. Considering that British society is 
classified as a horizontal individualist society (Guerra, 2008), this corresponds with 
the findings of a previous study by Lo, So, & Zhang (2010), who found that people in 
a horizontal individualist culture tend to behave according to the social norms of 
society regarding sexual and behavioural attitudes. This tendency explains the loading 
of the conforming to sexual norms item in the ingroup and authority factors in the 
British sample.  In contrast, all relationships in an Islamic collectivist culture such as 
 Saudi Arabia should represent the will of God (US Department of State, 2004; Ubillos, 
Paez, & Gonzalez, 2000). This accounts for the loading of the conforming to sexual 
norms item on the purity factor in the Saudi sample. 
          The internalisation subscale and external moral motivations subscale both 
loaded on one factor in both samples. For the symbolization subscale, the items did 
not achieve a factor loading of .40. Although criticisms regarding the symbolisation 
aspect of moral identity were previously discussed, it is worth mentioning that these 
criticisms were specifically about the symbolization items in Aquino and Reed’s 
(2002) moral identity subscale. In the present study, the symbolisation aspect was 
measured with five items that 7are more closely related to the concept of moral identity 
than Aquino and Reed’s items. Examples of the symbolisation subscale items are ‘I 
value morality when it comes to making decisions in my life’ and ‘Whenever possible, 
I try to behave morally’, while samples of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) items include 
‘The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics’ and ‘I often wear clothes that identify me as having these 
characteristics’. However, as the loading on the symbolisation items was 
unsatisfactory, this subscale was removed from the moral identity scale.  
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Taken together, this might indicate that the symbolisation aspect was somehow 
problematic and less consistent with the concept of moral identity (Hardy et al., 2014). 
          The moral identity scale equivalence of the British and Saudi samples was 
examined. The congruence coefficients indicate that that the factor loadings of the new 
moral identity scale are similar, not identical, in the samples. Fischer and Fontaine 
(2011, p.197) proposed the convention of accepting factor similarity “varies for 
different instruments, and no statistical test is associated with these indicators”. 
Regardless, these results should be considered when interpreting the observed 
differences in the scores on this scale across the samples.  
          Regarding the reliability of the moral identity scale, it is considered adequate. 
Although there were low alpha coefficients (below .65) for some items in the moral 
variations subscale, these are still considered acceptable values (Gliem & Gliem, 
2003). Kline (1999) for example, pointed out that alpha values below .7 can be 
accepted while it has been suggested that values as low as .5 can be accepted, 
especially in the initial stages of research (Nunnally, 1978 as cited in Field, 2013).  
Alpha values are likely to be influenced by the number of items in the scale so when 
the number of items increases, alpha values will increase (Field, 2013). It can be said 
that by and large, all subscales showed satisfactory internal consistency, even though 
there were not that many items in the subscales.    
          The correlations showed acceptable test-retest results; however, some of these 
correlations were not of the highest magnitude. This might be explained whereby 
“...psychological characteristics which are not stable over time should not necessarily 
give good levels of test-retest reliability” (Howitt & Cramer, 2008. p. 265). 
Additionally, Aquino and Reed (2002) argued that moral identity is a construct and is 
not supposed to be seen as a stable trait; instead, it is malleable and likely to be 
influenced by situational stimuli. This might explain why the correlations are not very 
high. That said, the correlations indicated that the moral identity scale can be 
considered stable (reliable) over time.  
          Turning to external validity, the results for the morality variations subscale 
revealed moderate to strong correlations (Field, 2013), ranging from .34 to .69, 
between each group of moral items and related moral foundations in both samples. The 
three CADS moral codes correlated with the moral variations subscale, this consistent 
with the theoretical prediction stated above. As predicted, fairness/reciprocity items 
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did not correlate with autonomy in the Saudi sample.  One explanation for this is that 
the Saudi participants may not have perceived the moral items of fairness to be part of 
the ethics of autonomy. Instead, they may have seen these items to be more related, or 
relevant, to the ethics of divinity from the CADS. This assumption was supported by 
the result of the correlation analysis between the fairness items and the divinity 
subscale; the results revealed a significant relationship (r = .30) between those 
subscales.  
          Associations were demonstrated between the moral variations subscale and both 
religious orientation subscales, with the exception of fairness items in the Saudi 
sample, which correlated with both religious orientation subscales. This is in contrast 
to the study’s prediction.  It may be that fairness items are more closely related to 
religion in religious societies such as Saudi Arabia (US Department of State, 2004). 
This is supported by the aforementioned correlation found between the ethics of 
divinity and fairness items. As a whole, it can be said that the results support the 
validity of the moral variations subscale in both cultural contexts. Regarding the 
unpredicted results, these can be seen as an indication of the influence of culture and, 
consequently, the resulting differences between the British and Saudi samples in terms 
of correlations between the moral variations subscale and theoretically related 
constructs.    
           Regarding the validity of the internalisation subscale, convergent validity 
measures were strongly correlated with the internalisation subscale in both samples, 
as expected. For the nomological validity measures, all resulting correlations were in 
accordance with the study’s predictions. However, there were some unexpected 
results; all five subscales of the Big Five Inventory were not significantly correlated 
with the internalization subscale in both samples. Lovett & Jordan (2005) found no 
associations between moralism - defined as the tendency to see everyday life through 
the lens of morality - and the big five personality traits.  Other studies which indicated 
certain relationships between those personality traits and morality were in fact 
interested in moral exemplars; the concept of moral identity is different to the concept 
of moral exemplars. Likewise, the study that showed a link between personality traits 
and moral qualities had a limited sample of young people; it was not heterogeneous as 
in this study (Roberts, Robins, Caspi & Trzesniewski, 2003). These factors are likely 
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account for the absence of relationships between the internalisation subscale and the 
big five inventory.  
          Another unpredicted result was the correlation between the internalisation 
subscale and the balanced inventory of desirable responding with respect to the British 
sample. It was expected that the British participants would demonstrate more self-
deceptive enhancement tendencies than impression-management tendencies (Johnston 
& Lee, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). However, the results revealed no 
correlation between the internalisation subscale and self-deceptive enhancement.           
A correlation was found however, between the internalization subscale and impression 
management. A possible explanation for this is that British society is considered to be 
a vertical individualist society (Guerra, 2008). This accords with the distinction made 
by Triandis and Gelfand (1998) with regard to the characteristics of individualistic 
societies. In light of this vertical attribute, British participants were likely to express 
more respect and concern for others; this might have resulted in the correlation 
between the internalization subscale and impression management. It is worth 
mentioning here that the same results were found in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) study, 
where the internalisation subscale of moral identity correlated with the impression-
management measure (r = .18). Nevertheless, Aquino and Reed’s study did not use a 
self-deceptive enhancement measure. The weak relationship between the 
internalization subscale and the balanced inventory of desirable responding in both 
samples merits attention.  This means that the internalization subscale, to some degree, 
is not influenced by social desirability bias. This weak relationship may be attributed 
to the self-administration of the questionnaire, the anonymity of the answers, and the 
lack of items that might trigger social desirability responses, such as lying and stealing.  
           Regarding discriminant validity measures and their association with the 
internalisation subscale, the results were as expected. Taken as a whole, it is evident 
that the internalisation subscale shows satisfactory validity in both samples.  
         With respect to the validity of the external moral motivations subscale, all results 
demonstrated validity through concurrent associations with theoretically related 
constructs. In general, the external moral motivations subscale is considered to be 
valid.  
          Finally, with respect to differences between the two samples in the new moral 
identity subscales, the results indicated that the scores for care items were higher for 
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the British sample, this corresponding with the results of Study 1. These results also 
contradict the results of Study 2, in which no differences were found between the moral 
identity scores of the two samples in terms of the traits that represented the care/harm 
moral foundation.  For the fairness items, no differences were found in the two 
samples, which is inconsistent with the previous two studies; in Study 1, the British 
sample listed the fairness trait more frequently than the Saudi sample. Likewise, in 
Study 2, no differences were found in the moral identity scores of the two samples in 
terms of traits representing the fairness moral foundation.  Saudi participants scored 
higher than British participants on the in-group/authority purity items, the 
internalisation subscale, and the external moral motivations subscale, this 
corresponding with the results of both Studies 1 and 2 and with the assumptions of 
moral foundations theory. These inconsistent results regarding care and fairness 
concerns may suggest that there were, in general, no major differences in the two 
cultures in terms of the endorsement of these universal moral concerns.  In contrast, 
the differences were larger for the ingroup, authority and purity moral concerns, with 
the Saudi sample endorsing these concerns more than the British sample, even when 
different methods, or scales, were used to measure them across all the three studies.  
Such results support the notion that these concerns are more unique to non-Western 
cultures (Graham et al., 2011) such as Saudi Arabia, as the results of this study and 
previous studies in this thesis have shown.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
          This study presented the development of the moral identity scale and outlined 
the steps that were taken to translate it into Arabic. The developed moral identity scale 
was tested for its reliability and validity. The results demonstrated the scale’s 
satisfactory psychometric properties in both samples. Since the developed moral 
identity scale considers variations in moral identity contents, this study contributes to 
moral identity measurements by generating a valid and reliable moral identity scale 
that can be used in other cultural contexts.  However, it is necessary to further test the 
scale in terms of the replication of the structure of its factors and its ability to predict 
moral behaviours; this will be the focus of the next study. 
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Chapter 7  
    Study 4: A Double-Edged Sword: When Moral Identity  
Leads to Prejudice 
 
     Sometimes it seems that people who are most motivated to do the right 
and moral thing fill two deeply contradictory roles. They are the most 
likely to work and sacrifice for peace among nations, races, 
ethnicities, and cultures. But, they also seem to be the most likely to 
hate, fight, and kill members of other nations, races, ethnicities, and 
cultures in the name of a moral cause. (Shaw, 2007, p.3). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
           In the previous chapter, a novel moral identity scale was developed, its 
reliability and validity tested to overcome the shortcomings of previous scales which 
measure moral identity.  This scale includes the impact of cultural variation regarding 
the content of moral identity.  Further work is required though including replication of 
the factors structures and to examine the ability of the scale to predict moral 
behaviours, specifically in comparison with the moral identity scale that is most widely 
used in the literature, Aquino and Reed's (2002) self-importance of moral identity 
scale.  All these aims are the focus of the present study.  
           In this thesis, I argue that moral identity content is not exclusively about caring 
and fairness concerns. It is important that researchers who investigate moral identity 
and its associations with other variables or constructs, do not dismiss the other moral 
concerns that form people’s moral identity, such as those that are morally binding. 
This expansiveness of moral identity contents then leads us to rethink the concept of 
moral identity and see it through a different lens. This is necessary because all the 
documented associations with moral identity are highly dependent on how this identity 
is conceptualised and measured in the conducted research. To put it simply, in the two 
recent reviews of moral identity in the literature (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Jennings 
et al., 2015), the tone explicitly supports the positive role of moral identity and how 
holding such an identity can lead people to engage in various prosocial and ethical 
behaviours, as well as restrain them from antisocial and unethical behaviours. That 
said, the question arises, what if there is a dark side to moral identity that is neglected 
specifically when we as researchers recognise and include other moral concerns in the 
conceptualisation and measurements of moral identity? This might be a 
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counterintuitive suggestion but, to explain this idea further, I offer the example of how 
researchers saw the attacks of September 11 through the lens of morality and 
developed a different take in terms of the potentially positive and negative 
consequences of holding a strong sense of morality.  
          Reed and Aquino (2003) point out that since September 11, 2001, many 
Americans have shown great solidarity with Muslims and Arabs in the face of 
increasing anger and negative attitudes towards these groups. Such Americans have 
stood firmly against any discrimination or prejudice and have condemned expressions 
of anti-Muslim sentiment. Many have carried out voluntary work with Muslims, even 
if such work has put their own lives at risk. Reed and Aquino (2003) suggested that 
moral identity can explain such behaviours, where people display comparatively less 
hostility towards out-groups and expand their psychological boundaries and moral 
concerns to include different social groups, not only their own group. However - and 
interestingly - there is a contrasting view of the aftermath of September 11 and the 
possible role of morality as suggested by Skitka and colleagues (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005). These researchers argued that moral convictions, which they define as 
a “strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral” (p. 
896), are likely the motivation behind the September 11 attacks.  People who took part 
in these attacks held strong moral principles and believed that their targets deserved to 
be punished because they violated these core principles. 
          This example invites us to consider the different outcomes of holding a strong 
moral identity. As I mentioned before, the literature on moral identity points us 
towards the positive influences of moral identity, including improved inter-group 
relations, while consideration of the potential negative influence of moral identity is 
missing.  Therefore, in this study, the fourth in this line of research, I aim to investigate 
the relationship between moral identity and prejudice and other related constructs in 
British and Saudi societies, to fill the gap in the moral identity literature. In addition, 
since I argue that we need to consider other content of moral identity, such as the long-
overlooked binding moral approach (e.g., authority, purity and in-group loyalty), 
focusing on prejudice seems to be the logical extension of the previous three studies. 
This is because we need then to expect different patterns in terms of the relationship 
between moral identity and prejudice.   
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            For this study, I measure moral identity using the recently developed moral 
identity scale and Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale (2002).  I use both scales to 
determine which one would more effectively predict behaviours. This study can also 
be considered a replication of the previous exploratory factor analysis of the moral 
identity scale. In other words, the stability of moral identity factors was examined to 
see whether this scale produces the same factors as found in Study 3 in both samples. 
Before elaborating on the related literature and hypotheses for this study, it is first 
necessary to discuss how prejudice and the related scales are defined and 
operationalised. 
7.1.2 Definition and operationalisation of prejudice and other related constructs  
7.1.2.1 Prejudice  
            In this study, prejudice is operationalised as negative attitudes that are held 
towards individuals or groups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010).  In some cases, prejudice 
can take the form of positive or benevolent attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1996), so this 
form of modern prejudice is considered in this study as well.  Given that this study 
compares patterns of moral identity relationships with prejudice in the British and 
Saudi cultures, the effort was made to choose a target out-group which is meaningful 
and relevant in each country. Therefore, this study focuses on prejudice towards 
foreign workers, women and religious groups. No previous study has attempted to 
investigate the relationship between moral identity and moral prejudice, so a moral 
prejudice scale is included here to demonstrate whether people who score highly on 
the moral identity scale demonstrate prejudice towards people who hold different 
moral principles.  
           Regarding the type of prejudice in this study, I considered measuring old-
fashioned and modern prejudice towards foreign workers in Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
I included old-fashioned prejudice because overt forms of prejudice still exist in non-
Western countries and outside the WEIRD world. Here, WEIRD means people who 
are western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (Bilewicz, 2012; Henrich et 
al., 2010).  In addition, and due to the debate in Britain over the Brexit referendum and 
immigrant issues, measuring old-fashioned prejudices towards foreign workers in 
Britain is still worth considering and examining. Very recent research has warned that 
there has been an upsurge in prejudice against immigrants and foreigner workers in 
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the UK (Evans & Kelley, 2017). Both these types of prejudice exist, irrespective of 
culture, although each may vary in its degree and manifestation.  
7.1.2.2 Other related constructs 
          The willingness, or intentions of participants to donate to various charities was 
measured. Here, the aim of including this scale, as some previous studies have pointed 
out (Abrams & Houston, 2006), is to obtain a measurement of prejudicial behaviour, 
but not in a direct way. In this study, this scale also can be considered to be a measure 
of the participants’ prosocial behaviour intentions as it measures the circle of moral 
regard (Reed & Aquino, 2003).  Moral regard refers to “the boundary that defines the 
individuals and groups for whom a person is willing to exhibit moral concern” (Hardy 
et al., 2010, p. 112). Reed and Aquino (2003) created the circle of moral regard to 
measure the extent to which people include various outgroups in their moral concerns. 
This scale is included in this study to replicate Reed and Aquino’s aforementioned 
study and to determine how it might be associated with both Reed and Aquino’s scale 
and the new moral identity scale. After detailing the operationalisation of prejudice 
and related variables in this study, the literature that is related to moral identity and 
prejudice that has helped to develop the rationale for the hypothesis, will be explored.  
          In terms of the positive relationship between moral identity and prejudice, Reed 
and Aquino’s research (2003), highlighted that people whose moral identity has a high 
self-importance, tend to expand their moral regard towards different out-groups: they 
display less hostility and more forgiveness towards out-group members. They argue 
that people with high moral identity “rather than confining [their] in-group to a narrow 
set of others (e.g. family, kin, fellow citizens), . . .[they] should include a larger set of 
social groups. In the extreme, this psychological boundary might include all of 
humanity” (Reed & Aquino, 2003, p.1271). In the same vein, another study 
demonstrated that a higher level of moral identity is related to a higher-level circle of 
moral regard among adolescents (Hardy et al., 2010). Research has also shown that 
activating people’s moral identity leads to a decrease in the desire for punishment, i.e. 
a response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and leads instead to a heightened 
negative emotional response towards the ill treatment of Iraqi detainees (Aquino, 
Reed, Thau & Freeman, 2007). In a more recent study in Italy, results showed a 
negative relationship between moral identity and blatant prejudice towards Romanian 
immigrants (Passini, 2013).  In Kugler and Jost’s study (2014), the researchers found 
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that fairness and caring were negatively correlated with inter-group hostility and 
support for discrimination towards Muslims, foreigners and illegal immigrants among 
an American sample. While not all of the above-mentioned studies directly measured 
prejudice, it can be inferred from their research that moral identity is linked to lower 
prejudice towards out-groups. It is worth mentioning that all these studies, except the 
Italian study, were conducted in the United States and used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) 
moral identity scale, which mainly focuses on the morality of fairness and caring to 
assess the participants’ moral identity. Regarding donating to charity, a recent study 
(Nilsson et al., 2016) demonstrated that moral individualising concerns are positively 
correlated with intentions to donate to out-group members, e.g. begging EU-migrants. 
         The above-mentioned studies helped to inform the present study’s hypotheses: 
see Table 12 for the predicted correlations between the study variables). For the first 
hypothesis, it was expected that the care/fairness items in the new moral identity scale 
and Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale, both represent an individualising 
approach to morality, would be negatively correlated with the different types of 
prejudice in both the British and Saudi samples. It was also expected that the same 
scales would be positively correlated with donations intention scales and also the circle 
of moral regard scale. Regarding the differences between the British and Saudi 
samples in this relation, the correlation coefficient should be higher in the Saudi 
sample than in the British sample. This prediction was based on previous studies in 
this thesis which showed that compared with the Saudi participants, British 
participants attribute more importance to concerns for caring and fairness than any 
other concerns such as in-group, authority and moral concerns for purity. 
          However, the relationship between moral identity and prejudice may not be that 
straightforward. In other words, while morality contributes to lowering prejudice, as 
suggested by several studies, this does not mean that we should overlook the possibility 
of an association between morality and negative attitudes towards out-groups (Skitka 
& Morgan, 2009). This kind of association was observed in a recent study that 
investigated the relationship between moral foundations and prejudice (Kugler & Jost, 
2014). They found that in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity moral 
concerns are positively correlated with inter-group hostility and support for 
discrimination towards Muslims, foreigners and illegal immigrants among an 
American sample. Along the same lines, another study (Federico, Weber, Ergun & 
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Hunt, 2013) showed that scores on a binding approach to the morality of a theory of 
moral foundations strongly and positively correlated with scores on a right-wing 
authoritarianism scale, a well-established predictor of prejudice and racism 
(Altemeyer,1998). A further study in New Zealand supported this relationship 
(Milojev et al., 2014) and demonstrated that a binding approach to morality was 
negatively associated with a social dominance orientation, which is also a well-
established predictor of prejudice (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
Likewise, Peterson, Smith, Tannenbaum & Shaw (2009) found that people who 
consider their moral principles to be absolutes, are more likely to display greater 
prejudice and lesser tolerance towards different social groups. Research has also 
demonstrated that people with high moral convictions, especially religious ones, tend 
to express greater prejudice towards Middle Eastern immigrants and Arab Americans. 
(Shaw, 2007). While these studies focused on moral foundations and moral 
convictions rather than moral identity in relation to prejudice, they direct our attention 
towards the potentially negative consequences of moral identity. Considering the area 
of charitable giving, research has revealed that moral binding concerns predict lower 
donations to out-group members (Nilsson et al., 2016). 
          From the studies above, the second hypothesis was derived; thus, it was expected 
that the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity items in the new moral 
identity scale and the external moral motivations subscale (which all represent a 
binding approach to morality) would be positively correlated with the different types 
of prejudice in both the British and Saudi samples. The prediction regarding the 
external moral motivations subscale was based on Study 3 of this research, which 
found a positive relationship between this subscale with collectivism and a binding 
approach to morality. It was predicted that the same scales would be negatively 
correlated with donations intention scales and also the circle of moral regard scale. 
Regarding differences here between the British and Saudi samples, the correlation 
coefficient would be higher in the Saudi sample than in the British sample. This 
prediction was based on the previous studies in this thesis, which showed that, 
compared with British participants, the Saudi participants attribute more importance 
to in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity moral concerns than the 
British participants.  
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         With regard to the relationship between the different forms of prejudice and the 
internalisation subscale of the moral identity subscale and due to the lack of 
information in the literature, the third hypothesis was generated based on the results of 
the previous chapters. This is because this subscale measures the internalisation of 
moral concerns without stating what types of concerns those are, something which is 
different to the other moral identity subscales. Since the British participants attribute 
more importance to caring and fairness concerns than to the binding approach to 
morality, it was predicted that relationship patterns similar to the individualising 
approach to morality with prejudice, and other related scales, would be found with the 
internalisation subscale. For the Saudi sample, it is not clear which two approaches to 
morality are more important, thus, no prediction was made about the direction of 
relationships with prejudice and other related scales. 
          The last hypothesis was focused on the comparison between the new moral 
identity scale and Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale in terms of their 
predictability of behaviour. As seen in the previous chapter, the premise of a novel 
moral identity scale is concerned with capturing the variety of moral diversity that is 
missing from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. Consequently, the 
diverse content included in the moral identity scale, is thought to provide a clearer 
picture of moral identity and its association with behaviours.  It was therefore predicted 
that the new moral identity scale would perform better on the ability to predict 
prejudice as compared to Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale.  
           Finally, and with regard to the regression analysis, age, gender, religiosity, 
political orientation and social desirability were entered as statistical control variables. 
Age was included as a possible confounding factor because of the broad age range of 
participants in this study. In comparison to younger people, older people tend to exhibit 
higher levels of prejudice toward different out-groups (Henry & Sears, 2009; Wilson, 
1996).  Because some studies have indicated that women, compared to men, tend to 
show less prejudice toward different target groups (Whitley, 1999), gender was also 
entered as a control variable. Given that prejudice research has documented the fact 
that religion is one of the predictors of prejudice toward different out-groups (Hall, 
Matz & Wood, 2010), religiosity was included as a control variable. Likewise, political 
orientation was also among the control variables since conservatism is considered to 
be a predictor of prejudice (amongst others) (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 
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1995; Walker, 1994). Lastly, and due to the possibility that the social desirability bias 
is likely to confound participants’ responses to the moral identity and prejudice scales, 
a social desirability bias scale was included as a control variable. 
 
 
Table 12. Predicted correlations between moral identity scales and prejudice and 
other related scale  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prejudice and 
other related scales 
                                            Moral identity scales  
      1.The new moral identity scale  
2. Aquino 
and Reed’s 
moral 
identity 
scale (2002)  
Morality  
variations  
subscale 
Moral internalisation 
subscales 
External 
moral 
motivations 
subscale 
  1.Circle of moral 
regard scale (Reed 
   & Aquino, 2003). 
Positive correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlations with 
moral binding 
 items 
 Positive correlation 
 for the British sample.  
 No prediction is 
 made for the Saudi  
 sample 
 
Negative 
correlation   
 
 
Positive 
correlation 
 2.Old-fashioned and 
modern prejudice 
toward foreign workers 
scale, adopted from 
McConahay (1986) 
Negative correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlation with 
moral binding 
 items 
Negative correlation 
for the British sample.  
No prediction is made  
for the Saudi sample 
 
Positive 
correlation   
 
 
Negative 
correlation 
  3. Ambivalent Sexism 
Inventory (hostile and 
Benevolent sexism. 
  (Glick & Fiske, 1996) 
Negative correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlation with 
moral binding 
 items 
Negative correlation 
for the British sample.  
No prediction is 
made for the Saudi 
sample 
 
Positive 
correlation   
 
 
Negative 
correlation 
  4. Interreligious 
prejudice scales, 
adapted from Clobert 
et al. (2014) 
Negative correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlation with 
moral binding 
 items 
Negative correlation 
for the British sample.  
No prediction is made  
for the Saudi sample 
 
Positive 
correlation   
 
 
Negative 
correlation 
5. Moral prejudice 
scale, adopted from 
Clobert et  
al. (2014) 
Negative correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlation with 
moral binding 
 items 
Negative correlation 
for the British sample.  
No prediction is made  
for the Saudi sample 
 
Positive 
correlation   
 
 
Negative 
correlation 
6.The donation 
intentions scale, 
created by the 
researcher 
Positive correlation with 
moral individual items and 
negative correlations with 
moral binding 
 items 
Positive correlation  
for the British sample.  
No prediction made  
for Saudi sample 
 
Negative 
correlation   
 
 
Positive 
correlation 
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7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Participants 
           The British participants were 214 adults ranging from 18–68 years of age (M = 
36.28, SD = 11.57; 73 males, 140 females and 1 other). The ethnic composition of the 
British sample was predominantly White British (166, or 77%). The remainder of the 
sample was 3 White Irish, 8 White Scottish, 7 White Welsh, 1 other White background, 
3 Black African, 3 Black Caribbean, 2 other Black background, 4 Indian, 2 Pakistani, 
1 Chinese, 2 other Asian background, 1 Arab, 7 other ethnic groups, and 4 participants 
who did not report their ethnicity background.  The Saudi participants were 282 adults 
ranging from 18–66 years of age (M = 29.82, SD = 8.31; 87 males, 193 females and 2 
who did not identify their gender).  Similar to previous studies in this thesis, the Saudi 
sample was not asked about ethnicity, as almost all of the Saudi Arabian population is 
of Arab ethnicity (DeBel-air, 2014). Likewise, Saudi participants were not asked about 
their political orientation, because the political system is a monarchy so therefore there 
are no political parties in Saudi Arabia (Angrist, 2010).   
           A t-test was performed to determine whether there were differences in age 
scores. The groups differed significantly by age, t (482) = 7.15, p = .001. The two 
samples did not differ significantly in the gender variable, χ² (1) = 0.25, p = .43. 
            In exchange for their participation, participants in each country were entered 
in the prize draw for one of ten £10 Amazon gift cards.  
 
7.2.2 Procedure 
           The study was administered using an online survey software (Qualtrics 
Surveys).  It was advertised on notice boards across the University of Surrey, UK and 
King Saud University, Saudi Arabia. The link was also posted on SONA (a participant 
recruitment system) and various social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.  
Participants were also recruited via a snowball sampling method and through word of 
mouth advertising.  
          Two demographic questions about nationality and age were included to verify 
that participants completing the questionnaire matched the study criteria: ‘participants 
must be either British or Saudi citizens (over 18 years of age)’. Ineligible participants 
were prevented from completing the study through the End of Survey tool, which is 
part of the online survey software.  
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         The study materials were divided into two blocks, the first consisting of prejudice 
and other related scales and the second containing the moral identity scales. Within 
each block, the set of measures were counterbalanced.  The block of prejudice and 
other related scales was presented to the participants firstly, followed by the block of 
moral identity scales1.  Following this, participants completed the social desirability 
scale.  Demographic information was reported last, the participants then debriefed. 
 
7.2.3 Design 
         The present study was initially a correlational design followed by regression 
analysis whereby the moral identity scales were the predictors (the independent 
variable), the prejudice and other related scales were the outcomes (the dependent 
variables).  
 
7.2.4 Materials 
7.2.4.1 Moral identity scales 
                  1.The new moral identity scale (Study3, designed by the researcher). This scale 
consists of three subscales. The first subscale is the moral variations subscale further 
divided into four sub-subscales: care/harm, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/authority, 
and purity/sanctity.  In this subscale, participants are asked to identify the extent to 
which each moral concerns or characteristics is true for them. The second subscale is 
the internalisation subscale.  It measures the importance of being moral person or the 
role of morality regarding an individual’s identity. The third subscale is the external 
moral subscale. It focuses on external moral motivations. 
                  2.Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale (2002).  In this scale participants 
answered ten items measuring their moral identity using a 5-point Likert rating scale 
(1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), where a high score indicated a high 
                                                 
1 According to the moral licensing and moral credential theories, when individuals perceive 
themselves as a moral individual, this can lead to a reduction in their subsequent moral behaviours 
(Conway & Peetz, 2012). In other words, people’s moral self -perceptions provide them with a licence 
or permission to act less morally without fear of disgracing themselves (Miller & Effron, 2010). 
Bearing these effects in mind and to avoid the potential for any carry-over of moral licensing effects 
in this study, participants were presented with the prejudice and other related scales firstly.   
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activation of moral identity. As previously mentioned, this scale is divided into two 
subscales; Internalization (α= 0.73) and Symbolisation (α = 0.82) subscales. 
7.2.4.2 Prejudice and other related scales 
          1.Circle of moral regard scale (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Moral regard refers to 
“the boundary that defines the individuals and groups for whom a person is willing to 
exhibit moral concern” (Hardy et al., 2010, p.112). In this scale, participants are asked 
to identify the extent to which they have moral concerns about the welfare of six 
different out-groups: people from another country, strangers, people who practice a 
different religion, people with different ethnicities, people of a different gender and 
people who hold different moral views. The response scale ranges from 1, absolutely 
no obligation, to 5, very strong obligation.  High scores indicate that, overall, a person 
has a strong moral obligation regarding the welfare of the five different outgroups. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .88 (Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
         2.Old-fashioned and modern prejudice towards foreign workers scale, adopted 
from McConahay (1986, cited in Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter,1995). McConahay’s 
scale is designed to measure attitudes toward African Americans in the US. Because 
the focus of this study is on prejudice towards foreign workers in the British and Saudi 
societies, foreign workers are substituted for African Americans in each item. This is 
similar to other studies on prejudice toward immigrants and other out-groups that 
adopted items from McConahay’s racism scale in both subscales, the old-fashioned 
and new/modern ones (e.g. see Akrami, Ekehammar & Araya, 2000). The old-
fashioned prejudice subscale originally consisted of seven items that measured the 
participant’s direct and openly negative attitudes toward foreign workers.  An example 
of an item is “It is a bad idea for foreign workers and British to marry one another”. 
The new prejudice subscale consists of six items that capture the participant’s subtle 
negative attitudes toward foreign workers (Akrami et al., 2000).  An example of an 
item is “Discrimination against foreign workers is no longer a problem in the United 
Kingdom”. Three items in the old-fashioned prejudice scale were removed “I favor 
laws that permit black persons to rent or purchase housing even when the person 
offering the property for sale or rent does not wish to rent or sell it to blacks”, “I am 
opposed to open or fair housing laws” and ‘It was wrong for the United States 
Supreme Court to outlaw segregation in its 1954 decision”.  Likewise, one item in the 
modern prejudice scale was removed: “Blacks have more influence upon school 
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desegregation plans than they ought to have”.  Given that these items are relevant to 
the context of American society, it is difficult to adapt them to measure prejudice 
toward foreign workers, so the decision was made to remove them. The response scale 
ranges from 1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree, with higher scores indicating 
strong prejudices toward foreign workers. The reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
for the old-fashioned racism scale was .67 and for the modern racism scale was .85 
(Swim et al., 1995). 
          3. Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). This scale is divided into 
two subscales. The first subscale is hostile sexism, consisting of 11 items (α = .80), 
that encompass negative attitudes toward women, mostly those who resist male control 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996). These attitudes aim to uphold inequality between women and 
men, confirm gender roles and objectify women (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Fiske & North, 
2015). A sample item of the scale is, “Women seek to gain power by getting control 
over men”. The second subscale is benevolent sexism; it consists of 11 items (α = .85), 
that reflect seemingly positive attitudes toward women who are seen as weak creatures 
that constantly need to be protected and cherished by men (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Fiske 
& North, 2015). A sample item of the scale is, ‘A good woman should be set on a 
pedestal by her man’. The common underlying functions of both ambivalent sexism 
scales is perpetuation of the patriarchal social system of male authority (Glick & Fiske, 
1996).  One item, “There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing 
men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances”, from the hostile 
sexism scale, was removed. This decision was made because the item is considered to 
be inappropriate for Saudi culture. The removal of an unsuitable item is recommended 
in cross cultural research (He & Van de Vijver, 2012).  All items in both subscales 
were measured on a 5-point Likert rating scale, anchored at 0 = disagree strongly and 
5 = agree strongly, with high scores reflecting a high degree of prejudice towards 
women. 
           4. Interreligious prejudice scales, adapted from Clobert, Saroglou, Hwang & 
Soong (2014). This comprises four scales measuring prejudice toward four specific 
groups: Christians (for the Saudi sample), Muslims (for the British sample) and Jews 
and atheists for both samples. The interreligious prejudice scale is an altered version 
of the Bogardus Social Distance scale (see Wark & Galliher, 2007), both scales 
measuring an individuals’ willingness to engage in different degrees of social contact 
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with members from various social groups. This scale is a one-item scale; participants 
were asked if they would mind having people from the above-mentioned groups as 
their a) neighbour, b) their political representative and c) husband/wife. In the present 
study, ‘political representative’ was replaced by ‘boss’, because in Saudi Arabia there 
are no political parties. Similarly, ‘husband/wife’ was replaced by ‘friend’. This is 
because Saudi female participants are not allowed to marry someone from other 
religions, so asking them about marrying someone from another religion is more likely 
to reflect the extent to which they conform to Islamic laws rather than their prejudice 
towards other religious groups. Participants rated their responses on a 7-point Likert 
rating scale ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like. Higher scores 
correspond to stronger prejudice towards the given outgroup. The Cronbach’s alpha 
has ranged from .76 to .86 for this scale in past research (Clobert et al., 2014). 
          5.Moral prejudice scale, adopted from Clobert et al. (2014). Like the 
interreligious prejudice scale, this one-item scale measures an individuals’ willingness 
to engage in different degrees of social contact with people who hold different moral 
principles/views from their own. A previous study (Skitka & Mullen, 2002) showed 
that people who place importance on moral convictions tend to display hostility toward 
out-groups.  In this scale, participants are asked if they would like to have someone 
who holds different moral principles/views than them be: a) their neighbor, b) their 
boss and c) their friend. Participants rated their responses on a 7-point Likert rating 
scale ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like.  High scores indicate a strong 
prejudice towards people whose moral views differ from the respondent’s views. This 
is the first time this scale has been used so there is no Cronbach's alpha value to be 
reported.   
           6.The donation intentions scale, created by the researcher. Participants were 
told the following: “Imagine that you had won the £ 20 Amazon prize draw. How much 
money do you think you will donate to the following charities?”. Participants 
responded using a 5- point scale ranging from 0 to £20. The more money they chose, 
the more prosocial intentions they have to towards those charities. The listed charities 
are: To Be Diverse - a charity that helps foreigner workers to adjust and to fight the 
discrimination against them; Women Empowerment Charity - a charity dedicated to 
empowering women and raising their status, and Interfaith Dialogue - a charity has 
been established to advance the dialogue between different religions.  
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7.2.4.3 Social desirability bias scale 
          1.The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). This scale 
was included due to concerns that the study results could be confounded by social 
desirability bias, since the moral identity and prejudice scales appear to be prone to 
this bias. This scale is a short form of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
(Hart, Ritchie, Hepper & Gebauer, 2015; Paulhus, 1991), and is divided into two 
subscales: the self-deceptive enhancement (8 items), with a Cronbach’s alpha ranging 
from .63 to .82 (Hart al., 2015). A sample item of this subscale is: “I am very confident 
of my judgments”. The second subscale is the impression management (8 items); the 
Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from .66 to .74 (Paulhus, 1991). A sample item of this 
subscale is: “I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught”.  Each of the items 
in both social desirability bias subscales are rated on a 7-point Likert rating scale 
ranging from 1 = not true and 7 = very true. High scores indicate high levels of social 
desirability bias. 
           Some distractor items were included in the materials to disguise the true 
propose of this study.  Items were taken from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Gray-
Little et al., 1997), the Self-Construal Scale (Hardin et al., 2004), the Auckland 
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Shulruf et al., 2007) and the Negative Reciprocity 
Norms (Eisenberger et al., 2002). 
           Similar to Study 3, the materials for Study 4’s were translated into the Arabic 
language by using Vallerand’s (1989) methodology to ensure that the scale are 
equivalent in both languages (for the details of these translation steps, see Study 3).  
           In addition, the cross-cultural equivalence of all the materials was examined by 
calculating the congruence coefficients, these considered to be an index of the 
similarity between the factor structures of different groups. All the congruence 
coefficients values in the present study are acceptable having coefficients larger than 
the cut off value of .85 (Fischer & Fontaine, 2011). 
 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Data screening 
          The normality of the variables was investigated first. The absolute values for 
skewness and kurtosis were examined, since both samples were large (Field, 2013).  
All the scales’ scores were normally distributed, with the absolute values of skewness 
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and kurtosis at < 3.29 with the exception of the internalisation subscale in the Saudi 
sample, which had a positive kurtosis (leptokurtic) of 5.26. A square root 
transformation was applied to this variable (Field, 2013).  Scree plots and the absolute 
values for skewness and kurtosis were examined to identify outliers (Field, 2013). 
There were outliers, but these were not considered extreme enough to influence the 
data as they were less than 3 standard deviations from the mean). As a result, an 
acceptable normality of distribution was established for all the study variables. 
Descriptive analysis identified some missing data, these replaced with the mean value 
of the respective scale.  
7.3.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
          First, the KMO index and Bartlett’s test of sphericity for all subscales were 
applied. The results revealed that the correlation matrix for all factors in both samples 
was suitable for factor analysis. A factor analysis for the new moral identity scale was 
performed using a direct oblimin rotation, where factors are allowed to be correlated.  
          In the British sample, I arrived at the same factors as in the previous study with 
the same related items, except for the item ‘conforming to sexual norms’. In Study 3, 
this item appeared in the authority/groups factor, while in this study, it appeared in the 
purity factor. It was initially part of the purity moral concerns, as per moral foundations 
theory.  Regarding the factors in the Saudi sample, I arrived at the same factors with 
the same related items, except that the ‘care/harm’ and ‘fairness/reciprocity’ items 
appeared in two separate factors in Study 3, whereas here, they appeared in one single 
factor. 
7.3.3 Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients 
           The means, standard deviations and alphas for all study scales are presented in 
Table 13. All scores displayed satisfactory to excellent reliability except old-fashioned 
prejudice in the Saudi sample, which had an alpha value of .55.  A t-test was performed 
to determine whether there were differences in variables’ scores between the samples 
(see Table 13). Although differences between the samples in terms of the study 
variables are not the main interest of this study, presenting these differences might help 
with the later analysis of the study results.  
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         Table 13. Reliability coefficients, means and standard deviations among independent 
and dependent variables 
            Note: Since the Saudi sample’s scores on the internalisation subscale was transformed, the British sample’s 
scores were also transformed here to compare the two samples. Transforming both variables here is advisable 
when researchers test the differences between two variables (see Field, 2013). When independent and 
dependent variables consisted of only one item, no descriptive statistics or Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
coefficients were reported. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
 7.3.4 Relationships between the moral individualising approach and prejudice 
        I reasoned that the items that represent an individualising approach to morality 
would be negatively correlated with the different types of prejudice in both the British 
and Saudi samples, and that the same items would be positively correlated with 
donations intention scales and also the circle of moral regard scale. To test these 
Variables 
    British sample  Saudi sample  
t-test 
 
a 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
a 
 
M 
 
SD 
Independent 
Political orientation  - 3.99 2.06 - - - - 
Religiosity - 2.36 2.01 - 4.60 2.37 -10.95* 
Social desirability (self-deception) .68 30.62 6.95 .66 34.89 7.94 -.5.89* 
Social desirability (impression management) .76 33.12 7.65 .65 38.14 7.92 -6.63* 
Care/Fairness items .90 35.60 5.39 .77 33.82 5.71 3.34* 
In-group/Authority items  .85 13.58 3.85 .87 27.55 10.42 -.18.23* 
Purity/Sanctity items .84 11.42 6.32 .77 20.49 5.45 -.15.12* 
Internalisation subscale .91 5.24 .75 .84 5.72 .61 -.7.63* 
External moral motivations subscale .72 10.17 3.77 .76 13.65 6.09 -7.05* 
Aquino & Reed’s (2002) scale .81 35.68 5.18 .76 37.00 6.47 -2.24* 
Dependent  
Old-fashioned prejudice .73 6.84 3.01 .55 8.95 3.28 -7.15* 
Modern prejudice .98 12.85 5.13 .71 16.36 5.31 -7.17* 
Hostile sexism .93 16.12 11.04 .79 21.95 8.64 -6.33* 
Benevolent sexism .88 18.01 10.36 .72 30.94 9.23 -14.12* 
Interreligious prejudice (Muslims /Christians)  .94 8.98 5.06 .90 11.84 5.46 - 
Interreligious prejudice (Jews) .95 8.25 4.69 .95 15.28 6.04 -13.74* 
Interreligious prejudice (atheists) .96 7.31 4.33 .97 14.93 6.58 -14.36* 
Moral prejudice .96 11.57 5.04 .88 15.03 4.68 -7.58* 
Donation intentions to foreign workers ‘charity - 1.95 1.08 - 2.46 1.35 -4.38** 
Donation intentions to women’s charity - 2.05 1.17 - 3.89 1.31 -13.21** 
Donation intentions to interfaith charity - 1.81 1.35 - 2.61 1.42 -6.52** 
Circle of moral regard .97 21.06 6.68 .93 22.70 5.79 -2.83** 
156 
 
hypotheses, partial correlations, controlling for the potential effects of social 
desirability, were conducted. For a full report of the results, refer to Table 14. As 
hypothesised, the results indicated small -to large-magnitude negative relationships 
between care/fairness items in the moral identity scale, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral 
identity scale (all together representing an individualising approach to morality) and 
some prejudice scales in both samples. This was with the exception of some items for 
the Saudi sample, where the relationships are surprisingly positive for hostile sexism, 
benevolent sexism, prejudice against atheists, Christians and moral prejudice. The 
results also revealed small- to medium magnitude positive relationships, only in the 
British sample, with donations intentions to foreign workers and women’s charities. 
With regard to the circle of moral regards scale, small-to- medium magnitude positive 
relationships were found except for Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale in 
the Saudi sample, where the relationship was not significant. Regarding the differences 
between the British and Saudi samples on those significant correlations, I expected that 
the correlations would be higher in the British sample than Saudi sample. In line with 
this prediction, the results show that there were more significant correlations in the 
British samples. When there were significant correlations in the same directions for both 
samples, a Fishers z-test (Soper, 2017) was conducted to determine whether the 
correlations were significantly different (see Table 15). The correlation coefficients for 
the relationship between the caring/fairness foundation and prejudice towards Jews was 
higher in the British sample than in the Saudi sample, while there were no significant 
differences between the samples in the relationship between caring/fairness concerns 
and circle of moral regard.  
7.3.5 Relationships between the binding approach and prejudice  
       I expected that the items that represent the binding approach to morality would be 
negatively correlated with different types of prejudice in both the British and Saudi 
samples and that the same items would be negatively correlated with the donation 
intentions scales and also the circle of moral regard scale. To test these hypotheses, 
partial correlations, controlling for the potential effects of social desirability, were 
conducted. For a full report of the results, refer to Table 14. Consistent with the 
prediction, the results showed small-to-large magnitude negative relationships between 
the in-group/authority and purity/sanctity items in the new moral identity scale and also 
the external moral motivations subscale (together representing a binding approach to 
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morality), as well as some prejudice scales in both samples. Regarding donations to 
charities, a few small-magnitude negative correlations were found in both samples, with 
the exception of donation intentions to interfaith charities, where the relationship was 
positive with purity and external moral motivations in the British sample. With regard 
to the circle of moral regards scale, the only positive relationships were found with 
external moral motivations in the British sample. Looking to the differences between 
both samples on the significant correlations, I expected that the correlations would be 
higher in the Saudi sample than British sample. The results indicated that there were 
more significant correlations in the Saudi samples than the British one. When there were 
significant correlations in the same directions in both samples, a Fishers z-test was 
conducted to determine whether the correlations were significantly different (see Table 
15). Fishers z-tests revealed that the Saudi sample was higher than the British sample in 
four correlations while the British sample was higher in one correlation.  The other five 
correlations were not significantly different.  
7.3.6 Relationships between the internalisation subscale and prejudice  
        I next tested the hypothesised negative correlations between the moral 
internalization subscale and prejudice in the British sample.  This was hypothesised to 
be positively correlated with the donation intentions scales and the circle of moral regard 
scale. For the Saudi sample, no prediction was made about the relationships with 
prejudice and other related scales. Similar to the previous hypotheses, partial 
correlations, controlling for the potential effects of social desirability, were conducted, 
the results are presented in Table 14.  In line with the predictions, the results reveal 
small- to medium-magnitude negative relationships between the internalisation subscale 
and some of the prejudice scales, while in the Saudi sample, the relationships are 
negative. For donation intentions scales, the results showed medium significant 
relationships between the internalisation subscale and donation intentions to interfaith 
charities, positive in the British sample but negative in the Saudi sample.  Regarding the 
circle of moral regards scale, positive relationships were only found in the British 
sample. While not all correlations are found to be significant, the direction of the 
significant correlations supports the hypothesis regarding the British sample.  
7.3.7 Predictability of moral identity scales  
          Going beyond bivariate relationships, I next conducted regression analyses to 
further evaluate the relationships between the moral identity scales, prejudice and other 
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related constructs. The purpose here was to compare the contribution of each of the 
moral identity scales as predictors of prejudice.  I predicted that the new moral identity 
scale would be better than Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale in terms of 
predicting prejudice and other related constructs. Twelve hierarchical regression 
analyses were performed on prejudice and other related constructs. All variance 
inflation factors were less than two ([VIFs]< 2), indicating that multicollinearity is not 
a problematic concern in this analysis. In step 1, age, gender (1 = male, and 2 = female), 
religiosity, political orientation (only in the British sample), and two social desirability 
subscales were entered as the statistical control variables.  In step 2, Aquino and Reed’s 
moral identity scale was entered. In step 3, the new moral identity scale was entered to 
allow the contribution of its scores to be assessed as predictors of prejudice and other 
related constructs beyond that afforded by Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale and 
the control variables. These three steps will allow for a clear picture of the of predictive 
ability of the new moral identity scale. Summaries of the regression analysis on 
prejudice and other related constructs scores in both samples, are displayed in Tables 16 
to 21. 
       Beginning with the old-fashioned prejudice towards foreigner workers, as can be 
seen in Table 16, for the British sample, in step 2, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral 
identity scale did not account for unique variance found here. However, when adding 
the new moral identity scale at step 3, caring/fairness, in-group/authority and political 
orientation, were significant predictors of old-fashioned prejudice and there was a 
significant increase in the predictive power, (R² =.35***).  This was also the case for 
the Saudi sample, in step 2 Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale did not account for 
unique variance in old-fashioned prejudice. When adding the new moral identity scale 
at step 3, in-group/authority was a significant predictor of old-fashioned prejudice and 
there was a significant increase in the predictive power where, R² =.14***.  
        Looking at modern prejudice towards foreign workers for the British sample, 
(Table 16), Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale and political orientation both 
contributed to variances in modern prejudice. However, this contribution disappeared 
when adding the new moral identity scale was added in Step 3. 
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Table 14. Correlations between moral identity scales and different types of prejudice 
and other related scales 
 
 
Note: BR = British sample; SA = Saudi sample; OFPTF = old-fashioned prejudice toward foreign workers; MPTF = 
modern prejudice toward foreign workers; HS = hostile sexism; BS = benevolent sexism ; IPAM/C* = interreligious 
prejudice against Muslims in British sample and against Christians in Saudi sample; IPAJ = interreligious prejudice 
against Jews; IPAA = interreligious prejudice against atheists; MP = moral prejudice; DIFWC = donation intentions 
to foreign workers charity; DIWC = donation intentions to women’s charity; DIIC = donation intentions to interfaith 
charity; CMR = circle of moral regard. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
  
Caring/fairness, in-group/authority and moral internalisation of the new moral identity 
scale were significant predictors of modern prejudice, with a significant increase in R² 
= . 46***.  For the Saudi sample, in step 2, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale did 
not account for unique variance in modern prejudice. However, when adding the new 
moral identity scale at step 3, in-group/authority was a significant predictor (R² =.15***). 
 
Measures 
Partial correlation controlling for SD and IM scales 
 OFPTF MPTF HS BS 
BR SA BR SA BR SA BR SA 
Caring/Fairness foundation -.45** -.06 -.39** .01 -.34** .09 -.16* .10 
In-group/Authority foundation .10 .37** .17* .37** .17* .35** .28** .24** 
Purity foundation .13 .26** .17* .27** .32** .27** .45** .22** 
Moral internalisation  -.19** -.03 -.30** .09 -.18* .08 -.05 .21** 
External moral motivations -.01 .22** -.02 .32** .15* .41** .34** .30** 
Aquino & Reed’s moral identity  -.32** .12 -36** .12 -24** .18** .07 .29** 
 
Measures 
Partial correlation controlling for SD and IM scales  
IPAM/C* IPAJ IPAA MP 
BR SA BR SA BR SA BR SA 
Caring/Fairness foundation -.40** -.12 -.40** -.15* -.23** -.01 -.22** .05 
In-group/Authority foundation -04 .36** .02 .36** -.05 .55** -.04 .14* 
Purity foundation .14* .30** .11 .34** .23** .55** -.01 .26** 
Moral internalisation subscale -.30** .12 -.30** .11 -.16* .11 -.03 .13* 
External moral motivations .04 .35** .03 .37** .06 .48** -.03 .22* 
Aquino & Reed’s moral identity -.37** .14* -.27** .08 -.19** .16* -.08 .18** 
 
Measures 
Partial correlation controlling for SD and IM scales 
DIFWC DIWC DIIC CMR 
BR SA BR SA BR SA BR SA 
Caring/Fairness foundation .22** .06 .17* .06 .07 .10 .40** .27** 
In-group/Authority foundation -.17* -.20** -.03 -.12 .01 .07 .02 -.07 
Purity foundation -.10 -.13 -.12 -.14* .21** .07 .01 -.02 
Morality internalisation subscale .13 .03 .13 .05 .16* -.18* .32** .06 
External moral motivations -.07 -.09 -.00 -.13 .08 .07 .20** -.11 
Aquino & Reed’s moral identity .20** -.04 .16* .06 .06 -.09 .41* .05 
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              Table 15. Comparison between the two significant correlations obtained 
                             from the British and Saudi samples 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Note: z, Fisher r-to-z transformation. * p < .05 
 
 
          Turning to hostile sexism (Table 17) for the British sample, in step 2, Aquino and 
Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale did not account for variance in hostile sexism. In step 
3, caring/fairness and the external moral motivations subscales of the new moral identity 
scale were significant predictors of hostile sexism and there was a significant increase in 
the predictive power, R² =. 41***.  In the Saudi sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity 
scale did contribute to the variance in hostile sexism in step 2.  However, this contribution 
disappeared when adding the new moral identity scale in step 3. The external moral 
motivations subscales of the new moral identity scale were significant predictors of 
hostile sexism with a significant increase in predictive power R² = .23**. 
          In respect of benevolent sexism (Table 17), for the British sample, Aquino and 
Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale, as well as gender and political orientation, contributed 
to the variances in modern prejudice, as can be seen in step 2. However, the contribution 
of Aquino and Reed’s scale disappeared when adding the new moral identity scale in step 
3. Purity, moral internalisation and external moral motivations subscales were significant 
predictors and (R²) = .37*** having stronger predictive power than in step 2.  In the Saudi 
sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale contributed to the variance in modern 
Correlations    BR   SA     z 
Moral Individualising 
Caring/Fairness foundation and IPAJ -.40  -.15 2.99* 
Caring/Fairness foundation and   MCR  .40 .27 1.61 
Moral Binding 
In-group/Authority foundation and MPTF .17 .37 -2.38* 
In-group/Authority foundation and HS .17 .35 -2.12* 
In-group/Authority foundation and BS .28 .24 -0.47 
In-group/Authority foundation and DIFWC -.17   -.20 -0.34 
Purity foundation and MPTF .17 .27 -1.15 
Purity foundation and HS .32 .27  0.6 
Purity foundation and BS .45 .22 2.86* 
Purity foundation and IPAA .23 .55 -4.21* 
External moral motivations and HS .15 .41 -3.12* 
External moral motivations and BS .34 .30 .0.49 
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prejudice in step 2.  In step 3, only self-deception contributed to the variance in benevolent 
sexism.  
     Turning to interreligious prejudice (Tables 18 and 19) for the British sample, 
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale and political orientation, contributed to 
the variances in prejudice against Muslims.  In step 3, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity 
scale and political orientation still contributed to the variances but were joined by 
caring/fairness from the new moral identity scale with a significant increase in the 
predictive power, R² =.27**.  In the Saudi sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity 
scale and religiosity, contributed to the variance in prejudice against Christians. However, 
in step 3, the contributions of those two predictors disappeared, and only caring/fairness 
and in-group/authority contributed to the variance in prejudice against Christians with a 
significant increase in predictive power R² = .20***.    
     In the British sample, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale and political 
orientation contributed to the variances in prejudice against Jews. In step 3, the 
contribution of Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale disappeared, and caring/fairness, 
purity and moral internalisation subscales contributed to the variance in prejudice against 
Jews, with a significant increase in the predictive power (R²) = .22***.  However, in the 
Saudi sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale did not contribute to the variance 
in prejudice against Jews. In step 3, caring/fairness, in-group/authority and purity 
contributed to the variance in prejudice against Jews with significant increase in 
predictive power (R²) = .25***.  In step 2, for prejudice against atheists in the British 
sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale and religiosity contributed to the 
variances; however, in step 3, neither of these two variables, nor any other variables, was 
a significant predictor of prejudice against atheists.  In the Saudi sample, Aquino and 
Reed’s moral identity scale and religiosity contributed to the variances in prejudice 
against atheists.  However, in step 3, the contribution of Aquino and Reed’s moral identity 
scale disappeared, and caring/fairness, in-group/authority purity subscales and religiosity, 
contributed to the variance in prejudice against atheists with a significant increase in 
predictive power (R²) =.48***. 
    With respect to moral prejudice (see Table 19), for the British sample, the only 
significant predictor in step 2 was political orientation.  In step 3, caring/fairness was the 
only predictor of moral prejudice with a significant predictive power (R²) = .05*.  In the 
Saudi sample, Aquino and Reed’s moral identity scale and gender were significant 
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predictors in step 2. When the new moral identity scale was entered in step 3, purity and 
gender were the only significant predictors of moral prejudice with a slight increase in 
the predictive power (R²) = .08*.    
    Regarding intention to donate to various charities, the results are displayed in tables 
20 and 21. For the British sample, in step 2, political orientation was the only predictor 
of donation intentions to foreign workers.  In step 3, caring/fairness and in-
group/authority contributed to the variance in donation intentions to foreign workers and 
there was a significant increase in the predictive power (R²) = .25**.  For the Saudi 
sample, in step 2, gender was the only predictor, while in step 3, in-group/authority added 
a further significant contribution to the variance with a significant predictive power, (R²) 
= .05*. With regard to intention to donate to women’s charities, age and political 
orientation were only the predictor variables in steps 2 and 3. Neither moral identity scales 
contributed to the variance in donation intentions to women’s charities. For donation 
intentions to interfaith charities, in the British sample, religiosity was the only predictor 
in step 2. In step 3, there were no significant predictors for this variable. In the Saudi 
sample, in step 2, there were no significant predictors. In step 3, the results indicate that 
the moral internalisation subscale contributed to the variance in donation intentions to 
interfaith charities with a significant predictive power, (R²) = .05*.  
      The final analysis was for circle of moral regard (see Table 21). In the British 
sample, in step 2, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale contributed to the 
variance in this variable as did religiosity, political orientation, self-deception and 
impression management. Yet, the contribution of Aquino and Reed’s scale disappeared 
when adding the new moral identity scale in step 3. Caring/fairness also contributed to 
the variance, as well as the variables in step 2 with a significant increase in the predictive 
power (R²) = .34**.  In the Saudi sample, self-deception was the only the significant 
predictor in step 2. In step 3, the results show that caring/fairness was the only variable 
that contributed to the variance in circle of moral regard with a significant increase in 
predictive power (R²) =.12**. 
       Based on the results of the all regression analyses, the results supported the 
hypothesis that the new moral identity scale is better at predicting prejudice and related 
constructs than Aquino and Reed’s scale.  
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Table 16 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting old-fashioned and modern prejudice towards foreign workers in the British and Saudi 
samples  
 
 
Note: OFPTF = old-fashioned prejudice towards foreign workers; MPTW = modern prejudice towards foreigner workers. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p ≤.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor variables 
OFPTF MPTF 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age .08 .04 .12 .03 .01 -.01 .13 .09 .16** .04 .01 -.00 
Gender -.13 -.10 -.10 .05 .05 -.01 -.06 -.04 .03 09 .09 .04 
Religiosity -.07 -.03 .09 .19** .19** -.07 .12* .08 .21** .18* .18** .06 
Political orientation .38*** .38*** .19**    .52*** .47*** .31***    
Self-deception .02 .02 .09 .028 .016 .01 .12 .09 .14* .05 .03 .01 
Impression management -.07 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.03 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  -.21 -.11  .14 .07  -.22*** -.12  .14 -.01 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   -.46***   -.13   -.26***   -.06 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   .18**   .36***   .21**   .25** 
     Purity traits   .01   .11   .14   .09 
     Moral internalization    .02   -.04   -.18*   .05 
     External moral motivations   .13   -.04   .10   .14 
 Adjusted R² .18*** .21** .35*** .02 .04* .14*** .33*** .36*** .46*** .02 .04 .15*** 
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Table 17 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting hostile and benevolent sexism in the British and Saudi samples 
 
 
Note: HS = hostile sexism; BS = benevolent Sexism. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p ≤.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor variables 
HS BS 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age .08 .06 .11 .13 .09 .08 .04 .07 .11 .04 -.02 -.04 
Gender -.26*** -.25*** -.19** -.19*** -.18** -.23*** -.24*** -.26*** -.19** -.08 -.08 -.10 
Religiosity .08 .10 -.07 .20** .21** .09 .17** .14* .17* -.01 -.02 .05 
Political orientation .42*** .39*** .26***    .27*** .31*** .14*    
Self-deception .07 .06 .12* -.06 -.07 -.09 .01 .03 .08 .01 -.01* -.01* 
Impression management -.01 .01 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.09 .07 .03 -.01 -.09 -.15 -.19 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  -.10 -.08  .20** .05  .16* .14  .33*** .16 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   -.22**   .05   -.13   .01 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   .12   .15   .12   .08 
     Purity foundation traits   .17   .07   .37***   .10 
     Moral internalization    -.11   -.05   -.22**   .14 
     External moral motivations   .19**   .29***   .27**   .14 
 Adjusted R² .32*** .33* .41*** .06** .09** .23*** .20*** .22* .37*** -.01 .08*** .14** 
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Table 18 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting interreligious prejudice against Christians, Muslims and Jews in the British and Saudi 
samples  
 
   
Note: IPAM/C = interreligious prejudice against Muslims in British sample and against Christians in Saudi sample; IPAJ = interreligious prejudice against Jews.    
* p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p≤.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor variables 
IPAM/C IPAJ 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age .02 -.01 .01 -.06 -.07 -.10 -.06 -.09 -.05 -.05 -.08 -.11 
Gender -.13 -.10 -.04 .09 .09 .03 -.13 -.11 -.03 .16* .16 .08 
Religiosity -.02 .02 -.07 .23** .24** -.10 -.10 -.07 .24** .18** .19** -.01 
Political orientation .36*** .30*** .22**    .31*** .26*** .14    
Self-deception .02 -.01 .03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.03 -.06 -.01 -.05 -.01 -.02 
Impression management -.13 -.06 -.05 .00 -.24 -.03 -.05 -.01 .01 .01 -.06 -.02 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  -.29*** -.19*  .15* -.01  -.21** -.08  .14 -.02 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   -.21**   -.24**   -.27**   -.26*** 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   .01   .29**   .03   .34*** 
     Purity foundation traits   .11   .11   .24*   .18* 
     Moral internalization    -.15   .14   -.19*   .11 
     External moral motivations   .13   .08   .11   .08 
 Adjusted R² .16*** .23*** .27** .04* .06* .20*** .09*** .13** .22*** .04* .06 .25*** 
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Table 19 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting interreligious prejudice against atheists and moral prejudice in the British and Saudi 
samples  
 
 
Note: IPA = interreligious prejudice against atheists; MP = moral prejudice. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p≤.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor variables 
IPAA MP 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age -.04 -.07 -.09 .03 -.03 -.06 .04 .04 .05 .06 .02 .02 
Gender -.09 -.07 -.04 .13 .01* .03 .07 .07 .11 .20** .20** .18* 
Religiosity .21** .25*** .14 .35*** .36*** .12* -.12 -.12 .16 -.07 .08 -.01 
Political orientation .19* .14* .15    .18* .17* .14    
Self-deception -.02 -.04 -.02 .01 .01 .02 -.01 -.01 .03 -.07 .03 -.07 
Impression management -.01 .04 .05 -.02 -.03 -.11 -.13 -.12 -.12 -.07 -.09 -.02 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  -.20** -.15  .18** -.07  -.03 .03  .17* .07 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   -.06   -.15*   -.28**   .01 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   -.16   .33***   -.03   -.07 
     Purity foundation traits   .15   .33***   .05   .21* 
     Moral internalization    -.07   .11   .12   .06 
     External moral motivations   .08   .13   .01   .09 
 Adjusted R² .08** .11** .12 .12*** .15** .48*** .02 .02 .05* .03* .06* .08* 
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Table 20 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting donation intentions to foreign workers and Women charities in the British and Saudi 
samples  
 
 
Note: DIFWC = donation intentions to foreigner workers charity; DIWC = donation intentions to women charity. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p≤.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor variables 
DIFWC DIWC 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age -.13 -.12 -.20** -.02 -.01 -.01 -.16* -.15* -.18* .06 .05 .05 
Gender -.11 -.12 -.17** .15 .12* .20** .01 .01 -.02 .25*** .25*** .28*** 
Religiosity .06 .04 .03 .06 .07 -.03 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.24*** -.24*** -.15* 
Political orientation -.43*** -.41*** -.29***    -.31*** -.30*** -.27**    
Self-deception -.07 -.06 -.12 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.06 -.06 -.08 -.05 -.06 -.071 
Impression management .10 .08 .08 .12 .14 .15 .11 .09 .07 .01 .01 .01 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  .10 .04  -.07 -.07  .05 -.02  .03 .07 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   .23**   .12   .11   .09 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   -.20**   -.22*   -.03   -.07 
     Purity traits   .11   -.13   .03   -.12 
     Moral internalization    .09   .04   .07   .03 
     External moral motivations   -.17   .05   -.01   -.05 
 Adjusted R² .20*** .21 .25** .01 .01 .05* .15*** .14 .13 .10*** .10 .11 
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Table 21 
Hierarchical multiple regression predicting donation intentions to interfaith charity and circle of moral regard in the British and Saudi 
samples  
 
 
Note: DIIC = donation intentions to interfaith charity; CMR = circle of moral regard. * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p≤.001
 
 
Predictor variables 
DIIC CMR 
British sample Saudi sample British sample Saudi sample 
β β β β 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step3 Step1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Age .04 .04 -.01 .09 -.02 .01 -.03 .01 -.03 .07 .07 .09 
Gender .07 .07 .05 -.02 .08 .07 .01 -.01 -.07 -.11 -.11 -.08 
Religiosity .22** .22** .12 -.04 -.04 -.01 .18** .13* .15 -.02 -.02 -.05 
Political orientation -.07 -.06 -.02    -.38*** -.32*** -.23**    
Self-deception -.08 -.08 -.11 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.17** -.13* -.17** .04** .04** -.01 
Impression management .12 .11 .09 .12 .14 .13 .26*** .19** .16* .21 .21 .15 
Aquino’s moral identity scale  .01 -.05  -.10 -.04  .32*** .18*  -.01 -.02 
The new moral Identity scale  
     Caring/Fairness traits   .04   .16   .25**   .30*** 
     Ingroup/Authority traits   -.09   .03   -.13   -.07 
     Purity foundation traits   .19   .04   -.05   .02 
     Moral internalization    .19   -.24**   .08   -.01 
     External moral motivations   -.13   .96   .04   -.06 
 Adjusted R² .05* .04 .06 -.01 .02 .05* .21*** .29*** .34** .06** .06 .12** 
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7.4 Discussion 
           Although moral identity research has flourished over the last two decades, 
relativity little social psychology research has explored the role that might moral 
identity might play in individuals’ every day interactions with members of various 
outgroups.  So, in addition to replicating the factors of the new moral identity scale, 
in this the study I aimed to examine the relationships between moral identity and 
prejudice towards various target groups and to examine the relationships between 
moral identity and other constructs related to prejudice, such as donation intentions to 
various charities and the circle of moral regard. These relationships were tested using 
the new moral identity scale and I also used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity 
scale. The purpose of using both two scales was to compare them in terms of their 
ability to predict prejudice and other related scales. I hypothesised that an 
individualising approach to morality would be negatively correlated to the prejudice 
scales and positively correlated to donation intention and the circle of moral regard 
scales and that these relationships would be higher in the British sample than in the 
Saudi sample.  In contrast, I hypothesised that a binding approach to morality would 
be positively correlated to the prejudice scales and negatively correlated to donation 
intention and the circle of moral regard scales, and that these relationships would be 
higher in the British sample than in the Saudi sample.  In the next section, I will discuss 
the study results, beginning with an examination of the structure of the factors for the 
new moral identity, followed by the results of the relationships between the moral 
identity scales and prejudice, and other constructs that related to prejudice.  
7.4.1 Factors analysis. With respect to the structure of the factors for the new moral 
identity scale, the sub-subscales of the moral variations subscale were replicated, but 
with some differences.  In the British sample, ‘the conforming to sexual norms’ item 
loaded on the purity factor while previously in Study 3, it loaded on the authority/groups 
factor. According to moral foundation theory, this item is related to purity moral 
foundation. In Study 3, the results were explained by considering that British society is 
a horizontal individualist culture (Guerra, 2008). In such a cultural orientation, sexual 
behaviour is likely to be guided by the norms of society.  However, in the present study 
and as stated above, the ‘the conforming to sexual norms’ item loaded on the purity 
factor.  In the factor analyses for both studies, for any item to be retained it had to load 
at .40 or more on only one factor.  The item loading had also to be less than .40 on the 
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second factor.  In Study 3, the sexual norm item factor loading scores were .42 and .30 
for the authority/groups factor and purity factor, respectively, while in Study 4, the 
factor loading scores were .28 and .56 for the authority/groups factor and purity factor, 
respectively. This consistency in the cross-loading scores for sexual norms on both 
factors in Study 3 and Study 4 might be explained by the secularisation of British 
society. Hence, the sexual norms item sometimes loads on the authority/groups factor 
and sometimes on the purity factors. These cross-loading scores for the sexual norms 
item did not existed in the Saudi sample. In Study, 3, the sexual norms item factor 
loading scores were .11 and .69 for the authority/groups factor and the purity factor, 
respectively, while in Study 4, the scores were .03 and .72 for the authority/groups factor 
and the purity factor, respectively. To put it differently and considering the loading 
scores across the two studies in both cultures, the religiosity of society or the role of 
religion in society, is likely to influence whether or not conforming to sexual norms is 
perceived to be related to moral purity or moral authority.             
         With respect to the Saudi factor analysis, the care/harm and fairness/reciprocity 
items only loaded on one factor in Study 3, whereas before they were loaded on two 
separate factors. In the British sample, the care/harm and fairness/reciprocity items 
loaded on one separate factor in both studies. In Study 3, I noted that the results might 
indicate that the morality of care and fairness were interrelated in the British sample, 
but not in the Saudi sample. The loading of both foundations on one factor in the Saudi 
sample suggests that the Saudi participants perceived both moral foundations as one 
broad foundation. According to moral foundations theory, taken together, caring and 
fairness represent the individualising moral domain. In relation to other sub-subscales 
in the Saudi sample, it is worth mentioning that the conforming to purity standards item, 
which is related to the purity items, failed to reach an adequate factor loading in Studies 
3 and 4, but that it loaded on the purity factor in the British sample. These results across 
the two studies might suggest that the conforming to purity standards item is not part of 
the moral concerns or domain for Saudi participants; in contrast, it is related to morality 
concerns in the British sample. The conforming to purity standards item was excluded 
from subsequent analysis in the present study because, in cross-cultural research, only 
the common items or factors of the measured concepts should be retained and further 
analysed (He & Van de Vijver, 2012). With respect to the remaining subscales, the 
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internalisation and external moral motivations subscales were replicated in the present 
study, each subscale loading on one factor in both cultures.    
7.4.2 The relationships between the moral identity scales and prejudice and other 
related constructs. The results provide support for the moral individualising hypothesis 
by which moral concerns such as caring and fairness contribute to less prejudice and are 
also in line with the widely documented relationships between moral identity, or 
morality, and prejudice and other closely related constructs; people who place more 
importance on caring and fairness and moral concerns or values, are less prejudicial and 
hostile towards out-groups (e.g., Aquino et al., 2007; Hardy et al., 2010; Passini, 2013) 
and tend to donate more to out groups charities (Nilsson et al., 2016).  While there were 
a few exceptions where moral identity positively correlated to prejudice in the Saudi 
sample only, these significant positive relationships, of small-to-medium magnitude, 
disappeared in the three-step regressions analysis. Furthermore, and as expected, all the 
revealed negative relationships were higher in the British sample.  However, while the 
British and Saudi participants differed in their levels of the individualising approach to 
morality and prejudice, their scores showed comparable patterns of correlations between 
these variables. These results suggested that the negative relationships between 
prejudice and the individualising moral contents of moral identity, are likely to be 
universal regardless of the culture or society.  
          The results also lend support to the moral binding approach hypothesis. 
Participants who scored highly in the binding approach to morality scales, tended to also 
score highly for prejudice. These results are also in consistent with Kugler and Jost’s 
study (2014), where the same positive relationships between binding foundations of 
moral identity theory and prejudice toward different out-groups were identified. 
Likewise, the results are in line with Nilsson and colleagues’ study (2016) where binding 
moral concerns lead to lower donations to outgroup-focused charities. This is similar to 
the individualising approach in the sense that although the British and Saudi participants 
differed in their levels of a moral binding approach to morality and prejudice, their 
scores showed the same patterns of correlations between these variables. This suggests 
that the positive relationships between prejudice and binding moral concerns can be 
found across different cultures. While both samples here show differences in the 
importance they give to the moral binding content, this content appears to be part of 
Saudi and also British individuals’ moral identity, as well as a predictor of prejudice. 
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This content then is not only part of the moral identity of people in collectivistic 
societies, but is also, at least for some people, part of moral identity in individualistic 
societies. 
           With respect to the moral internalisation hypothesis, whenever there was a 
significant relationship with prejudice and other related scales, the direction of these 
results was as predicted in the British sample. As mentioned previously, the moral 
internalisation subscale measures to what extent people consider morality an important 
part of their identity, without identifying the contents of morality. The relationship 
between this and prejudice was negative, this similar to the relationship patterns of the 
individualising approach to morality with prejudice. Such results are in line with the 
previous results in this thesis, indicating that British participants’ moral identity is 
mainly caring, and fairness based, whereas the Saudi sample for whom there was no 
specific prediction, the relationships with prejudice were positive, similar to the 
relationship patterns of the binding approach to morality with prejudice. However, the 
similarity of relationship patterns here with the binding approach can be seen to be in 
line with the previous chapter, where the Saudi participants’ moral identity consisted of 
both approaches to morality. Because such patterns here are found in the Saudi sample, 
it could be suggested that Saudi participants place more emphasis on the binding 
approach rather than the individualising approach to morality. 
             Based on the regression analysis, the results also lend support to the better 
predictability of the new moral identity scale in comparison with Aquino and Reed’s 
(2002) moral identity scale across both samples. The prediction of prejudice towards 
different groups and donation intentions was significantly improved following the 
addition of the new moral identity scale to the regression models in step 3.  These results 
show the benefits of the new moral identity scale in predicting prejudice, partly because 
this scale includes the measurement of various moral concerns that are overlooked in 
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale.   Even within the moral individualising 
concerns, those covered by Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale, the subscale of the new 
moral identity scale that related to this, is better in terms of predicting prejudice and 
other related constructs.    
            One should not, however, conclude that holding a strong moral identity 
necessarily leads to greater prejudice even in a collectivistic society where binding 
moral concerns are more predominant than in an individualistic society.   Prejudice and 
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hostility towards outgroups can be mitigated by holding strong individualising moral 
concerns.  Moral identity therefore needs to be examined as a potential predictor – 
among other well-established predictors in the prejudice literature.  More importantly, 
it is necessary to be aware of the complexity and diversity of moral identity content and 
the implications of this for moral identity that have not been considered in the existing 
literature. The central message of these findings is quite clear, putting the diverse 
content of moral identity and its various possible outcomes into perspective. 
           Despite the interesting and important patterns of the findings, the present study has 
a number of limitations. First, it presents the first study investigating the relationships 
between moral identity and prejudice towards various different outgroups, thus all 
findings here should be considered as a baseline and needed to be replicated. Likewise, 
it is important not to forget that this study is also the first implementation of the new 
moral identity scale, and thus should also be replicated. An important point for 
consideration is that the data are correlational in nature meaning that the results cannot 
speak to the causal direction of the links between moral identity and prejudice. While 
many variables were controlled, there is the possibility that one or more unmeasured 
variables might systematically covary with the moral identity scale, prejudice and other 
related constructs. Another limitation of this study is regarding the measures which were 
all self-reports; this can lead to problems of shared method variance.  To overcome this 
limitation, future studies should utilise other methods, such as longitudinal and 
experimental designs.  It is not clear from this study if the same results would occur if 
the prejudice under examination was different than the ones measured in this study.  
Further research is necessary in order to arrive at a better, well established relationship 
between moral identity and prejudice. Last but not least, the present study relied 
exclusively on explicit measures to assess moral identity and prejudice. Future research 
might consider employing some implicit measures. By taking into account all these 
considerations, future research could expand and deepen our knowledge regarding 
moral identity, out groups attitudes and moral behaviours.  
           In summary, this study represents a broad initial investigation into the 
relationship between moral identity and prejudice. While we have learned that 
overlooking the measurement of the range of moral identity content might mask insights 
about the implications and consequences of holding these moral codes, clearly more 
work is needed in terms of exploring moral identity in relation to other constructs, 
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specifically when the moral content used in conceptualization and measurements of 
moral identity is more diverse and inclusive.   In contrast to the approaches of previous 
researchers, this research demonstrates that moral identity is not an absolute positive, 
and that the positive consequences of moral identity should not be taken for granted.  
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
  
        Thus, although members of all groups in society are likely to agree 
that being a moral person is a positive aspiration, cultural groups 
vary in the meaning they attribute to being moral and in the values, 
they associate with being a moral person (Sverdlik al., 2011, p.230). 
 
        But if moral psychology is to make progress in the twenty-first 
century, it will have to overcome its own moral homogeneity. It will 
have to conduct a great deal of cross-cultural research, which does 
not necessarily require crossing any national borders. It should 
commit to the principle that—descriptively speaking—there’s more to 
morality than harm and fairness (Haidt, 2013, p.292). 
           
8.1 Background and aims of the thesis 
            Whilst moral-identity research has witnessed a surge over the last 25 years, 
little attention has been given to the impact and role of culture on moral identity. In 
the literature, moral-identity conceptualisation and measurement is based on a limited 
range of moral content, mainly fairness and caring or the individualising of the moral 
domain. For example, the scale most frequently used is Aquino & Reed’s (2002) self-
importance of moral identity scale, which assesses to what degree moral traits such as 
being kind and fair, are important to a person’s self-concept. However, reviewing the 
literature on both identity and morality supports the idea that there are moral concerns 
beyond the morality of caring and fairness. Thus, narrowing moral identity content to 
caring and fairness neglects other moral concerns that are found across, and in other, 
cultures.  With such a limited focus and emphasis on certain kinds of moral domains, 
there is a risk of ethnocentrism, where moral identity is mainly conceptualised 
according to the longstanding Western view of morality.    
            Accordingly, the aim of this thesis was to address the gap in the moral identity 
literature regarding the role of culture in forming people’s moral identities. This aim 
was achieved by conducting four studies for samples from both Britain and Saudi 
Arabia. The current thesis, with its limitations, is the first to investigate moral identity 
from a cross-cultural perspective. By conducting research in two different cultural 
contexts, more insights were gained into the variety of moral domains that people 
integrate into their moral identity. A new moral identity scale was developed that 
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expands the previously limited measurement of the moral domain. Research into 
moral identity and prejudice and other related scales such as donations to various 
outgroups was then carried out.  My aim here was to show how including other moral 
domains which have previously been neglected, could change how researchers think 
about moral identity and its potential consequences. Put another way, recognising 
other moral concerns in the study of moral identity turns our attention to the 
unthinkable downside of having a strong moral identity.        
           In this final chapter, I will briefly present the findings of each of these studies 
and highlight the strengths and limitations of this thesis. Suggestions for future 
research will also be outlined.  
 
8.2 Summary of findings 
           This thesis consists of four empirical studies that aimed to examine the influence 
of culture on moral identity, and more specifically, to expand the moral contents of 
moral identity beyond fairness and caring concerns to consider other moral concerns in 
different cultures.  
8.2.1 Chapter 4: Study 1 
           In Chapter 4, I began my initial examination of moral identity in British and Saudi 
Arabia by utilising prototype theory. In this study, the participants generated traits that 
represented the moral prototype they hold. By using a prototype approach, there were 
no assumptions imposed of what constitutes a moral person, and as such, the traits 
generated by the participants mirror the normative and cultural perceptions of a moral 
person. Consistent with the characteristics of individualistic cultures, the British 
participants generated moral traits that represented the individualising approach to 
morality. Likewise, and typical of collectivist cultures, the Saudi participants generated 
both individualising and binding features as prototypical of moral people. 
           Overall, the results from both samples lend support to the moral foundation 
theory, where people from different cultures have similar moral concerns, namely 
fairness and caring. However, in some cultures, mostly non-Western and collectivistic 
cultures, people hold moral concerns about religion, authority and groups. 
8.2.2 Chapter 5: Study 2 
          In this study, I aimed to gain more insights into the traits that constitute a moral 
person in British and Saudi cultures. In addition, I examined the participant’s 
177 
 
perceptions of what is culturally believed to be the traits of a moral person. In this study, 
I found that while British participants identified with moral people who showed moral 
individualising features but not binding features, Saudi participants identified highly 
with moral persons who have characteristics of both moral individualising and binding 
approaches. Almost mirroring the results of the moral identity scales, the perceived 
cultural importance of the binding moral traits was higher among the Saudi participants 
compared with the British participants. Likewise, the participants in the British sample 
perceived a greater level of cultural importance of the individualising moral traits than 
the binding traits, while the Saudi participants perceived the individualising and binding 
moral traits as equally important in their culture. There was a positive correlation 
between moral identity and the perceived cultural importance scales, but with a few 
exceptions.  In this study, cultural differences in moral identity and perceived cultural 
importance were larger in regard to the moral binding traits of morality than the moral 
individualising traits. I also conducted a mediation analysis to see if the cultural 
differences between both countries in moral identity scores could be explained 
(mediated) by the participants’ scores on the perceived cultural importance of moral 
traits.  
8.2.3 Chapter 6: Study 3 
          The results of Studies 1 and 2 highlighted the importance of measuring cultural 
variations in moral identity, something that has been completely overlooked in the few 
existing moral identity scales. Moving beyond moral individualising domains is 
necessary and important because neglecting morality variations leads to a 
misrepresentation of some people’s accounts of their moral identity.  To remedy this 
limitation, the aim of Study 3 was to develop a new moral identity scale that includes 
various moral domain concerns, specifically, individualising moral domains, 
traditionally the focus of all existing moral identity scales, along with binding moral 
domains that have been overlooked in the existing moral identity scales. To translate the 
new moral identity scale into Arabic, I used Vallerand’s (1989) methodology to create 
an equivalent scale in both languages. The final new moral identity scale consists of 
three subscales: morality variations, morality internalisation and external moral 
motivations.  Study 3 demonstrates that the new moral identity scale had acceptable test-
retest reliability. Convergent, nomological and discriminant validity measures were 
correlated with the new moral identity scale as predicted, with some exceptions.    
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8.2.4 Chapter 7: Study 4 
          Study 4 had two general aims. The first was to replicate the factors structures for 
the new moral identity scale and examine the similarity of the subscales factors across 
both cultures.  The second was to test its ability to predict behaviours in comparison 
with the widely used Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. As noted before 
and throughout the whole thesis, I argue that moral identity content is not entirely about 
moral individualising concerns, namely the morality of caring and fairness. This 
argument was supported and evidenced by the results of the three studies in this thesis. 
When researchers include other moral concerns such as the moral binding approach, 
there is the need to rethink the concept of moral identity in terms of its association with 
other variables or constructs. Most of the literature on moral identity based on fairness 
and caring concerns clearly speaks to the positive outcomes of holding a strong moral 
identity. Moving beyond caring and fairness concerns, alternative moral concerns are 
likely to result in different outcomes which will not necessarily be positive. This study 
tested this idea, or argument, and showed that moral individualising concerns of moral 
identity contributed to less prejudice and more donations to outgroup charities, while 
moral binding concerns and external moral motivations contributed to prejudice and 
fewer donations to various outgroup charities. With respect to a moral internalisation 
subscale, this study demonstrated a negative relationship between this subscale and 
prejudice scales in the British sample, while the relationship was positive in the Saudi 
sample.  In addition, the results also demonstrate that the new moral identity scale has 
better predictability than Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale in both the 
British and Saudi samples.  
 
8.3 Strengths and Contributions  
           Figure 5 presents the contributions of each study in this thesis which was carried 
out to test Western assumptions of moral identity and extended the content of moral 
identity to be more inclusive of people’s accounts of what it means to be a moral person.  
The cross-cultural approach adopted here helped to identify the universal content of 
moral identity such as caring, fairness and other closely related concerns while allowing 
for the recognition of moral variations due to cultural differences, such as moral 
concerns pertaining to religion and ingroup loyalty. 
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Study 1 and 2 
 
• This is the first research in non-American cultures to adopt a prototype approach to 
mapping moral identity in both an individualistic culture (Britain) and a 
collectivistic culture (Saudi Arabia). 
 
• It examined how the moral identity of people from both cultures can be activated 
by various sets of moral traits drawn from the Moral Foundations Dictionary, thus 
going beyond fairness and caring as the only content of moral identity as found in 
the existing literature.  
 
• By conducting mediation analysis, this research demonstrates that perceiving the 
cultural importance of moral identity traits explains the differences between both 
countries’ moral identity scores. 
 
• The results show that the larger differences between the two cultures are for 
ingroup, authority and purity moral concerns (binding foundations), with Saudi 
culture endorsing these concerns more than British culture.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
                    Figure 5. Summary of the contributions of each study in this thesis 
 
Study 3 and 4 
 
• The development of a new, valid and reliable moral identity scale that considers the 
diversity in the content of moral identity (individualising and binding moral 
foundations). 
 
• By using the new moral identity scale, this research indicates the negative 
relationships between individualising the moral content of moral identity and 
prejudice, as well as the positive relationships between the binding moral contents 
of moral identity and prejudice. 
 
• These studies draw attention to aspects of moral identity that are overlooked (binding 
moral foundations), demonstrating the positive and negative consequences of 
holding a moral identity based on various moral foundations. 
 
Together, these two studies 
demonstrate that the moral traits 
that make up moral identity are not 
limited to the Western assumptions 
regarding moral concerns (caring 
and fairness concerns). 
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           In this thesis, I conceptualised the construct of moral identity by expanding the 
range of moral foundations that people are likely to incorporate in their moral identity. 
The inclusion of various moral domains in the new moral identity scale is likely to 
increase the validity of measuring moral identity particularly in non-Western and 
collectivistic cultures (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016) and within Western and 
individualistic cultures, in the case of conservative and religious people for example 
(Graham et al., 2011).  
           It is worth mentioning here that the majority of cross-cultural research samples 
have been undergraduate students (He & Van de Vijver, 2012; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). 
Given that undergraduate student characteristics vary across cultures, this provides the 
potential for sampling bias.  However, in this thesis and in Studies 2, 3 and 4, such bias 
was likely reduced; and the samples from both countries were heterogeneous and 
appeared to be reasonably representative of the general British and Saudi populations.  
           One of the strengths of this thesis is the way the materials were translated in 
Studies 3 and 4. Most cross-cultural research has used standard back-translation 
techniques as I did in the first and second studies here.  At that time, I was not aware of 
Vallerand’s (1989) methodology which researchers use to obtain not only linguistic 
equivalence but also other types of cultural equivalence. Although this method is far 
more time consuming, costly and complicated because it involves more steps compared 
to the commonly used back-translation technique, it can considerably improve the 
quality of the translated materials in general (Kristjansson et al., 2003; Banville, 
Desorosiers, & Genet- Volet, 2000).  
 
8.4 Research limitations 
           In all the empirical studies included in this research, the measures were self-
reported, the pattern of results likely to be confounded by a social desirability bias. I 
measured this bias in Studies 3 and 4, finding that the relationships between the moral 
identity scale and social desirability bias were weak. However, as noted before, the 
threat of social desirability bias needs to be considered, but it would appear to be of 
minimal concern (Shao et al, 2008). Likewise, in the new moral identity scale as in 
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale there were no items that might elicit a 
social desirability bias such as cheating, lying or stealing (Reynolds, 2008). In addition 
to this, for the three studies of this thesis, the moral identity scale and all other scales 
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were administrated online, the respondents’ answers completely anonymous, this 
helping to mitigate the possibility of social desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985). However, 
despite all the above considerations, the potential influence of social desirability bias on 
the research results cannot be entirely ruled out and this should therefore be considered 
when interpreting the results.  
          This thesis investigated moral identity in only two countries, thus the results are 
confined to those countries. Having chosen these countries as the focus of my thesis, it 
deserves discussion here because like most cross-cultural psychology research, I treated 
geographical boundaries as cultural boundaries and equated nations with cultures. While 
the geographical or national borders are not accurately equivalent to cultural boundaries, 
the accumulative literature indicates that national borders offer valuable and practical 
proxies for cultural boundaries (Aslani et al., 2016; Schaller & Murray, 2011). However, 
the limitation of using ‘nation’ or ‘country’ to symbolise ‘culture’ needs be 
acknowledged and noted. 
          Although reverse translation was used in studies 1 and 2, and a more thorough 
translation method was used in studies 3 and 4, it was not possible to ensure that both 
methods would eliminate all language-related issues that could influence the meaning 
of the generated moral traits in Study 1 or the scale items and the moral traits used in 
Study 2. The same concern applies to the new moral identity scale and all materials used 
in Studies 3 and Study 4.  
           In line with the aforementioned language issues, there is need to highlight an 
important aspect regarding the items of the new moral identity scale. When I constructed 
the items for this scale, I followed the roles that guide researchers who tend to use their 
newly designed scales in different cultural contexts (Behling & Law, 2000; Brislin, 
Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973 as cited in Khalaila, 2013; Yu et al., 2004). One of these 
rules is to avoid using metaphor and colloquial terms in order to make scale items 
meaningful, understandable and not culturally bound. This rule helps to produce an 
equivalent tool that can be used in different cultural contexts and guards against cultural 
bias (Peña, 2007; Yu et al., 2004). However, metaphor plays a significant role in any 
culture as part of the repertoire of everyday language and communications (see Lakoff 
& Johnson, 2003 for more details on the importance of metaphors). Therefore, 
developing culturally equivalent and valid scales cannot be achieved without excluding 
such essential and rich specific cultural knowledge.   In this sense, the items in the new 
182 
 
moral identity scale might fail to map onto the very local, or cultural specificity of being 
or perceiving a moral person in Britain or Saudi Arabia. As He and Van de Vijver (2012, 
p.4) stated “maximising local validity and cross-cultural comparability can be 
incompatible goals”. 
  
8.5 Where to from here?  
           In this thesis, Britain and Saudi Arabia were the focus of the cross-cultural 
comparisons. Further research is necessary in other countries to examine the 
replicability of the findings in terms of the universality and cultural specificity of moral 
identity contents.  In a related vein, the analysis here is based primarily at the individual 
level, treating the country as an independent variable. By conducting more cross-cultural 
research, the hope is that there will be more data about moral identity from various 
cultures that allows us to compare the individual-level results with the results that 
emerge from a country-level analysis.   
           It would also be valuable to examine moral identity within each society with a 
focus on different groups such as various ethnic minority groups and religious or 
spiritual people.  Such suggestions are consistent with moral foundation theory in that 
it emphasises the ways that minorities in individualist cultures can be dismissed, such 
as conservatives and people from lower social classes who value purity and loyalty, but 
are overlooked by moral universalism (Graham et al., 2011). The same comment is 
applicable with regard to people across the political spectrum (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, 
& MacKinlay, 2013).  While such examinations are worth pursing in order to move to 
a more nuanced empirical paradigm of moral identity, it would also be helpful to 
understand and tackle issues that are likely to result from people basing their moral 
identity on different moral domains. For example, Haidt (2013) pointed out that moral 
foundation theory provides researchers with an explanatory framework. In this regard, 
he illustrated that part of the culture war between conservative and liberals in American 
society over issues related to abortion, sex and sexuality for example, can be partially 
explained by the variation in people’s scores on moral foundations. This may suggest 
that recognising and scrutinising differences in moral identity content, across and within 
cultures, might help us to understand and explain issues related to, for example, group 
conflict and intolerance.  
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          This thesis demonstrates that moral identity can be based on a broad range of 
moral domain, and not solely on caring and fairness concerns. As discussed in Chapter 
7, the range of moral identity content should make researchers rethink the concept of 
moral identity because all documented associations concerned moral identity are highly 
dependent on how this identity is conceptualised and measured. Two recent reviews of 
moral identity in the literature (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Jennings et al., 2015), 
supported the positive role of moral identity based on the universal morality of fairness 
and care. However, Study 4 showed that moral identity is positively and negatively 
correlated to prejudice toward various out-groups. Recognising neglected moral 
concerns such as the binding ones in the moral identity literature, invites consideration 
of the concept of moral identity and its implications for understanding and explaining 
not only moral actions but also a wide range of different types of behaviours. In this 
way, and in future research, it would be useful to investigate the relationship between 
moral identity where there are accounts of a variety of moral identity contents and 
various behaviours, which can lead to the theoretical development of a moral identity 
paradigm. 
          Other interesting research for future studies could focus on how people’s moral 
identity can and might change; in other words, how people might centralise or 
decentralise the content of their moral identity. The reason for this change, amongst 
others, could be moving from one’s home culture to a new one, for example immigrants 
and sojourners (Sverdlik et al., 2011; Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010).  In such cases, 
people would find themselves in a different cultural framework somewhat different from 
their own, in terms of the endurance of certain moral codes and opposition to others. 
This, in turn, is likely to cause certain changes in the moral concerns that people 
integrate into their sense of moral self. Some possible research questions for future work 
in this area are, ‘How will such change happen and under what conditions?’ and ‘What 
if the new culture makes people resist any changes to their adherent moral domain?’ 
Such research is relevant and might add to the understanding of topics like assimilation, 
adjustment and xenophobia.  
          An additional question could be why individuals integrate particular kinds of 
moral concerns, and equally important, why individuals might embrace moral domains 
that go against their cultural moral values (Graham et al., 2011). In relation to this, 
researchers need to be aware that culture is not entirely homogeneous and that there are 
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potential conflicts in moral perspectives within the same culture (Wainryb, 2006; 
Wainryb & Recchia, 2013). In this case, individuals might embrace certain moral 
concerns that diverge from the dominant moral outlook or discourse in their culture.   
         Another research strand could go beyond the self-reporting measure. For example, 
some studies have utilised qualitative methods such as interviews to investigate and 
understand people’s moral identity (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; Maclean et al., 2004; 
Reimer et al., 2012; Onat, Kocabiyik, & Kulaksizoglu, 2014). Considering identity and 
culture research, Hammack (2008) highlighted that narrative approaches such as 
ethnographic methods, provide researchers with a valuable tool to understanding the 
identity that is situated in any given cultural context.  Building on this, researching 
cultural aspects using qualitative methods that have already been employed to examine 
moral identity, may offer more insight into how moral identity manifests itself in 
people’s daily lives and their moral discourse.  
           Potential future research could also expand on this thesis’ findings by examining 
the relative importance of individualising and binding moral domains on people’s moral 
identity. In this thesis, I examined the importance of both these moral domains on 
people’s moral identities in British and Saudi cultural contexts. However, there is still a 
question regarding people who face a situation where they have to prioritise one moral 
foundation over another. Such a situation is likely to be found in collectivistic societies 
rather than individualistic ones because people in collectivistic contexts tend to have 
various moral concerns, e.g., being kind and fair, as well as obedient and religious. By 
this token, it can be suggested that the more people are inclusive in terms of 
incorporating various moral foundations into their moral self, the more they face such 
situations where there are incompatibilities or clashes between moral foundations 
(Sverdlik et al., 2011). To give an example, in a culture where honour is very important, 
punishing someone who defies the cultural honour-code would be desirable, the same 
going for cultures where duties and societal traditions have priority over individuals’ 
rights (Sverdlik al., 2011).  In these instances, how would people perceive their moral 
identity and behaviour? Such conflict between diverse moral domains is perhaps one of 
the factors that can explain the low-effect size of the relationship between moral identity 
and moral behaviour in collectivist cultures. This is an important direction for future 
research. 
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8.6 A final thought 
         No one can claim that American college students or western, educated, 
industrialised, rich and democratic people (WEIRD), who form the majority of the 
research samples in psychology studies, are truly representative of humanity (Henrich 
et al., 2010). Moral individualising concerns have long been the traditional focus of 
moral psychology (Nilsson, Erlandsson, & Västfjäll, 2016) including moral identity 
research.   
         My thesis questions the normative account of moral identity and demonstrates that 
moral identity content is more diverse than has been assumed by the WEIRD-ness of 
moral identity research. Throughout this thesis, I have argued and demonstrated that 
moral identity content is not exclusively about caring and fairness concerns. 
Accordingly, it is important that researchers who investigate moral identity do not 
dismiss the other moral concerns that form people’s moral identity, such as those that 
are morally binding. 
         It has been argued that conducting cross-cultural research is not merely about 
establishing that the findings of Western samples are not replicable in non-western 
cultures; it is more about examining various constructs and theorisations that were 
originally developed and tested in Western societies, specifically American society (An 
& Trafimow, 2014; Arnett, 2008). The findings in this thesis demonstrate that people in 
British and Saudi cultures do base their moral identity on individual moral domains. 
However, conducting research into moral identity with the exclusive lens of such 
normative or universal moral concerns such as fairness and caring risks, masks the 
complete and inclusive story of moral identity in relation to how people may draw on 
other moral domains along with the individual ones, that are deemed to be important 
attributes of a moral person. 
         Finally, and because research on moral identity will likely continue to thrive, and 
that research on the role of culture on moral identity is still in its infancy, there are 
promising avenues for future research in the field of psychology. It is my hope that my 
thesis elicits more studies and is a step on the path towards further research in moral 
identity in relation to culture, as there is still much to learn about moral identity in 
relation to cultural contexts beyond the “liberal WEIRD moral framework” (Haidt, 
2013, p. 289). 
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   Appendix A. Study 1, moral traits free-listed by British sample (N = 80) 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
 
     Moral traits    %           Moral traits     %         Moral traits % 
1 Honest 49 21 Stand up for what 
they believe in 
6 41 Sincere 1 
2 Caring 43 22 Unselfish 6 42 Patient 1 
3 Kind 29 23 Genuine 4 43 Ethical 1 
4 Helpful 25 24 Supportive 4 44 Protective 1 
5 Fair 24 25 Having moral 
values  
4 45 Thinking about 
others’ needs 
1 
6 Considerate 20 26 Not committing 
crimes 
4 46 Believing in equality 1 
7 Open-minded  19 27 Friendly 4 47 Righteous 1 
8 Selfless  16 28 Conscious 4 48 Democratic 1 
9 Knowing what 
is right and what 
is wrong 
15 29 Understanding 3 49 Not abusing animals 1 
10 Unbiased 14 30 Generous 3 50 Caring about animals 1 
11 Sympathetic 13 31 Trustful 3 51 Not prejudiced 1 
12 Empathetic 13 32 Thoughtful 3 52 Resilient 1 
13 Trustworthy 10 33 Grateful 3 53 Wise 1 
14 Not judgmental 10 34 Chartable 3 54 Affectionate 1 
15 Respectful 10 35 Loyal 3 55 Knowledgeable 1 
16 Harmless 9 36 Polite 3 56 Ambitious 1 
17 Law-abiding 9 37 Independent 1 57 Passionate 1 
18 Appreciative 8 38 Having personal 
values 
1 58 Respectful of other 
people’s beliefs 
1 
19 Just   8 39 Loving 1 59 Mature 1 
20 Compassionate  8 40 Thinking about 
their actions 
1    
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Appendix A. (continued).  Study 1, moral traits free-listed by Saudi sample (N = 80) 
 
  
 Moral traits %  Moral traits %  Moral traits % 
1 Respectful  58 20 Assuming good 
intentions in others 
5 39 Flexible 1 
2 Honest 39 21 Avoiding 
Selfishness 
4 40 Easy going 1 
3 Truthful 24 22 Wishing good 
things to others 
4 41 Not envious 1 
4 Caring 21 23 Having religious 
faith  
4 42 Treating others 
as you want to be 
treated 
1 
5 Religious 16 24 Following roles 4 43 Treating people in a 
good way even if 
they are poor 
1 
6 Forgiving 15 25 Generous 4 44 Responsible 1 
7 Fearing God 13 26 Frank 3 45 Doing good things 
for others with no 
thoughts of any 
reward 
1 
8 Appreciative 13 27 Loving others 3 46 Following Islamic 
roles 
1 
9 Helpful 13 28 Not lying to others 3 47 Performing regular 
prayers 
1 
10 Cooperative 9 29 Courageous 3 48 Treating people in a 
good way 
1 
11 Humble 9 30 Patient 3 49 Representing our 
society in a good 
way 
1 
12 Following 
religious 
principles 
9 31 Considering 1 50 Being good with 
people 
1 
13 Kind 9 32 Trying to excuse 
people’s behaviours 
1 51 Having good heart 1 
14 Loving for 
people what you 
love for yourself 
9 33 Avoiding bad 
words 
1 52 Humanitarian 1 
15 Accepting 
others 
7 34 Knowing God 1 53 There are no such 
certain moral traits 
1 
16 Following 
Prophet 
Mohamed 
7 35 Having a good soul 1 54 Listening to others 1 
17 Controlling self-
desires 
5 36 Sympathetic 1 55 Trying to have the 
best moralities 
1 
18 Having good 
manners 
5 37 Not arrogant 1 56 Passionate 1 
19 Smiling 5 38 Being a good 
Muslim 
1 57 Supportive 1 
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Appendix B – Copies of ethics approval for thesis studies (continued) 
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Appendix B – Copies of ethics approval for thesis studies (continued) 
 
Study 3 
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Appendix B – Copies of ethics approval for thesis studies (continued) 
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Appendix C – Study 1 Materials 
 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Please complete the following questions: 
1. What is your gender?  
 Male [  ] Female [   ]   
2-What is your nationality? 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. What age group do you belong to?  
18-21 [ ] 22-25 [   ] 26-29 [   ] 30-33 [   ] 34-37 [   ] 38-41 [   ] 42 or above [   ] 
4- What is your ethnic background?  
White British [ ] White Irish [   ] White Scottish [   ] White Welsh [   ]  
Any other White background [   ] Black American [   ] Black African [   ] Black 
Caribbean [   ] Any other Black background [   ] Indian [   ] Pakistani [   ] Bangladeshi 
[   ] Chinese [   ]  Arab[   ]  Any other Asian background [   ] 
Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
5-Which religious doctrines do you follow? 
 Christianity [   ] Islam [   ] Hinduism [   ] Buddhism [   ] Sikhism [   ] Judaism [   ] 
Non-religious [   ] Other [   ] (please specify): _____________ 
6- Please indicate your political orientation  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
liberal 
 
Slightly 
liberal 
 Moderate  
Slightly 
conservative 
 
Strongly 
conservative 
 
 
7. What university course are you studying? 
………………………………………………………………………. 
 
8. What year of your undergraduate degree are you in? 
   Second year [   ] Third year [   ] Fourth year [   ]  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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The Open-ended Question 
 
 
Please answer this question: 
 
Which qualities or traits do you think a moral person should have?  
You can list more than three points. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Demographic Information 
 Please complete the following questions: 
1. Your gender?  
    Male [   ] Female [   ] 
2- Your nationality? 
     [   ]British      [   ] Saudi     [   ] Others 
 
3. Your age? 
   _____________ 
 
4- Your ethnic background?  
 
White British [   ] White Irish [   ] White Scottish [   ] White Welsh [   ]  
Any other White background [   ] Black American [   ] Black African [   ] Black 
Caribbean [   ] Any other Black background [   ] Indian [   ] Pakistani [   ] Bangladeshi 
[   ] Chinese [   ]  Arab[   ]  Any other Asian background [   ] 
Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
5-How religious do you consider yourself to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely  Very  Somewhat  Little  
Not at all 
 
 
6- Do you consider yourself to be: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
liberal 
 
Slightly 
liberal 
 Moderate  
Slightly 
conservative 
 
Strongly 
conservative 
 
 
7. What is your occupation? _____________  
 
8. If you are a student, what do you study? _____________ 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Moral Identity Scale 
 
Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. 
Imagine how the person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what 
this person would be like, answer the following question. 
 
 (1-strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree) 
 
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics 
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.  
4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.  
5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
6. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.  
7. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as 
having these characteristics. 
8. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
9. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
10. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have  
     these characteristics. 
 
Perceived cultural importance scale  
Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
(1-strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree) 
1. These characteristics are important in British society. 
2. It is important that people in my society have these characteristics. 
3. These characteristics are important to a typical British Person. 
4. These characteristics represent what British people think a moral person is like. 
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Demographic Information 
 Please complete the following questions: 
1. Your gender?  
    Male [   ] Female [   ] 
2- Your nationality? 
     [   ] British      [   ] Saudi     [   ] Others 
 
3. Your age? 
   _____________ 
 
4- Your ethnic background?  
 
White British [   ] White Irish [   ] White Scottish [   ] White Welsh [   ]  
Any other White background [   ] Black American [   ] Black African [   ] Black 
Caribbean [   ] Any other Black background [   ] Indian [   ] Pakistani [   ] Bangladeshi 
[   ] Chinese [   ]  Arab[   ]  Any other Asian background [   ] 
Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
5-How religious do you consider yourself to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely  Very  Somewhat  Little  
Not at all 
 
 
6- Do you consider yourself to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
liberal 
 
Slightly 
liberal 
 Moderate  
Slightly 
conservative 
 
Strongly 
conservative 
 
 
 
7. What is your occupation? _____________  
 
8. If you are a student, what do you study? ____ 
 
                                       (continued on next page) 
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Moral Identity scale 
1. Morality Variations Subscale 
To what extent are these traits important to your sense of yourself? 
Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
 
1. Caring about others  
2. Being kind                                                                                       
3. Being honest  
4. Treating others fairly. 
5. Being a just person                                                                    
6. Being open-minded 
7. Respecting other's personal choices and freedom  
8.Being loyal to your social group  
9.Being proud of your country                                                     
10. Being obedient.  
11. Conforming to the traditions of society  
12. Respecting your family traditions  
13. Showing respect for authority                                              
14. Respecting the social order  
15. Acting in a way that God would approve of. 
16. Being religious person.    
17. Conforming to the required purity standards of your society.    
18. Being a chaste person.                                                 
 
2. Morality Internalization Subscale 
Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
1 Being moral is an important part of my identity. 
2. I strongly desire to be a moral person. 
3. Being moral is not important to me. 
4. Being moral is an important reflection of who I am.   
                                       (continued on next page) 
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5. I am willing to make certain sacrifices in order to be moral person. 
6. I will feel most fulfilled by being a moral individual.  
7. Being a moral person is not a priority for me. 
8. Being moral has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
9. I perceive myself to be a moral person. 
10. Being a moral person is one of many aspects that make up my identity.   
 
3. Morality Symbolization Subscale 
Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
1.I value morality when it comes to making decisions in my life 
2.Expressing my sense of morality to others is not important for me. 
3.I am constantly reflecting on my moral behaviour 
4.1. I am willing to put time and effort into reflecting my sense of morality to others. 
5. Whenever possible, I try to behave morally 
 
4. Moral External Motivations Subscale 
 
-Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
         [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
 
1. I strive to be a moral person because I want to impress other people 
2. I strive to be a moral person to avoid any punishments.  
3. I strive to be a moral person because I am a religious person.  
4. I strive to be a moral person for my family. 
5. I strive to be a moral person for my society. 
 
                                        
(continued on next page) 
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Aquino & Reed’s Moral Identity scale 
 
Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind. 
 The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. 
Imagine how the person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what 
this person would be like, answer the following question. 
Likert scale (1-strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree) 
 
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics 
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.  
4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.  
5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
6. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.  
7. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as 
having these characteristics. 
8. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
9. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
10. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics. 
 
Self-Worth Scale, Virtue subscale  
 
 
Please respond to each of the following statements by clicking your answer using the 
scale from "1 = Strongly disagree" to "7 = Strongly agree.” If you haven't experienced 
the situation described in a particular statement, please answer how you think you 
would feel if that situation occurred. 
 
1. Doing something I know is wrong makes me lose my self-respect. 
2. Whenever I follow my moral principles, my sense of self-respect gets a boost 
3. I could not respect myself if I did not live up to a moral code. 
4. My self-esteem would suffer if I did something unethical. 
5. My self-esteem depends on whether or not I follow my moral/ethical principles. 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using 
this scale: 
      [0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with  
               my judgments of right and wrong) 
         [1] = not very relevant 
            [2] = slightly relevant 
                [3] = somewhat relevant 
                   [4] = very relevant 
                      [5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when 
I judge right and wrong) 
______1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
______2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
______5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______6. Whether or not someone was good at math 
______7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
______11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______12. Whether or not someone was cruel 
______13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
______16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
 
 
Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Scale (CADS) 
The following sentences express standards that different people may have when 
judging something as morally right or morally wrong.  When YOU are judging 
something as MORALLY RIGHT, to what extent is each of the following standards 
important to your judgment? 
 
When judging an act as morally RIGHT, I consider this standard. 
 
(continued on next page) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
important 
Not 
important 
Not very 
important 
More or 
less 
important 
Important Very 
important 
Of the 
Utmost 
Importance 
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If you think that the standard is not at all important in your judgment, write the number 
1 in the space provided before the sentence. If you think that the sentence is more or 
less important, write the number 4, and so on. 
 
1. It is a religious tradition. 
2. By doing it, the person gains respect from the family. 
3. It follows nature's law. 
4. It is a customary practice of the community. 
5. It allows a person to defend herself/ himself. 
6. It expresses someone's autonomy. 
7. It is socially accepted. 
8. It is God's will. 
9. By doing it, the person gains respect from society. 
10. It is socially approved. 
11. It respects the natural order. 
12. It respects family traditions. 
13. It is in accordance with the scriptures. 
14. It expresses personal choice and liberty. 
15. It respects someone's privacy. 
16. It is in accordance with religious authority. 
17. It follows the rules of one's social group. 
18. People will gain God's approval from it. 
19. It is in accordance with true faith. 
20. It is accepted by the family. 
21. People respect the social order. 
22. It protects someone's interests and needs 
 
Religious Orientation Scale  
Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
  
 
 
 
       
Intrinsic items 
1. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.  
2. Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being. 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
disagree 
234 
 
Appendix E – Study 3 Materials (continued) 
 
 
3. The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as 
those said by me during services. 
4. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and 
meditation. 
5. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
6. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the 
meaning of life. 
7. I read literature about faith (or church).  
8. If I were to join a church group, I would prefer to join a Bible Study group or (2) a 
social fellowship. 
9. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church.  
Extrinsic items 
1. The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships. 
2. The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.  
3. What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike. 
4. It doesn’t matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life.  
5. Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations influence 
my everyday affairs. 
6. I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.  
7. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social 
activity. 
8. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to 
protect my social and economic well-being. 
9. The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.  
10. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in 
my life. 
11. Religion helps to keep my life balanced and steady in exactly the same way as my 
citizenship, friendships, and other memberships do. 
12. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to 
establish a person in the community. 
 
 
Altruism scale 
 
Using the following scale, please select the category that conforms to the frequency 
with which you have carried out the following acts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Once More than 
once 
Often Very often 
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1) I have helped push a stranger's car that was broken down or out of gas. 
2) I have given directions to a stranger. 
3) I have made change for a stranger. 
4) I have given money to a charity. 
5) I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it). 
6) I have donated goods or clothes to a charity. 
7) I have done volunteer work for a charity. 
8) I have donated blood. 
9) I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, parcels, etc). 
10) I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger. 
11) I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (in the supermarket,  
      at a copy machine, at a fast-food restaurant). 
12) I have given a stranger a lift in my car. 
13) l have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging 
me for an item. 
14) I have let a neighbour whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value 
to me (e.g., a dish, tools, etc). 
15) I have bought 'charity' holiday cards deliberately because I knew it was a good 
cause. 
16) I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with an assignment when 
my knowledge was greater than his or hers. 
17) I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbour’s pets or children 
without being paid for it. 
18) I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street. 
19) I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing. 
20) I have helped an acquaintance to move households. 
 
 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do 
you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next 
to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I see Myself as Someone Who... 
 
(continued on next page) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
A little 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree 
little 
Agree 
strongly 
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____1. Is talkative                                                                        ____23. Tends to be lazy 
____2. Tends to find fault with others                                         ____24. Is emotionally stable,  
                                                                                                          not easily upset      
____3. Does a thorough job                                                          ____25. Is inventive 
____4. Is depressed, blue                                                             ____26. Has an assertive  
                                                                                                                   personality 
____5. Is original, comes up with new ideas                                 ____27. Can be cold and aloof 
____6. Is reserved                                                                ____28. Perseveres until the             
task is finished 
____7. Is helpful and unselfish with others                                ____29. Can be moody 
  ____8. Can be somewhat careless                                                ____30. Values artistic, 
                                                                                                                  aesthetic experiences 
____9. Is relaxed, handles stress well                                     ____31. Is sometimes shy, 
inhibited 
____10. Is curious about many different things                       ____32. Is considerate and kind 
to almost everyone 
____11. Is full of energy                                                                ____33. Does things efficiently 
____12. Starts quarrels with others                                            ____34. Remains calm in tense 
situations 
____13. Is a reliable worker                                                         ____35. Prefers work that is 
routine 
____14. Can be tense                                                                    ____36. Is outgoing, sociable 
____15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker                                            ____37. Is sometimes rude to 
others 
____16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm                                    ___38. Makes plans and follows 
through with them 
____17. Has a forgiving nature                                                    ____39. Gets nervous easily 
____18. Tends to be disorganized                                                ____40. Likes to reflect, play 
with ideas 
____19. Worries a lot                                                                  ____41. Has few artistic  
____20. Has an active imagination                                              ____42. Likes to cooperate  
____21. Tends to be quiet                                                            ____43. Is easily distracted 
____22. Is generally trusting                                                        ___44. Is sophisticated in art, 
music, or literature 
 
(continued on next page) 
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The Auckland Individualism-Collectivism Scale 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to find out how you think or behave in regard to 
yourself and to groups to which you belong.  Please read the following questions and 
answer each question by indicating how often you would think or behave as described 
in each of the following. 
 
Never or almost, Rarely, Occasionally, Other, Very Often, Always. 
 
1 I define myself as a competitive person. 
2 I enjoy being unique and different from others 
3 Before I make a major decision, I seek advice from people close to me 
4 Even when I strongly disagree with my group members, I avoid an argument. 
5 I consult with superiors on work-related matters. 
6 I believe that competition is a law of nature. 
7 I prefer competitive rather than non-competitive recreational activities 
8 Before taking a major trip, I consult with my friends. 
9 I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. 
10 I consider my friends' opinions before taking important actions 
11 I like to be accurate when I communicate. 
12 I consider myself as a unique person separate from others. 
13 It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision 
14 Without competition, I believe, it is not possible to have a good society.  
15 I ask the advice of my friends before making career related decisions 
16 I prefer using indirect language rather than upsetting my friends by telling them 
directly what they may not like to hear. 
17 It is important for me to act as an independent person. 
18 I discuss job or study-related problems with my parents/ partner 
19 I take responsibility for my own actions. 
20 I do not reveal my thoughts when it might initiate a dispute 
21 I try to achieve better grades than my peers 
22 My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. 
23 I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. 
24 I consult my family before making an important decision. 
25 Winning is very important to me 
26 I see myself as “my own person” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire 
Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and rate how 
frequently you feel or act in the manner described.  Circle your answer on the response 
form.  There are no right or wrong answers or trick questions.  Please answer each 
question as honestly as you can.  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
 
NO. 
Items 
 
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
 
Always 
1. When someone else is feeling 
excited, I tend to get excited too  
0 1 2 3 4 
2. Other people's misfortunes do not 
disturb me a great deal  
0 1 2 3 4 
3. It upsets me to see someone being 
treated disrespectfully  
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I remain unaffected when someone 
close to me is happy  
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I enjoy making other people feel 
better  
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I have tender, concerned feelings 
for people less fortunate than me  
0 1 2 3 4 
7. When a friend starts to talk about 
his\her problems, I try to steer the 
conversation towards  
something else  
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I can tell when others are sad even 
when they do not say anything 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I find that I am "in tune" with other 
people's moods 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I do not feel sympathy for people 
who cause their own serious 
illnesses  
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I become irritated when someone 
cries  
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I am not really interested in how 
other people feel 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I get a strong urge to help when I 
see someone who is upset 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. When I see someone being treated 
unfairly, I do not feel very much 
pity for them 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I find it silly for people to cry out 
of happiness  
0 1 2 3 4 
16. When I see someone being taken 
advantage of, I feel kind of 
protective towards him\her 
0 1 2 3 4 
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The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Please indicate the extent to you think the following statements truly describe you. Rate 
your reaction to each statement by writing a number to the left of each statement 
showing that you: 
 
1 ------------ 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
Not True                                 Somewhat True                                        Very True 
1) ____ I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. (SDE) 
2) ____ I never cover up my mistakes. (IM) 
3) ____ I always know why I like things. (SDE) 
4) ____ I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. (IM) 
5) ____ The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. (SDE) 
6) ____ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. (IM) 
7) ____ I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. (SDE) 
8) ____ I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. (IM) 
9) ____ When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. (SDE) 
10) ____ I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. (IM) 
11) ____ It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. (SDE) 
12) ____ I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him (her). (IM) 
13) ____ I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. (SDE) 
14) ____ I always declare everything at customs. (IM) 
15) ____ It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. (SDE) 
16) ____ My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. (SDE) 
17) ____ I have some pretty awful habits. (IM) 
18) ____ I don’t gossip about other people’s business. (IM) 
19) ____ I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. (SDE) 
20) ____ I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. (IM) 
21) ____ I never swear. (IM) 
22) ____ My parents were not always fair when they punished me. (SDE) 
23) ____ I sometimes tell lies if I have to. (IM) 
24) ____ I rarely appreciate criticism. (SDE) 
25) ____ I am a completely rational person. (SDE) 
26) ____ I am fully in control of my own fate. (SDE) 
27) ____ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (IM) 
28) ____ It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. (SDE) 
29) ____ I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. (IM) 
30) ____ I have never dropped litter on the street. (IM) 
31) ____ Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. (SDE)  
32) ____ When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. (IM) 
33) ____ I am very confident of my judgments. (SDE) 
34) ____ I never regret my decisions. (SDE) 
35) ____ I never take things that don’t belong to me. (IM) 
36) ____ I have not always been honest with myself. (SDE) 
37) ____ I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. (IM) 
38) ____ I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. (SDE) 
39) ____ When I was young I sometimes stole things. (IM) 
40) ____ I never read sexy books or magazines. (IM) 
 *SDE Self-Deceptive Enhancement.  
 * IM Impression Management 
(continued on next page) 
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Self-Report Psychopathy Scale  
 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please read the 
following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
  
 
 
NO 
 
Items 
D
is
a
g
r
e
e 
N
e
u
tr
a
l 
 
A
g
r
ee
 
 
1 Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about the losers.         
2 I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time.          
3 For me, what's right is whatever I can get away with.          
4 I am often bored.          
5 In today's world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to 
succeed.       
   
6 I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time.          
7 My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can.          
8 I don't plan anything very far in advance.          
9 Making a lot of money is my most important goal.          
10 I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.          
11 I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the bottom 
line.       
   
12 Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don't understand 
me.       
   
13 People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve it.          
14 Before I do anything, I carefully consider the possible consequences.          
15 Looking out for myself is my top priority.          
16 I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people.          
17 I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I want them 
to do.       
   
18 When I get frustrated, I often "let off steam" by blowing my top.          
19 I would be upset if my success came at someone else's expense.          
20 Love is overrated.          
21 I often admire a really clever scam.          
22 I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my goals.          
23 I enjoy manipulating other people's feelings.          
24 I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone else to feel emotional pain.          
25 Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn't lie about it.          
26 Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others.          
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Negative Reciprocity Norms 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you think the following statements truly describe 
you. Rate your reaction to each statement by writing a number next to each of the 
following statements: 
            1 ------------ 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
Not True for me                                                                                               Very True 
for me 
 
 
Moral attentiveness scale 
Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
1) strongly agree, 2) disagree, 3) somewhat disagree, 4) neutral, 5) somewhat agree, 6) agree, 7) 
strongly agree 
 
1.In a typical day, I face several ethical dilemmas. 
2. I often have to choose between doing what’s right and doing something that’s wrong. 
3.I regularly face decisions that have significant ethical implications. 
4. My life was being filled with one moral predicament after another. 
5. Many of the decisions that I make have ethical dimensions to them 
6. I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions. 
7. I think about the morality of my actions almost every day. 
8. I rarely face ethical dilemmas. 
9. I frequently encounter ethical situations. 
10. I often find myself pondering about ethical issues. 
11. I often reflect on the moral aspects of my decisions. 
12. I like to think about ethics.                                                       (continued on next page) 
 
 
NO. 
 
Items 
R
a
ti
n
g
 
1 If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take my revenge as soon as possible, no matter 
what the costs 
 
2 I am willing to invest time and effort to reciprocate an unfair action  
3 I am kind and nice if others behave well with me, otherwise it’s tit-for-tat  
4 If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her  
5 If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back  
6 If someone is unfair to me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of 
accepting his/her apologies 
 
7 I would not do a favour for somebody who behaved badly with me, even if it meant 
foregoing some personal gains 
 
8 If somebody is impolite to me, I become impolite  
9 The way I treat others depends much on how they treat me  
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   The Attitudes Toward Self 
   For each statement below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with it: 
   1)I disagree a lot, 2) I disagree a little, 3) I neither agree nor disagree, 4) I agree a    
    little 5) I agree a lot.  
 
1.Compared to other people, I expect a lot from myself. 
2. When even one thing goes wrong I begin to wonder if I can do well at anything at all. 
3. I get angry with myself if my efforts don not lead to the results I wanted. 
4. When it comes to setting standards for my behaviour, I aim higher than most people. 
5. I hardly ever let unhappiness over one bad time influence my feelings about other  
    parts of my life 
6. When I don’t do as well as I hoped to, I often get upset with myself. 
7. I set higher goals for myself than other people seem to. 
8. If I notice one fault of mine, it makes me think about my other faults. 
9. I get unhappy with anything less than what I expected of myself. 
10. A single failure can change me from feeling OK to seeing only the bad in myself. 
 
Social Interaction Anxiety  
  For each question, please indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is    
characteristic or true of you. 
   0) not at all, 1) slightly, 2) moderately, 3) very, 4) extremely. 
1.I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority (teacher, boss). 
2.I have difficulty making eye- Contact with others. 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work with. 
5. I find it easy to make friends of my own age 
6. I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance in the street. 
7. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one other person. 
9. I am at ease meeting people at parties. 
10. I have difficulty talking with other. 
11.I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view 
14. I have difficulty talking to attractive persons of the opposite sex. 
15. I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in social situations. 
16. I am nervous mixing with people that I don’t know well. 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be ignored. 
19.I am tense mixing in a group 
20. am unsure whether to greet Someone I know only slightly 
(continued on next page) 
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General Self-Efficacy Scale 
Please rate each statement using this scale: 
1 = Not at all true 2 = Hardly true 3 = Moderately true 4 = Exactly true Items.  
 
1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough  
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.  
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.  
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.  
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.  
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort 
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities. 8. 
When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.  
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution  
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.  
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Demographic Information 
 Please complete the following questions: 
1. Your gender?  
    Male [   ] Female [   ]   Other [   ]    
2- Your nationality? 
     [   ] British      [   ] Saudi     [   ] Other 
 
3. Your age? 
   _____________ 
 
4- Your ethnic background?  
 
White British [   ] White Irish [   ] White Scottish [   ] White Welsh [   ]  
Any other White background [   ] Black American [   ] Black African [   ] Black 
Caribbean [   ] Any other Black background [   ] Indian [   ] Pakistani [   ] Bangladeshi 
[   ] Chinese [   ]  Arab[   ]  Any other Asian background [   ] 
Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
5-How religious do you consider yourself to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at 
all 
 
A 
little 
 Somewhat  Very  
Extremely 
 
 
6- Do you consider yourself to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
liberal 
 
Slightly 
liberal 
 Moderate  
Slightly 
conservative 
 
Strongly 
conservative 
 
 
 
7. What is your occupation? _____________  
 
8. If you are a student, what do you study? ____ 
 
(continued on next page) 
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The Developed Moral Identity scale 
 
-These statements describe different moral concerns or characteristics. How true is each 
of   these statements for you? Please rate each statement using the following scale: 
                  1 -------- 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
  Not at all  
True for me                                                                                                   Very True for 
me 
  
1. Caring about others  
2. Being kind                                                                                       
3. Being honest.    
4. Treating others fairly.  
5. Being a just person                                                                    
6. Being open-minded.  
7. Being loyal to your social group  
8. Being proud of your country                                                     
9. Being obedient.  
10. Conforming to the traditions of my society  
11. Respecting your family traditions  
12. Showing respect for authority                                              
13. Respecting the social order  
14. Acting in a way that God would approve of. 
15. Being a religious person.  
16. Conforming to the purity standards of my society.  
17. Being a chaste person.     
18. Conforming to the sexual norms of my society.                                                    
 
-Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly     
Agree 
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1 Being moral is an important part of my identity. 
2. I strongly desire to be a moral person. 
3. Being moral is not important to me. 
4. Being moral is an important reflection of who I am.  
5. I am willing to make certain sacrifices in order to be moral person. 
6. I will feel most fulfilled by being a moral individual.  
7. Being a moral person is not a priority for me. 
8. Being moral has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
9. I perceive myself to be a moral person. 
10. Being a moral person is one of many aspects that make up my identity.   
 
 
-Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
1 2 3 4      5 
Strongly  
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly     
Agree 
 
.  
1. I strive to be a moral person because I want to impress other people 
2. I strive to be a moral person to avoid any punishments.  
3. I strive to be a moral person because I am a religious person.  
4. I strive to be a moral person for my family. 
5. I strive to be a moral person for my society. 
 
Aquino & Reed’s Moral Identity scale 
Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind. 
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. 
Imagine how the person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what 
this person would be like, answer the following question. 
Likert scale (1-strongly disagree, 5- strongly agree) 
 
1.It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics 
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2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.  
4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.  
5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
6. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.  
7. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as 
having these characteristics. 
8. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
9. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
10. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics. 
 
The circle of moral regard scale  
To what extent do you believe that you have ‘a moral or ethical obligation to show 
concern for the welfare and interests’ of the following groups: 
5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (absolutely no obligation) to5(very strong 
obligation) 
  -People from another country 
  -Strangers. 
  -People who practice a different religion than you. 
  -People of different ethnicities than you. 
  -People of a different gender than you. 
  -People who hold different moral views than you.  
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Donations intentions scale 
Imagine that you won the £20 Amazon prize draw. Below is a list of social charities 
that you may or may not have heard of.  Don't worry if you have not heard of them.  
How much money do you think you would be willing to donate for the following 
charities? 
1. 0 
2. £ 5 
3. £10 
4. £15 
5. £ 20 
- (To Be Diverse): This charity helps foreign workers to adjust and to fight the 
discriminations against them. 
- (Women Empowerment Charity): This charity is dedicated to empowering women 
and raising their status. 
- (Interfaith Dialogue): This charity has been established to advance the dialogue 
amongst different religions.  
 
Old -fashion and Modern prejudice towards Foreign workers scale 
 Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
Response scale is 1, strongly agree, to 5, strongly disagree  
Old-Fashion Prejudice 
1. Foreign workers are generally not as smart as British people.    
2. Generally speaking, I favor full integration of foreign workers.  
3. It is a bad idea for foreign workers and British people to marry one another.   
4. If a family of foreign workers with about the same income and education as I have 
moved next door, I would mind it a great deal.  
Modern Racism  
1.Discrimination against foreign workers is no longer a problem in the United 
Kingdom. 
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2. It is easy to understand the anger of foreign workers in the United Kingdom.   
3. Foreign workers are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.  
4. Foreign workers should not push themselves where they are not wanted. 
5. Over the past few years, foreign workers have gotten more economically than they 
deserve.  
6. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect 
to foreign workers then they deserve.  
 
The ambivalent Sexism Scale  
Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in 
contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with 
each statement using the following scale: Response scale is: 0 disagree strongly; 1 
disagree somewhat; 2 disagree slightly; 3 agree slightly ;4 agree somewhat; 5 agree 
strongly.  
1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he 
has the love of a woman.  
2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor 
them over men, under the guise of asking for ‘equality’.  
3. In a disaster, women ought not necessarily to be rescued before men.  
4. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.  
5. Women are too easily offended.  
6. People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a 
member of the other sex.  
7. Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.  
8. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.  
9. Women should be cherished and protected by men.  
10. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.  
11. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.  
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12. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.  
13. Men are complete without women.  
14. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.  
15. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on  
      a tight leash.  
16. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain 
      about being discriminated against.  
17. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.  
18. There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming 
sexually available and then refusing male advances.  
19. Women, compared to men, tend to have superior moral sensibility.  
20. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing in order to provide 
financially for the women in their lives.  
21. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.  
22. Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and 
good taste.  
-Hostile Sexism Score: 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21.  
-Benevolent Sexism: 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22.  
 
Interreligious Prejudice Scale  
Please answer the following questions:  
 -Would you like to have members of Muslims group as: 
  Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like)  
 a) Your neighbor. 
 b) Your boss. 
 c) Your friend.  
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-Would you like to have members of Jews group as: 
  Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like)  
 a) Your neighbor. 
 b) Your boss. 
 c) Your friend.  
 
-Would you like to have members of atheists group as: 
  Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like)  
 a) Your neighbor. 
 b) Your boss. 
 c) Your friend.  
 
Moral Prejudice Scale  
 Please answer the following question:  
-Would you like to have someone who holds different moral principles/views  
  than you as: 
  Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = totally dislike to 7 = totally like)  
 a) Your neighbor. 
 b) Your boss. 
c) Your friend.  
 
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Please indicate the extent to you think the following statements truly describe you 
1 ------------ 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
Not True                                 Somewhat True                                        Very True 
1) ____ I have not always been honest with myself.  
2) ____ I always know why I like things.  
3) ____ It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.  
4) ____ I never regret my decisions.  
5) ____ I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough.  
6) ____ I am a completely rational person.  
7) ____ I am very confident of my judgments.  
8) ____ I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.  
9) ____ I sometimes tell lies if I have to.  
10) ____ I never cover up my mistakes.  
11) ____ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.  
12) ____ I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.  
13) ____ I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
14) ____ When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.  
15) ____ I never take things that don’t belong to me.  
16) ____ I don’t gossip about other people’s business.  
 
